18 July 2006

TD Ameritrade Q3 2006 Earnings

  
BMO Capital Markets, 18 July 2006

TD Ameritrade (40% owned by TD Bank) reported strong EPS and raised guidance for 2007. EPS in the quarter were US$0.23 up 28% from a year ago and marginally ahead of forecasts. Solid fee revenues and better cost control offset somewhat weaker commission revenues. In addition, AMTD increased guidance for 2007 to reflect higher expected margins on balances and tight cost control. Overall, these were positive results and suggest that the benefits of the integration of Waterhouse and Ameritrade are larger than initially expected. This is despite the fact that trades per day in June and the start of July are 25% less than in April and May. We estimate that, when translated into TD’s cash earnings, AMTD will contribute about $60 million this quarter, ahead of the $39 million reported in TD’s second quarter (and $53 million if the second quarter was adjusted to include a full quarter of AMTD). It is noteworthy that TD’s share of AMTD and BNK now each contribute about $60 million to TD’s quarterly cash earnings, which are roughly $850 million. We believe that TD shares are very good value at current levels. Canadian operations are performing well and the balance sheet is strong. In the U.S., BNK is underachieving but AMTD is ahead of plan.
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Bloomberg, 18 July 2006

TD Ameritrade Holding Corp. was raised to outperform from market perform by analyst Matt Snowling at Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co. The price target is $21.00 per share.
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AP, Josh Funk, 18 July 2006

Online brokerage TD Ameritrade Holding Corp. said Tuesday its third-quarter profit soared 67 percent on higher fee-based revenue and its acquisition of TD Waterhouse. The company's shares zoomed more than 6 percent in response.

The company also tightened its guidance for fiscal 2006 and raised its forecast for the following year. Ameritrade shares rose 87 cents to $14.51 in late morning trading, but the stock remains near the low end of a 52-week range of $13.30 to $26.37.

Ameritrade reported earnings grew to $139.8 million, or 23 cents per share, during the quarter that ended June 30, from $83.6 million, or 20 cents per share, a year ago.

Total revenue more than doubled, to $540.3 million from $234.4 million a year earlier. At the same time, expenses ballooned to $307.3 million from $97.5 million. The company said revenue from managing accounts for clients was nearly 60 percent of total revenue.

"Despite a decline in investor activity in June, we realized a record quarter, thanks in part to an increase in asset-based revenues," said Joe Moglia, Ameritrade's chief executive.

The Omaha-based company's net earnings per share of about 23 cents also exceeded what Wall Street had forecast. Analysts surveyed by Thomson Financial on average expected earnings per share of 22 cents on $544 million of revenue.

Ameritrade's results this year have been helped by its acquisition of TD Waterhouse's U.S. retail securities business. The deal closed in January.

Last month, some TD Waterhouse customers had trouble accessing Ameritrade's online trading platform for several days after new security measures were added, but Moglia said those problems did not significantly affect earnings.

Moglia says the company continues to work on completing the integration of TD Waterhouse to help the company grow in the long-term investor segment.

Previously, the company said it planned to close two of its five call centers as part of the merger and keep centers in Omaha and in Fort Worth, Texas.

Moglia said Tuesday that Ameritrade has now decided to keep its Yorkview, Canada, call center open for at least the next two years to help ensure good customer service. But even with the additional call center, Moglia said, the company still expects to save about $378 million in annual expenses once the integration is completed.

"We're investing in (fiscal) '06 and '07 to make sure we are stronger in '08," Moglia said.

Lauren Bender, an analyst with Boston-based Celent, said this quarter's results show that Ameritrade is becoming more than an online brokerage.

"The April-June results show that the merger of TD Waterhouse and Ameritrade has created a brokerage firm that is well-positioned to compete head-on for retail investors' trading and investment activity," Bender said.

Analyst Howard Chen, with Credit Suisse First Boston, said in a research note that he believes Ameritrade will have significant earning power once the Waterhouse integration is completed even though the short-term market outlook "remains choppy." Chen's one-year price target for the stock is $23.

Moglia said it's too soon to tell how the company's new $9.99-per-trade pricing, announced in April, will affect the business long term, but the initial response has been positive.

Ameritrade reported handling 252,784 trades a day on average during the third quarter, which is down from the 254,382 trades a day it handled during the second quarter.

And average client margin balances grew from roughly $6.8 billion in the second quarter to $7.9 billion in the third quarter.

The company narrowed its guidance for fiscal 2006 earnings to a range of 94 cents to $1, or between 87 cents and 93 cents when a one-time gain from the sale of its investment in Knight Capital Group Inc. is excluded. Previously, the company had forecast earnings in a range of 85 cents to $1.03.

Ameritrade raised its earnings projections for fiscal 2007 to a range of 99 cents to $1.21 per share, up from an earlier estimate of 94 cents to $1.18.

Analysts are expecting a profit of 90 cents in fiscal 2006 and $1.20 in fiscal 2007.
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Bloomberg, 18 July 2006

TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., the third-biggest online brokerage, said profit jumped 67 percent in the first full quarter since its $1.3 billion purchase of TD Waterhouse USA.

Net income in the fiscal third quarter ended June 30 rose to $139.8 million, or 23 cents a share, from $83.6 million, or 20 cents, a year earlier, the Omaha, Nebraska-based company said today in a statement. Revenue more than doubled to a record $540.3 million.

Chief Executive Officer Joseph Moglia is relying on the 2.25 million customer accounts acquired with TD Waterhouse USA to help maintain profit growth after the stock market declined for the first time in five quarters. Average client trades per day jumped 82 percent from a year earlier.

"We continue to believe post-integration TD Ameritrade earnings power is significant," said Howard Chen, a New York- based analyst at Credit Suisse Group, in a note to investors today.

Ameritrade shares rose after the company raised its earnings forecast for next year to between 99 cents and $1.21 from an earlier target of 95 cents to $1.17. It lowered the top end of this year's forecast to $1 from $1.06. Shares of the company jumped 75 cents, or 5.5 percent, to $14.39 at 11:18 a.m. in composite trading on the Nasdaq Stock Market.

Market Drop

On a per-share basis, the results matched the 23-cent estimate of Sandler O'Neill & Partners analyst Richard Repetto, ranked the most-accurate forecaster of the company's earnings by StarMine Inc. Based on the average of 12 analysts' estimates, the company was expected to earn 22 cents, according to Thomson Financial.

Before today, concern that a prolonged drop in U.S. stocks would slow trading had pushed TD Ameritrade's stock price down 30 percent since Jan. 25, when the merger closed. The stock is the worst performer this year in the 12-member Amex Securities Broker/Dealer index. Competition with rivals including Charles Schwab Corp. and E*Trade Financial Corp. has forced the company, which now has about 6 million accounts, to slash commission rates to keep customers from defecting.

Ameritrade clients averaged 253,000 trades per day during the quarter, which while down from the second-quarter average of 254,000 was higher than the 139,000 average of the third quarter of 2005.

Computer Glitch

The company had computer problems that kept its clients from using its Web-based trading site for almost a week in June. The problems arose from the merging of login procedures for TD Waterhouse and Ameritrade customers.

Revenue from commissions and transaction fees almost doubled in the quarter to $213.2 million. Net interest revenue, or what the company earns from loaning cash and securities to clients to trade with, more than doubled to $199.4 million.

Earnings per share last quarter grew slower than total net income because the company, previously called Ameritrade Holding Corp., paid for the acquisition of TD Waterhouse USA by issuing 196.3 million of its own shares to the seller, Toronto-Dominion Bank.

The purchase, which helped diversify the company beyond its roots as a Web site for day-traders, increased a cost base that previously consisted mostly of computers and customer-service call centers. TD Waterhouse had a network of 143 brokerage branches, compared with Ameritrade's four, and 2,600 investment advisers, compared with 1,400.

Expenses

Total operating expenses last quarter more than tripled to $307.3 million. Employee compensation and benefits almost doubled to $213 million, a smaller increase than Sandler O'Neill's Repetto had expected.

Moglia has vowed to reduce fixed costs by an annual rate of $328 million, or more than 30 percent, by mid-2007. The company already has closed 44 branches and a call center in Jersey City, New Jersey. It chopped the number of employees to 4,100 as of March 31 from 4,500 when the acquisition closed.

TD Ameritrade has said it wants to reduce the workforce to 3,500.
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Sun Life Signs China Pension Deal

  
The Globe and Mail, Sinclair Stewart, 18 July 2006

Sun Life Financial Inc. has signed a deal to distribute pension products through one of China's largest state-owned banks, an arrangement that is believed to be the first of its kind for a foreign insurer.

The move will give Sun Life a head start in the race to cash in on "enterprise annuities," a fledgling market that is viewed as one of the fastest-growing opportunities in China's deregulating financial sector.

Enterprise annuities are essentially corporate pension policies, and resemble group retirement plans in Canada or 401K plans in the United States. The Chinese government handed out licences to about 15 fund managers last year enabling them to offer the product, and is hoping it will become sufficiently popular to stave off what some fear could be a retirement funding crisis for the country's aging population.

Currently, the entire market is only worth about $13-million, but that number is expected to boom to approximately $55-billion in the next four years, according to independent research cited by Sun Life.

That would far exceed China's $25-billion (U.S.) National Social Security Fund, which was created to help bridge pension shortfalls, and in the process provide another lucrative source of fees for fund managers.

"The government is very much encouraging corporations to form these programs to help support the pension reform," said Janet De Silva, president and CEO of Sun Life Everbright Life Insurance Co., the insurer's 50-50 joint venture with China Everbright Group Ltd.

The annuities will be sold through the group's banking arm, China Everbright Bank.

Ms. De Silva said the enterprise annuities business will be a "very significant" part of Sun Life's growth plans in the world's most populous country. In Canada, Sun Life has lobbied against allowing banks to sell insurance products through their branches, but has made use of these very channels to fuel its expansion in India and China. The insurer has maintained that these markets are different, since they don't have the same concentration of banking powers in only a few hands.

Sun Life is targeting a top-10 position among all life insurers in China -- right now it is in the top 15 -- and intends to have a presence in 50 cities by 2009. Right now it has offices in seven cities, including Beijing, Tianjin and Hangzhou.

Yet it is competing against larger, foreign-owned insurance rivals, as well as state-run financial colossuses that have hands in banking, insurance, asset management and brokerage services.

"In the Chinese market, the competition in the life insurance industry is very fierce," acknowledged Xu Bin, the chairman of Sun Life Everbright, and former head of China Everbright Bank. "In the future, I think, according to a Chinese saying, we should give full play to our strengths and avoid our weaknesses."

Mr. Xu Bin is spearheading a delegation of about 15 officials who are in Toronto for the joint venture's first board meeting on foreign soil, which will be held today. He maintained that one of Sun Life Everbright's advantages is that both partners are rooted in the financial sector, something that is not always the case when Western banks or insurers look to team up with Chinese enterprise.

China Everbright Group has assets of 550 billion yuan, or about $80-billion (Canadian), while China Everbright Bank is ranked as the 10th-largest player in the country.

Initially, Sun Life will push its pension products through the bank's network of 370 branches, and support the bank's annuity offerings. Eventually, the plan is for China Everbright Bank to distribute Sun Life's life and health insurance products as well.

Mr. Xu Bin, who is also a vice-chairman of the China Everbright Group parent company, said the bank is also preparing for an initial public offering of its shares.

Amid the gold rush to grab a piece of China's emerging financial sector, skeptics have voiced concerns about the quality of the banking industry's books and its corporate governance regime.

Mr. Xu Bin acknowledged that the joint venture is benefiting from Sun Life's greater breadth of experience, and said the board meeting in Toronto has provided a first-hand opportunity for some of his Chinese officials to see how the business functions in Canada.

"I think Canadian people are very easy-going," he said, insisting that he was not saying this for the benefit of Sun Life CEO Donald Stewart, who was seated beside him at a conference table.

"Sun Life has more than 100 years of history and have shown their financial strength . . . but in our corporation they treat us on an equal basis. They never say you should listen to me because I'm bigger and stronger than you."
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17 July 2006

Scotia Capital Preview of Insurance Co Q2 2006 Earnings

  
Scotia Capital, 17 July 2006

• Valuations, after a modest “correction,” are certainly more reasonable – macro environment modestly favourable – sector’s defensive characteristics provide support in uncertain markets – we continue to recommend market weight, leaning toward overweight should the correction continue. As we approach the Q2/06 earnings season, we are much more comfortable with the Canadian lifeco group’s valuation, which, after a modest and somewhat overdue “correction,” is now in line with historical averages. The correction has brought the valuation for the group relative to U.S. lifecos back closer to historical averages, with the premium (forward P/E) versus the U.S. lifecos declining from 15% to 10%, now closer to its three-year mean of 5%. The premium versus the Canadian banks, at 8% (forward P/E), has not changed in the last three months and remains well above its 2% three-year average. While we certainly believe a premium above historical levels is justified in a rising interest rate environment, and would add that a flattening yield curve environment is much less punitive to the lifecos than the banks, we see little catalyst in the lifeco group that would force the multiple to significantly increase versus the banks going forward. However, in our opinion, the Canadian lifeco sector’s defensive characteristics, specifically a consistent track record of negligible earnings surprises and significant excess capital positions that allow for share buybacks and dividend increases, do warrant a valuation premium, especially in these uncertain markets.

• We are much more comfortable with Canadian lifeco valuations, which, after a modest and somewhat overdue “correction,” are now in line with historical averages. After a modest “correction” in the Canadian lifecos’ forward multiple in the last three months (from a lofty 14.2x to a more reasonable 13.0x), in part attributable to a correction in the S&P/TSX (down 4% in the last three months) as well as some profit-taking on what were indeed stretched Canadian lifeco valuations, and in part attributable to a flattening yield curve putting some pressure on all financials, we now find the Canadian lifecos trading at their long-term average multiple of 13.0x NTM EPS (average from January 2000 to June 2006). Coincidently, the U.S. lifeco group, at 11.8x, is trading in line with its 15-year average level of 11.9x NTM EPS. Relative to the S&P 500, the Canadian lifeco forward multiple has now declined from a lofty 90% level three months ago (the highest level we’ve seen) to 86% of the S&P 500 forward multiple. While we like the trend, we point out that we are still well ahead of the historical mean of 68%, suggesting to us there may be better value in other sectors. Even the U.S lifeco group, which, at 11.8x, is 80% of the S&P 500 forward multiple, while down slightly from three months ago, is just coming off four-year highs. However, with ample excess capital, an improving macro environment, especially with respect to long term interest rates (rising near the 5%-6% level we feel much more comfortable with), a diversified book of business that offers earnings stability, and reasonable growth prospects (we forecast 11%-12% CAGR through 2007), we see little risk to EPS growth going forward. In addition, we believe improved risk management techniques, developed from the fact that over the last four years there have been extremely volatile equity markets, credit markets, and interest rate environments, offer an additional element of earnings stability.

• Valuations contract relative to U.S. lifecos – now closer to historical average. The jump we saw in the group versus the U.S. lifecos in the first three months of 2006, when the premium to the U.S. lifecos (on a forward P/E basis) increased from 9% to 15%, essentially unwound in the past three months, declining from 15% to 10%, still modestly ahead of the 5% long-term average. We believe an increasing premium relative to the U.S. group is justified owing to faster increasing excess capital positions and better growth prospects. (While EPS growth was relatively the same from 2000-2005 for the two groups, Canadian lifecos are expected to grow in the 12% area through 2007, whereas consensus growth for the U.S. group is 10 %.) When you combine these valuation premiums to the U.S. lifecos with increasing levels of excess capital, and a more favourable Canadian currency, we have to believe the Canadian lifecos will look to the highly fragmented U.S. market to make what we consider to be reasonably accretive acquisitions. We expect acquisition activity to increase in 2006 and 2007, as we believe the players will continue to take advantage of low debt financing rates to acquire, and sub-scale players will look to rationalize or specialize.

• Valuation relative to Canadian banks – 8% premium versus 2% three-year mean – suggests banks may be slightly more attractive – unless long-term interest rates continue to rise and the yield curve continues to flatten. Rising long-term interest rates and a flattening yield curve have contributed to the expansion in the premium relative to the banks. We believe a modest premium over historical levels is justified, assuming long-term interest rates rise and the yield curve remains somewhat flat, which is traditionally an environment less punitive to lifecos than to banks. Furthermore, a modest premium to the group is perhaps somewhat warranted given the better growth prospects for the Canadian lifecos (12% through 2007) versus the Canadian banks (10% through 2007). However, we note that the premium the U.S. lifeco group enjoys versus its banks has in fact declined from 10% to 3% over the last six months (but still above its long-term average of 1%), despite rapidly rising long-term interest rates and a flattening yield curve, and despite the fact that consensus growth for the U.S. lifecos, at 10%-11%, is marginally better than the U.S. banks, at 10%.

• Fundamentals remain steady – improving macro environment as long-term interest rates continue to rise. Fundamentals remain steady for the group, with ROEs modestly climbing, excess capital positions growing, and targeted dividend payout ratios rising. Excellent risk-management techniques, in our opinion, help mitigate the risks to any potential unfavourable macro environments. As it stands now, we are comfortable with the risk profiles for the group, and see no apparent headwinds, especially as long-term interest rates continue to rise.

• Increasing long-term interest rates bode well for lifecos – U.S. long-terms well above our “5% threshold” is a positive for GWO, MFC, and SLF – Canada long-terms still well below 5% and not expected to move – negative for IAG. Long-term rates have risen in both the United States and Canada, mitigating our concerns, to some extent, over the negative impact of declining long-term interest rates. With liabilities longer than assets, a declining long-term interest rate scenario can pose significant reinvestment risk to the lifecos, as well as present spread compression issues for the fixed-rate products. We believe a continuation of a more moderate increase in long-term rates, to the 5%-6% range, would be a positive for the lifeco group. Since we are essentially at 5% in the United States (U.S. 10- year treasuries are 5.07%), we remain less concerned about interest rate risk for those companies with predominantly U.S. interest rate risk exposure, namely Great-West Lifeco, Manulife, and Sun Life. However, Industrial-Alliance is still the company most at risk; largely because the company’s business mix (more than half the business is very long tail individual insurance business) makes it the most sensitive to low levels of long-term interest rates, and Canadian long-term rates, currently at 4.45%, still have a way to go before they approach the 5%-6% range. Whether or not they get there remains less certain. Scotia Economics has recently trimmed its Canadian long-term (government) rate forecasts, and now expects the 10-year Canada yield to climb marginally to 4.80% by the end of 2006, and then fall to 4.40% by the end of 2007.

• Credit now is excellent – will the good times continue? Times are good now, but if credit spreads were to widen and the incidence of bond defaults increases, Canadian lifecos’ earnings could suffer. Manulife has the highest exposure of below-investment grade bonds for the group (6% of Manulife’s bond portfolio is below investment grade, as opposed to 3% for Sun Life, 1% for Great-West Lifeco, and 0% for Industrial-Alliance), albeit the entire group is still less exposed than most U.S. lifecos. Exposure to GM and Ford bonds is limited as well, with Sun Life at $0.37 per share, Great-West Lifeco at $0.36 per share, and Manulife at $0.22 per share. Manulife claims that 95% of its exposure to Ford and GM bonds is secured.

• If markets continue to be sluggish, 2007 EPS estimates could come under pressure. Manulife’s and Sun Life’s equity market exposure is largely U.S.-related, and with the S&P 500 up 3% in 2005, and up just 1% year-to-date 2006, the likelihood of average market levels in 2006 meeting or surpassing the expected 7%-8% may be slim, especially if markets remain flat for the rest of 2006. The likelihood of downward adjustments in 2006 for Great-West Lifeco or Industrial-Alliance is less, due to the better performance of the TSX and the FTSE over the last 12-18 months. Industrial-Alliance is 100% exposed to the TSX and Great-West Lifeco is about one-third exposed to each of the TSX, S&P 500, and FTSE. However, if markets continue to be sluggish, as they have been of late, we expect 2007 EPS estimates could come under pressure. Who’s the most sensitive to changes in equity markets? We put Industrial-Alliance first, with every 10% change in equity markets impacting EPS by 9%, followed by Sun Life at 6%, and then Manulife and Great-West Lifeco each at 5%.

• Strengthening Canadian dollar versus the U.S. dollar – Manulife the most at risk. Our EPS estimates assume an average exchange rate of $1.11 (CAD/USD) for 2006, with no currency hedging for Manulife and Sun Life, and a currency hedge for Great-West Lifeco in line with our average rate. Each 5% movement in our estimate is worth about $0.05 per share for Great-West Lifeco (or 2% of 2006E EPS), $0.17 per share for Manulife (or 4% of 2006E EPS), and $0.06 per share for Sun Life (or 2% of 2006E EPS). As Manulife’s U.S. owners (nearly 50% of the shareholder base) would obviously see their stock benefit from an appreciating Canadian dollar, we believe any perceived impact on Manulife’s share price due to an appreciating Canadian dollar may not be so dramatic.


Canadian P&C insurers – market remains rational - auto continues to pace ahead of industry norm, commercial becoming increasingly competitive.

• The profitability of Canadian auto insurance continues to pace well ahead of industry norms due to the sustained effectiveness of automobile reforms and continued low frequency levels. We get the impression from management at ING Canada that this trend will continue throughout 2006. The U.S. non-standard auto market (a significant portion of Kingsway’s business) remains very competitive and perhaps somewhat irrational, as niche players have gained market share. It remains to be seen whether the impact of more expensive reinsurance (in light of the hurricanes) in the July 2006 renewal season will introduce an element of rationality to the market, an obvious positive for Kingsway. However, should this market become more rational, we might expect large traditional players (State Farm, Geico, and Progressive) to no longer “hold back the reins” and possibly re-enter the non-standard market as well, thus increasing competition.

• While the 2005 hurricanes removed US$58 billion from the balance sheets of insurers/reinsurers worldwide (one-half of the impact was on U.S. domestic companies and one-half of the impact was on those outside of the United States, predominantly European and Bermuda domiciled companies), the perceived “hardening” of markets was a reality only for U.S. coastal coverages. Consequently, our Canadian P&C companies will likely see little impact, and we believe rate increases will continue to be flat. While the Canadian commercial market will continue to be increasingly competitive, we believe it will remain rational.


Great-West Lifeco Inc.
1-Sector Outperform – $33 one-year target, based on 2.9x 6/30/07E BV and 13.1x 2007E EPS
• We are looking for $0.52 per share for Q2/06, in line with consensus. Our 2006 EPS estimate of $2.13 is in line with consensus, and our 2007 EPS estimate of $2.43 is $0.03 ahead of consensus.
• Strong growth expected in 2007 when negative impact of hedge roll-off is mitigated.
• European segment (24% of bottom line), up 26% in 2005 (ex foreign exchange), should continue to show double-digit growth – with further support in 2006 from the recently announced acquisition.

Industrial-Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc.
3-Sector Underperform – $34 one-year target, based on 1.7x 6/30/07E BV and 11.7x 2007E EPS
• We are in line with consensus for Q2/06 and slightly below consensus for 2006E and 2007E.
• We expect product repricing in March 2006 may cause sales growth to begin to decelerate.
• Individual wealth management earnings growth expected to be strong as the company continues to bring Clarington Fund assets in-house.

Manulife Financial Corporation
1-Sector Outperform – $38.50 one-year target, based on 2.3x 6/30/07E BV and 13.8x 2007E EPS
• We are looking for $0.60 per share for Q2/06, $0.01 per share below consensus. Our 2006 EPS estimate of $2.43 is $0.03 below consensus and our 2007 EPS estimate of $2.76 is $0.04 below consensus.
• We expect the exceptional U.S. variable annuity sales growth will start to slow and return to more “normalized” levels.
• Flush with excess capital – but with this kind of organic growth company, who needs to make an acquisition?

Sun Life Financial Inc.
2-Sector Perform – $52 one-year target, based on 1.9x 6/30/07E BV and 12.8x 2007E EPS
• We are looking for $0.89 per share for Q2/06, $0.01 per share above consensus. Our 2006 EPS estimate of $3.59 is $0.04 above consensus and our 2007 EPS estimate of $3.95 is in line with consensus.
• A “show me” story – we will closely monitor much-needed progress U.S. variable annuity.
• Focus on margin improvement at MFS.
• Spread improvement in U.S. fixed annuity block should continue in Q2/06 as U.S. interest rates continue to rise.
• Little in the way of a catalyst until company announces CFO replacement - not likely until late 2006.

Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited
2-Sector Perform – US$172 one-year target, based on 1.0x 3/30/07E BV
• We expect another steady quarter ($5.00 EPS), not as good as the exceptional Q1/06 ($9.10 EPS), but one with good fundamentals in ongoing insurance operations, and close to break-even in runoff operations.
• Runoff segment remains under the radar screen.

ING Canada Inc.
1-Sector Perform – $61 one-year target, based on 2.3x 6/30/07E BV
• We are looking for $1.08 per share for Q2/06, $0.10 per share below consensus. Our 2006 EPS estimate of $4.53 is $0.09 below consensus and our 2007 EPS estimate of $4.19 is $0.07 below consensus.
• A good chance the company could exceed our estimate and consensus with another excellent quarter of underwriting profitability – we forecast a combined ratio of 89%, not as good as the exceptionally strong 81% in Q2/05, but Q2 and Q3 are typically strong quarters.

Kingsway Financial Services Inc.
2-Sector Perform – $27 one-year target, based on 1.35x 6/30/07E BV
• We are looking for C$0.78 per share for Q2/06; we believe this is in line with consensus.
• We look for a steady quarter in line with consensus, with no significant prior period reserve development and a combined ratio in the 97% range.
• Any catalyst for premium growth in the United States? Likely not in the near term.
• Company does not appear to be aggressively buying back stock as it continues to drift downward - why?

Northbridge Financial Corporation
3-Sector Underperform – $37 one-year target, based on 1.5x 6/30/07E BV
• We are looking for $0.86 per share for Q2/06, $0.03 per share above consensus. Our 2006 EPS estimate of $3.71 is $0.04 below consensus and our 2007E EPS estimate of $3.24 is $0.03 below consensus.
• We expect a steady quarter with nothing unusual.
• Valuation a little rich relative to U.S. commercial lines peers – we see little prospect for multiple growth.
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13 July 2006

Sun Life Unit to Pay U$3.8 Mln to Settle SEC Sales Allegations

  
Bloomberg, 13 July 2006

A U.S. brokerage unit of Sun Life Financial Inc., Canada's second-largest life insurer, agreed to pay $3.8 million to settle claims it failed to adequately tell customers how it was paid to sell investment products.

IFMG Securities sold mutual funds and variable annuities for as many as 17 companies through a ``preferred'' program, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission said in a statement today. The broker didn't properly inform clients those companies paid for special treatment and that its brokers received larger commissions for selling their products, the SEC said.

IFMG Securities didn't adequately disclose ``the potential conflicts of interest created by these payments,'' the SEC said in the statement.

Purchase, New York-based IFMG Securities, which proposed the settlement, neither admitted nor denied the claims.

The broker agreed to pay more than $2.8 million to cover improper gains and interest, as well as civil penalties of $1 million, the SEC said. Since 2003, the SEC and other regulators have imposed $400 million in penalties on brokers and fund firms for improper sales practices, including the failure to tell investors about so-called revenue sharing payments.

``We are pleased to bring this matter to a final resolution, and will continue to work to enhance our compliance practices and procedures so that they meet the highest possible standards,'' Michael Weiss, president of IFMG Securities, said in an e-mailed statement.
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Manulife Halts Japan VA Sales

  
RBC Capital Markets, 13 July 2006

Manulife Japan and its partner banks will suspend sales of certain variable annuity products pending tax clarification starting today.

Investment Opinion

• Certain VA Sales Suspended. Manulife Japan asked, and its partner banks complied, to suspend sales of certain Variable Annuity (VA) sales pending resolution of income tax treatment in the hands of annuitants. This impacts MFC’s recently imported Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefit VA product, so successful in the U.S. in recent years, but not yet a material product in Japan. Manulife is not pleased with the recent tax interpretation and potential for overtaxation of its customers. We think MFC is doing “the right thing”.

• Issue Highlights MFC’s EPS Diversity - Japan VA’s Not a Material EPS Contributor. First, Japan contributes only ~6% to MFC earnings, and most from insurance. Also, growing at 15-20% in USD terms (up 17% in Q106), Japan is an “in-line” EPS contributor, but no more, to Manulife’s 20%+ overall EPS growth. Further, the early-stage, high-growth VA business, in our view, is a not yet a material contributor to MFC Japan (actual is not disclosed). Second, the specific product suspension impacts an undisclosed, but we think, minority proportion of overall Japan VA sales, which were US$1.1B in Q1/06. The impact on in-force business is smaller still since the two new VA products impacted were only launched in November ‘05.

• Coveted Bancassurance Relationship? The real question is what impact, if any, will this have on Manulife’s coveted relationship with BOTM-UFJ – one of MFC’s three significant growth engines over the next 5-10 years (Hancock and China being the other larger two). Without background, this is difficult to assess; however, we would be concerned BOTM may choose to position Manulife as a scapegoat for this potentially embarrassing situation. We should also consider any potential for consumer liability if it turns out these products were sold without sufficient due diligence. Another outcome is that, as with the Portus hedge fund debacle and/or MFC’s Indonesian expropriation, Manulife is able to turn this in to a Public relations” coup.

• Valuation – No Changes to EPS estimates - Top Pick Reiterated. Our $43 target is based on 16.5x our forward EPS estimate, a 10% premium to our Canadian lifeco peer average of 15x, wider than the historical 3% premium to reflect the superior growth and capitalization as well as MFC’s enhanced global position. EPS risk centers on accelerated USD translation as nearly 2/3 of earnings are USD-based, and not hedged. Also, Manulife could be susceptible to a downturn in claims experience, unusually bad credit markets, or to an acquisition.
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RBC CM Best Equity Investment Ideas for 2006 H2

  
The Globe and Mail, Angela Barnes, 13 July 2006

RBC Dominion Securities Inc. has added a number of new names, including Focus Energy Trust, Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. and Nova Chemicals Corp. to its list of "best ideas" in stocks for the second half of 2006, while dropping another 14 names that were in the first half list. The best ideas list, which was first compiled at the beginning of last year, has substantially outperformed the market over the intervening period. It has delivered a total return of 29.3 per cent on an annualized basis since inception, compared with a 18.7-per-cent return in the S&P/TSX composite index over the same period.

Other additions to the list, which feature RBC Dominion analysts' top picks for the next six months in the sectors they follow, include AEterna Zentaris Inc., Anatolia Minerals Development Ltd., Atrium Biotechnologies Inc., Banro Corp., Calfrac Well Services Ltd., Chartwell Seniors Housing REIT, MacDonald Dettwiler & Associates Ltd., Murchison Metals Ltd., Shoppers Drug Mart Corp., Shore Gold Inc., Trimac Income Fund and West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd.

As some of the names suggest, the list is dominated by small- to mid-capitalization issues, but there are a number of larger issues there for balance, including Manulife Financial Corp. and Toronto-Dominion Bank that RBC Dominion believes offer a very attractive risk/return profile. The list as a whole is intended for more sophisticated and risk tolerant investors, said Richard Talbot, director of Canadian equity research. It is not designed for the "widows and orphans" type investors because of the higher risk and volatility entailed in some of the stocks. Higher risk can mean higher returns.

There are a number of stocks on the list that are not those of Canadian companies. Mvelaphanda Resources Ltd., a holdover from the first-half list, is one such example. The South African company has direct equity interests in gold, precious metal and diamond operations in South Africa and Angola. Zinifex Ltd., an Australian company that is a major producer of zinc and lead, is another. It too was a holdover from the earlier list.

Among the better-known stocks mentioned in the first half list but not the latest list were Petro-Canada and Mega Bloks Inc.
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12 July 2006

Bank of America upgrades TD Ameritrade

  
Forbes, Mary Crane, 12 July 2006

Banc of America has upgraded TD Ameritrade to "buy" from "neutral" as the shock of the TD Waterhouse acquisition is absorbed and earnings per share rise.

Analyst Michael Hecht said the online broker's stock has been weak on seasonal concerns about retail activity, pricing and concerns over integrating the U.S. operations of TD Waterhouse, which Ameritrade bought in early 2006.

But despite concerns about low-single digit growth in retail stock trading, he said near-term concerns are overdone.

Ameritrade's earnings per share should grow by 25% each year for the next two years as TD Waterhouse's securities business is integrated, Hecht forecasted.

"Ameritrade [has] maintained the right cost structure to maintain a very profitable business model which has less variability in fact than most investors probably realize."

Hecht raised his price target on TD Ameritrade stock to $20 from $19 to reflect his new 2007 earnings estimate of $1.42, up 3% from $1.21.

The risk-to-reward ratio on the stock also looks favorable, the analyst added.

If activity rates remain at trough levels of 3.6%, the downside worst-case scenario stock price would be $13 versus the current $20 price target.
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MarketWatch, Greg Morcroft, 11 July 2006

Analysts at Bank of America Tuesday upgraded shares of online financial services firm TD Ameritrade to buy, saying short -term concerns about retail activity and pricing cuts are overblown. The analysts also raised their price target on the shares to $20 from $19. "Despite our secular concerns about low-single digit growth in retail stock trading given continued pricing pressures as well as cyclical and secular concerns about net interest profits, we expect AMTD to deliver 25% average annual EPS growth the next two years as expense saves from the TD Waterhouse acquisition flow through and de-leveraging (as AMTD uses its substantial free cash flow to reduce debt) justifies at least a mid-teens multiple for the stock" the researchers concluded.
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11 July 2006

TD Banknorth Top Execs to Receive 2005 Bonuses After All

  
SNL Financial, Bree Fortney, 11 July 2006

TD Banknorth Inc. said in a Form 8-K filed July 11 that its top executives will in fact receive bonuses for 2005, despite an earlier announcement from the company that they would not.

In March, TD Banknorth said that its top five executives would not receive an annual bonus for 2005 after the company failed to achieve the targeted operating earnings per share growth.

However, TD Banknorth said in the filing that President and CEO William Ryan would receive a U$993,145 bonus, after receiving a U$303,200 bonus in 2004. Other executives to receive bonuses include COO Peter Verrill, President and CEO of the bank's mid-Atlantic division Wendy Suehrstedt, and Senior Executive Vice President Andrew Greene.

In addition, bonuses aggregating about U$954,000 were paid to certain other executive officers of the company, TD Banknorth said.

"The foregoing bonuses are intended to recognize the efforts of such officers in the successful completion of the acquisition of Hudson United Bancorp and for their significant contributions to the Company in 2005," TD Banknorth said.

The bank added that the acquisition of Hudson United increased TD Banknorth's total assets by approximately U$8.8 billion and positioned it for future growth in the mid-Atlantic region.
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10 July 2006

A.M. Best Affirms Sun Life’s Debt Ratings

  
Investment Executive, 10 July 2006

A.M. Best Co. has affirmed the financial strength rating of A++ and the issuer credit ratings of "aa+" for Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada’s Canadian and U.S. divisions, and Sun Life Insurance and Annuity Co. of New York.

Concurrently, A.M. Best has affirmed all existing debt ratings for Sun Life Financial Inc. and its subsidiaries. A.M. Best has also affirmed the ICR of "aa-" of SLF and has assigned a debt rating of "aa-" to SLF’s issuance of up to $300 million senior unsecured fixed/floating debentures Series C, due 2031. The outlook for all ratings is stable.

The proceeds from the offering will be used for general corporate purposes, including investments in the subsidiaries. The offering does not significantly increase SLF’s leverage or fixed-charge coverage, which remain within acceptable ranges for the company’s ratings.

The ratings reflect Sun Life’s diversified and profitable operations, favourable risk-adjusted capitalization and very strong market position in all major business segments in Canada, complemented by growth outside of North America.

Sun Life has strong debt servicing capabilities underpinned by a favourable liquidity position, along with a high quality investment portfolio and continued growth in operating earnings. Sun Life’s earnings are supported by its diverse operations and have been enhanced from expense synergies arising from earlier acquisitions.

Operating earnings are anchored by its very strong franchise in the Canadian market, along with a favourable position in the U.S. annuity area. Accordingly, Sun Life enjoys a good balance between its wealth management and protection businesses and is now less reliant upon earnings from its mutual fund operation, Massachusetts Financial Services Co., which had experienced volatility in recent years.

Despite overall improved earnings performance, A.M. Best believes Sun Life will remain challenged to significantly improve the operating performance of its U.S. wealth management and protection businesses, which remain exposed to both interest rate risk and volatility in the equity markets. Moreover, the future earnings from international businesses may be subject to uncertainty, reflecting a number of risks inherent in emerging economies as well as changes in currency valuations.
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Tracking the Wealthy Clients

  
Investment Executive, James Langton, 10 July 2006

Many financial firms covet the high net-worth investor, a market that is healthy but growing faster overseas than in Canada and the U.S., according to a new study.

The latest version of an annual survey co-produced by the U.S. brokerage giant Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. and the consulting firm Capgemini that tracks high net-worth investors finds there are currently 8.7 million people worldwide with US$1 million in financial assets (the metric the study uses to define a high net-worth investor). Collectively, they control approximately US$33.3 trillion in assets.

These are precisely the sort of clients that many financial services firms have come to focus on in the past few years. As brokerage firms have shifted their businesses away from transactions and toward fees, they’ve naturally become preoccupied with higher-value accounts. Active traders, who can churn out fat commissions for the firm, are out; large accounts with plenty of fee-generating assets are in. It doesn’t much matter if they’re eager traders. It’s big balances that bring home the bacon.

Yet the supply of these big clients is certainly limited. According to the Merrill Lynch/Capgemini survey, there were 232,000 high net-worth investors in Canada in 2005. For a country with about 30,000-odd financial advisors, that’s not many — fewer than eight such clients per advisor.

Moreover, the population growth among this client segment is slowing. In 2005, the number of millionaire clients in Canada grew by 7.2% from 217,000 in 2004. In the U.S., year-over-year growth was a little slower — 6.8% — taking the total number of high-value clients there to almost 2.7 million.

For both countries, these growth rates represent a slowdown from 2004, when the ranks of high net-worth investors grew by 9.9% in the U.S. and 8.3% in Canada. Growth slowed less acutely in Canada than the U.S. in 2005, the report suggests, as wealthier citizens in Canada benefited from higher commodity prices.

North America, however, is not where the population of high net-worth investors is swelling. The strongest growth is in places working from very low levels, such as Russia and India — countries in which the ranks of millionaire investors grew by 17.4% and 19.3%, respectively, in 2005. Increasingly, the fastest growth in the number of these sorts of clients is likely to come in Asia, where economic growth is expected to be strong and there are large populations of once-relatively poor people rapidly accumulating assets.

Although the greatest growth in the population of millionaire investors is expected to come in faraway regions, actual wealth accumulation by these sorts of clients is forecast to be quite strong here at home. The survey predicts the total value of high net-worth investors’ financial wealth will grow by an annual average of 6% from US$33.3 trillion in 2005 to US$44.6 trillion by 2010.

However, not all regions are expected to grow at the same rate. The survey forecasts that North Americans’ wealth will grow at an above-average 7.4% over that period. Indeed, North America is predicted to be the fastest-growing region by assets, surpassed only by the wealthy in the Middle East.

With wealth accumulation expected to outpace millionaire population growth in North America, the obvious conclusion is that the rich will be getting richer — a forecast that dovetails nicely with another recent theory that seeks to explain some of the apparent anomalies in the global economy: the rise of so-called “plutonomies,” or economies that are dominated by their wealthiest citizens.

In a report first published last fall and updated earlier this year, an analyst at Citigroup Global Markets advances the theory that the economies of the U.S., Canada and Britain are increasingly powered by the wealthy. This contrasts with continental Europe and Japan, where wealth distribution is more equal.

The Citigroup report indicates that Canada’s wealthiest people now account for the biggest share of national income since the 1940s — with the richest 1% capturing about 13% of income, and the top 5% accounting for almost 30% of income.

It’s a similar story in the U.S., where, Citigroup reports, the top 1% of households accounted for about 20% of overall U.S. income in 2000. In contrast, the bottom 60% of households also account for about 20% of income. The top 1% also represent 40% of financial net worth, the report notes, which is more than the bottom 95% combined.

The plutonomy notion would seem to be supported by data from the Merrill Lynch/Capgemini survey. It finds that, with almost 2.9 million high net-worth investors in Canada and the U.S. combined, North America is the region with the greatest number of millionaire investors. Europe is a close second at 2.8 million, but the region also has a much greater population to draw on — about 459 million people in Europe vs approximately 330 million in Canada and the U.S. combined. The much higher incidence of millionaires in Canada and the U.S. reflects the fact that greater wealth disparities exist in North America vs Europe.

The rise of the wealthy in North America, the Citigroup report suggests, is largely because of high incomes. It points to U.S. data, which show that in the early part of the 20th century, the wealthy derived most of their riches from dividends and entrepreneurship. Back then, only about 20% of the top 1%’s wealth came from wages, about 30% was attributed to entrepreneurial sources, and more than 30% to dividends.

Today, the picture has shifted dramatically. Now, about 60% of the top 1%’s wealth is from income, another 25% comes from entrepreneurship, with dividends, interest and rents making up the rest.

“The resurgence in their fortunes since the mid-’80s was mainly from oversized salaries,” the report says. “The rich in the U.S. went from coupon-clipping, dividend-receiving renters to a managerial aristocracy indulged by their shareholders.”

The rise of this rich, managerial class in the U.S., Canada and Britain explains some of the distortions, such as the size and persistence of global fiscal imbalances, that have worried monetary authorities for some time, it says.

“We believe that the actions of the rich and the proportion of rich people in an economy helps explain many of the nasty conundrums and fears that have vexed our equity clients recently, such as global imbalances or why high oil prices haven’t destroyed consumer demand,” the report says. “Plutonomy, we think, explains these problems away, and tells us not to worry about them.”

The report also predicts that the disparity will only grow in the years ahead. “We project that the plutonomies are likely to see even more income inequality, disproportionately feeding off a further rise in the profit share in their economies, capitalist-friendly governments, more technology-driven productivity and globalization,” it says.

Globalization is expected to be the biggest force for growing income inequality, as cheap foreign labour keeps wages down and boosts profit margins. “This bodes well for companies selling to or servicing the rich,” it concludes.

To wealth managers and financial advisors, this forecast suggests that their top clients are likely to become more valuable than ever. As the rich get richer, and their rate of wealth accumulation outpaces the population growth, advisors’ smartest move may be to do whatever it takes to keep their richest clients happy.
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Discount Brokerages’ Threat Increases

  
Investment Executive, Rudy Mezzetta, 10 July 2006

Online discount brokerages, which allow investors to manage their own portfolios and, increasingly, obtain advice, is accounting for a growing share of total retail assets. Industry leaders and experts say the trend is putting extra pressure on full-service advisors to adapt to investors’ changing expectations.

The online or discount business grew to $155 billion in assets by March 2006, up 26% from the year before, and represents 19.4% of total retail brokerage assets, up from 18.4%, says Investor Economics Inc. of Toronto.

“It’s here to stay,” says Jamie Sutherland, senior analyst at the Toronto-based research firm. “There’s no doubt the online discount brokerage business is growing. This whole sector will grow dramatically.”

The traditional industry segment is acutely aware of its powerful rival.

“If the full-service channel doesn’t respond, [online brokerages] could pose a serious threat,” says Simon Edwards, chief executive at Toronto-based HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc. “But my feeling is the full-service channel is responding.”

Edwards, who heads HSBC InvestDirect online brokerage as well as the firm’s full-service wealth-management channel, says full-service has to make sure it provides value superior to self-directed service, with a focus on comprehensive advice and relationship management. “It has to be a high-end, high-touch proposition,” he says.

The self-directed business is dominated by the online brokerage arms of the big banks, which claim around 90% of total Canadian market assets, according to industry insiders. The online channel saw its heyday in the high-tech boom of the late 1990s, but was hit hard when the bubble burst. In the past five years, the online business has rebuilt itself, but insiders say the clients have changed.

“There has been an evolution from traders to investors,” says Connie Stefankiewicz, president and CEO of BMO InvestorLine.

“Five years ago, it was all about price and execution,” says Duncan Hannay, head of Toronto-based E*Trade Canada. “While price is still a drawing card, product and quality of service are just as important.”

Most clients, insiders say, are “everyday” investors who enjoy running their own investment portfolios and are attracted to the low costs. About 1% could be classified as active traders, those who trade more than 30 times in a quarter, and such clients are highly coveted because their frequent trading adds to commission revenue.

Although some clients use their online accounts as their primary or only investment portfolio, others use one as a companion or a sideline to an advisory account. “You’ll often see a client holding a registered account with an advisor, and his or her non-registered account with an online broker,” Stefankiewicz says. HSBC’s Edwards says most of his firm’s online clients use their accounts as a primary investment account.

More than ever, clients are being offered opportunities to receive advice online, to help them make sense of the myriad of products and choose among a variety of investment strategies.

“Access to advice will be critical in the next few years,” says Marvin Daley, a regional head of TD Waterhouse financial planning and discount brokerage.

The biggest player in the group, TD Waterhouse offers discount brokerage services online, by phone or at 24 investor centres across Canada. It also offers discount investors with more $100,000 in assets access to a fully licensed financial planner at no cost.

Most other online brokerages are also searching for ways to give clients a higher level of support and advice. BMO InvestorLine offers clients model portfolios for mutual funds, exchange-traded funds and, coming in weeks, equity products managed by third-party providers.

Online brokerages are also looking for ways to make it easier for clients to use their Web sites, and to provide them with ways to clear a path through a thicket of investment choices. For example, Stefankiewicz says BMO InvestorLine has asset-allocation tools, retirement tools and other features to guide clients through investment decisions, provide relevant suggestions and give them validation for their choices.

“We can help investors by packaging information, in a way that’s relevant to them,” she says.

Despite the growth of the discount brokerage sector, most experts say the full-service business can continue to thrive, especially if it focuses on its strengths.

“I think the advisory community can take advantage of this phenomenon,” says Paul Bates, dean of the DeGroote School of Business at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ont. “It can more finely target that which adds the greatest value. Advisors know their clients best.” Bates was president of four brokerage and investment firms, including Charles Schwab Canada before its acquisition by Bank of Nova Scotia in 2002.

Daley says high net-worth clients will always need the advice, products and services a full-service advisor can provide. “Once you reach a larger asset size, it’s important to look for expert advice,” he says.

There is also a question of the survival of the online brokerages. The dozen or so players are currently fighting it out over pricing, with E*Trade Canada firing the latest salvo by setting a low flat fee for active investors, with other brokerage houses adjusting their fee structures in response. They are also competing on features, technology, access to foreign markets and security guarantees for clients.

Most industry experts agree the barriers are too high for a new player to enter the Canadian online brokerage market. But some say there could be consolidation in coming years.

“I foresee some consolidation,” says HSBC’s Edwards, adding that smaller firms without diverse revenue streams may feel the pinch and end up as acquisition targets.

Insiders say the online brokerage business and its clients are mature enough to survive an extended market downturn, and won’t repeat the run for the doors witnessed with the high-tech bust.
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Banks Find Little to Celebrate in Federal White Paper

  
Investment Executive, James Langton, 10 July 2006

If Canada’s banks were expecting the Harper government to be any friendlier to their cause than its predecessor, then a new federal white paper has dashed their hopes. It appears the banks have more work ahead of them if they hope to win meaningful legislative reforms in the future.

The long-awaited paper on financial industry reform, released in mid-June and out for comment until July 21, dodges the big questions of bank mergers and the banks’ desire to pursue insurance business more actively.

The big banks have long had an uneasy relationship with Ottawa, and have been frustrated by their treatment ever since 1998, when the federal government squelched two proposed mergers. The banks grudgingly accepted the verdict denying the mergers, but pleaded with the then-Liberal government for clarity surrounding the merger process. Such clarity, they said, would allow them to consider their strategies properly.

Although clarity was often promised, it never came. Without guidance, the banks found themselves dreaming up deals and then quietly sounding out the federal government on their political palatability. Deal-making proved elusive.

The banks had hoped the recent change in government, and a shift in focus from mergers and toward increasing their ability to market insurance, would make a difference.

The white paper, however, does not address the banks’ desire to market insurance actively. That’s not a big surprise, considering Canada has a minority government, but some in the industry no doubt had expected more.

In answer to the latest legislative review, the Canadian Bankers Association had submitted a list of 57 recommendations for reforms it wanted to see to financial services legislation. The wish list included changes dealing with everything from improving regulatory efficiency and corporate governance to a litany of technical amendments.

It’s not just the banks that had hoped for a more progressive federal policy for the financial services industry. Before the release of the white paper, a Toronto-based think tank, the C.D. Howe Institute, had published a short paper exhorting the government to focus on improving productivity in the financial services industry, arguing that a competitive, efficient financial industry is critical to the economy and “a vital policy goal.”

Canadian labour productivity has been lagging, and the financial services sector has been a particularly poor performer of late, experiencing five consecutive quarters of declining labour productivity, the report notes. One of the problems, it suggests, is that much of the financial sector “operates behind protective barriers that dampen competitive forces and may sustain uncompetitive cost structures.” Laws limit foreign ownership in banking and require that large banks’ shares be widely held, preventing cross-border or cross-pillar acquisitions of domestic firms. Rules also inhibit scale-building domestic mergers and limit competition among the sector’s parts, it adds.

The institute has called on the government to depoliticize the merger issue, to consider opening up the insurance industry to greater competition and to broach a federally mediated solution to the fragmented securities regulatory system.

None of the issues are addressed in the government’s white paper. Instead, it focuses on a variety of lesser changes — some of which should benefit the industry, while others have consumers in mind.

On the customer front, the white paper proposes, among other things: improving disclosure to bank clients around deposit-type investments such as GICs and term deposits; enhancing fee disclosure and borrowing cost disclosure; improving disclosure about the complaint-handling process; reducing cheque “hold” periods; and lowering the level at which the mortgage insurance requirement kicks in.

For the industry, the government white paper proposes raising the thresholds at which the “widely held rule” applies to $8 billion from $5 billion in equity value. This rule requires that no single shareholder can own more than 20% of the voting shares of banks classified as “large”, which effectively prevents takeovers of those firms. The proposal is most relevant to National Bank of Canada which is approaching the $5-billion equity value threshold, and would ensure that it will remain classified as a medium-sized bank for the foreseeable future. (Medium-sized banks can be closely held, but must maintain a public float of 35% of voting shares).

The paper also proposes streamlining ministerial approval for certain transactions and introducing electronic cheque imaging.

“The proposed recommendations will go a long way toward eliminating red tape, improving disclosure to consumers and fostering a strong and dynamic financial sector,” Finance Minister Jim Flaherty said upon releasing the paper.

The document clearly neglects the big issues, particularly as far as the banks are concerned. At the top of their list is greater freedom to market insurance in their branches. The CBA has called for banks to gain permission to distribute information about their insurance products in their branches, and the ability to provide referrals to “insurance professionals” to obtain information and advice about insurance. The banks haven’t gone so far as to seek permission to sell insurance in their branches.

“We are extremely disappointed the government hasn’t adopted our four simple insurance proposals,” says Ray Protti, the CBA’s president and CEO. “With the changes the government has made over the past several years — privacy legislation, prohibitions on coercive tied-selling, allowing insurers to restructure to become among the largest financial institutions in Canada — we don’t think it makes sense to maintain the current restrictions on insurance.”

Protti adds that the CBA will continue to lobby for greater freedom to operate in the insurance business, arguing that more competition will benefit consumers and increase business volumes for agents and brokers.

Although the CBA is obviously disappointed not to see progress on the insurance issue, it is pleased that the white paper addresses issues such as cheque imaging that, it says, “will strengthen the efficiency, security and maintains the competitive advantages of Canadian payments systems, and bring important benefits to Canadian consumers.”

Finn Poschmann, associate director of research and senior policy analyst at C.D. Howe and author of its brief on the legislative review, agrees that there is some good in the government’s effort. “The paper has good rhetoric about the importance of the sector, and the role of an effective and efficient financial sector in backstopping good economic performance,” he says, adding that it proposes a few positive legislative changes, too.

But much of it is “resolutely ho-hum,” he says, “as might be expected from a minority government in a field in which champions are few and there are no rewards for going down fighting.”

The existence of a minority government naturally discourages bold policy moves, but productive reforms don’t necessarily demand a huge political battle. For example, the government could have laid out a course for a less political bank-merger approval process that would have reduced the risk to a minority government by putting increased onus on competition authorities and industry regulators to approve any deals.

Giving the banks more room to operate in the insurance industry is surely a greater political risk, but enhanced competition would be the right policy direction for an industry that labours under too many outdated protectionist measures. In Europe, where there is greater crossover between banking and insurance, firms have enjoyed greater profitability and improved credit quality as a result of diversification.

For now, however, the changes coming to the Canadian financial sector will be modest. The government expects to introduce legislation in the fall enacting its slate of proposed changes.

More substantive reforms are going to have to wait. “I credit the government and the minister for keeping up the ‘pro consumer, pro competitive’ argument, and remain optimistic — or at least hopeful — that it will eventually lead to matching policy,” says Poschman.
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Cdn Bank Earnings Expected to Slow

  
Neil Murray, 10 July 2006

Few would argue that the past 10 years have been great for investors who held Canadian banking stocks. The question now is what can investors expect over the next five or ten years? Moreover, is it possible that the easy money has already been made in the Canadian banking sector?

Bank stocks sold off along with most other stocks in the TSX Composite's latest retreat that began on April 19. The TSX is enjoying a reflex rally from oversold conditions and as of July 5 was hovering around the 11,600 mark.

The high for the TSX on April 19 was 12,494. The TSX reached a low on June 16, 2006 of 10,860, before rallying back to the 11,733 level on July 4. The TSX's initial initial downward move to the downside from high to low amounted to a decline of 13 per cent. I say initial move to the downside, because I believe that the TSX could lose another 1000 points or more before a new, more sustainable, uptrend can emerge.

Canadian bank stocks are not immune to market volatility or corrections, especially in a rising interest rate environment. Bank stocks declined fell seven per cent from the market's April highs, compared to a decline of 10 percent for the TSX when measured off its closing price.

Among the big five banks in Canada, CIBC and TD Bank have declined the most. In fact, when you compare the performance of these two banks to the TSX from April 19 until July 4, they are off more than the index. CIBC and TD are down 11 per cent compared to the TSX which is off six per cent. Bank of Montreal, Royal Bank and Bank of Nova Scotia are down 5.5 per cent, 3.6 per cent and 2.7 per cent respectively.

Profitability amongst the banking sector in Canada has been stellar over the past five years. After-tax earnings have grown from $4.6 billion in 2000 to $6.5 billion at the end of 2004.

According to BMO Nesbitt Burns' banking analyst, Ian de Verteuil, "the strong Canadian economy has been good for the banks. Asset growth has been excellent and loan losses have been well controlled."

Going forward the concerns are higher loan losses, slowing asset growth and weaker capital markets. De Verteuil expects loan losses to increase over the next two years but acknowledges the losses will be low by historical standards.

In a note to clients in June, de Verteuil says, "five per cent asset growth can produce ten percent bottom line growth as long as spreads remain stable."

The biggest fear for bank analysts is the health of capital markets. After several record years, the environment seems ripe for some form of correction that would impact bank profitability.

de Verteuil expects to see more moderation in performance from bank stocks as the year progresses.

Many of the banks have raised their dividend payout ratios, which mean shareholders will get a bigger slice of the earnings pie. Bank of Montreal currently pays a dividend of 4.1 per cent -- the interest equivalent of 5.3 per cent for a bond or GIC investor in the top tax bracket.

Many investors are willing to accept moderate growth from their bank shares, as long as they continue to receive a tax-advantaged dividend that compares favourably on an after-tax basis with interest yielding investments.

de Verteuil has outperform ratings on TD Bank, National Bank, CIBC, Bank of Nova Scotia, and Canadian Western Bank. The Royal Bank, Laurentian Bank and Bank of Montreal are currently rated Market Perform.

Over the years, bank stocks have been terrific investments for Canadian investors. Despite the potential for a slowdown in bank earnings growth, there are fewer better equity investments out there for low to medium risk portfolios.
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US Regional Banks in a Rate Whirl

  
The Wall Street Journal, Robin Sidel & Clint Riley, 10 June 2006

After watching interest rates rise for two years, a growing number of Americans are transferring their money into high-yielding bank accounts, a trend that is taking its toll on the nation's regional banks.

As financial institutions gear up for quarterly earnings reports this month, a number of them have warned investors and Wall Street analysts that results will be hurt by rising rates. And part of the blame is being placed on consumers and businesses who are moving funds from traditional low-interest-bearing accounts to online savings accounts, certificates of deposit and other bank products that are sporting annual rates of more than 5%.

While this may be good news for consumers who are earning less than 1% on a plain-vanilla savings account, it is putting the banks in a pickle because they must either raise rates to stay competitive or watch their customers flee to rivals.

Although interest rates have been rising steadily since mid-2004, there is typically a lag time before banking customers take action, say industry analysts. Last month, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates for the 17th consecutive time, boosting its short-term target a quarter-point to 5.25%.

"We seem to have passed some threshold between 4.75% and 5% where the depositors' attention is focused on the costs associated with not moving their accounts," says Gary Townsend, an analyst at Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co. in Arlington, Va.

That is the case at City National Corp., a Beverly Hills, Calif., bank that has about $15 billion in assets. The bank, which has a market value of $3.2 billion, last month lowered its forecast for 2006 earnings growth to between 1% and 4% from its previous expectation of 8% to 10%.

"Responding to a steady rise in short-term interest rates over the past two years, some of City National's business clients have shifted funds from core deposit accounts into higher-yielding accounts and instruments," the bank said in a Securities and Exchange Commission filing. The company's stock tumbled 11% on the news and pressured shares of other California banks. City National, which fell to a 52-week low of $60.02, was trading at $65.84 on Friday as of 4 p.m. composite trading on the New York Stock Exchange.

The trend is contributing to a tricky time for regional banks, which often don't have a steady stream of fee-based products that can help offset the impact of rising rates. The recent deposit trends are adding more pressure to net interest margins -- the key measure of profitability that represents the difference between the amount that banks earn in interest from loans and what they pay out in interest for deposits.

Net-interest margins have been squeezed for much of the year by the flat yield curve, or the difference between long- and short-term interest rates. Banks, which borrow at lower-cost short-term rates and lend money at higher long-term rates, typically profit on the gap between the two. When the curve flattens or inverts -- as it did briefly earlier this year -- banks earn lower profits.

"With the curve remaining flat, we expect managements' tone to be cautious as the rate cycle could extend past most expectations," wrote John McDonald, an analyst at Banc of America Securities, in a June 30 report.

In recent weeks, other regional banks also have warned that the financial results are being squeezed. Among them: National City Corp. of Cleveland; Fifth Third Bancorp, which is based in Cincinnati; and New Jersey's Commerce Bancorp Inc. The warnings have prompted analysts to reduce their expectations for other regional banks that haven't yet sounded the alarm.

"As we get closer to second-quarter earnings season, it seems clear that the current operating environment is continuing to take a toll on bank earnings," wrote Robert Hughes, an analyst at Keefe, Bruyette & Woods Inc., in a 526-page earnings outlook issued late last month. The New York boutique firm specializes in providing investment banking and research in the financial-services sector.

Even as people move their money into higher-yielding accounts, banks are competing fiercely to retain those customers and attract new ones. Citigroup Inc.'s online savings account, for example, now boasts a 5% yield, up from 4.5% when the global bank introduced the account in March. A traditional Citibank savings account, meanwhile, is yielding 0.7%. And New York-based Emigrant Bank has raised the interest rate on its online savings account twice in the past two weeks. It now yields 5%.

The continued squeeze on net-interest margins is expected to accelerate a round of consolidation that already is taking place in the banking sector. Citizens Banking Corp. recently agreed to buy Republic Bancorp Inc. for $1.05 billion in a deal combining two Michigan banks that "will be better positioned to compete with super-regional as well as community banks," according to a statement announcing the transaction.

"We believe the challenges will force the hands of banks to strike low-premium, defensive consolidation deals, further limiting upside for investors," wrote Meredith Whitney, an analyst at CIBC World Markets in a report issued last month.
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08 July 2006

Cdn Banks' Battle to Sell Life Insurance

  
In the battle for insurance sales, the real muscle is on Main Street, not Bay Street

Financial Post, Duncan Mavin, 8 July 2006

It was supposed to be the financial-services battle of 2006, and on the surface, it was a gross mismatch. In one corner: Canada's banking industry -- $200-billion worth of market capitalization, almost a quarter of a million employees generating almost $70-billion of revenue at more than 5,000 branches and offices across the country.

The heavyweight big banks were eager to muscle in on the insurance industry. Specifically, the banks wanted restrictions lifted that currently bar them from selling or marketing insurance in their bank branches.

In the other corner: a loose collection of about 30,000 insurance brokers was on the ropes defending its turf.

If the banks are ever able to sell insurance through their branch networks, it could be doomsday for the brokers, some said. Thirty-two billion dollars in premiums previously paid to brokers would be diverted into the vast coffers of the banks, complained the brokers. Their businesses would be bankrupt, dumping a significant number of their estimated 50,000 workers on the employment scrap heap and reducing consumer choice.

Royal Bank of Canada chief executive Gord Nixon, perhaps the most powerful player on Bay Street, was at the forefront of the banks' fight.

In March, at RBC's annual meeting, Mr. Nixon struck an early blow, declaring, "Canada is the only developed country in the world that prohibits consumers and small-business owners from buying insurance products, or even getting information about insurance from their bank."

Toronto-Dominion Bank chief executive Ed Clark -- as well-connected politically as anyone on Bay Street -- followed up at his bank's annual meeting: "We're saying there are 33 million Canadians being negatively impacted."

With a review of the Bank Act by Ottawa initially due for the fall, the banks were gearing up their lobbying machines, piling pressure on a young, free-market Tory government to open up the insurance market.

Yet in this David versus Goliath battle, somehow the underdog brokers won out.

On June 14, the Finance Department released a white paper supporting the Tory's election promise that favoured upholding restrictions the banks wanted abolished.

The question some observers were left asking: How did the small, independent insurance brokers defeat the might of Canada's big banks?

The answer is complex, and depends on whom you are talking to. The bankers point to the influence of the broker lobby at a local, especially rural, level. The brokers say they didn't have to lobby too hard because the argument in favour of maintaining the status quo was so strong. Meanwhile, there are others that say the Tory government is more interested in protecting local small businesses than in wealthy centralized banks.

Another factor could be explained by the old adage: It's not the size of the dog in the fight but the size of the fight in the dog.

The chief executive of a large Canadian insurer explained that the amount of "noise" about access to insurance sales from the banks was "disproportionate" to the impact it would have had on the banks' bottom line.

For the banks, insurance is just another product, he said. But "for the brokers, it was a much bigger issue. It was a matter of survival."

Dan Danyluik, the Insurance Brokers Association of Canada's (IBAC) chief executive, said brokers have the emotional edge. "While [the banks] have tons of resources, we have a lot of passion."

And they also believe they have a strong argument.

"I don't think the brokers had to do a hell of a lot," said a senior manager with a large insurance company.

Ottawa understood the argument that giving the banks more access to insurance sales would ultimately limit consumer choice if brokers were forced out of business, she said.

Besides, she added, "I don't think consumers like banks."

However, it's generally accepted that the brokers are more influential at a local level than many people outside of the financial services industry would think. That is especially true in ridings outside of the banks' centre of influence.

"If you look at who the key people are in Toronto social circles, it's not insurance brokers," said a bank lobbyist. "But as you get into more rural and smaller communities, if you own a decent-sized insurance brokerage, you are an important person in town.... You are an influential person."

Bob Kimball, president of the IBAC, is a good example.

Mr. Kimball runs Pearson Insurance in Sussex, N.B., a community of just a few thousand residents. Pearson was established in 1935, and Mr. Kimball bought it 24 years ago.

"If I'm typical -- and I think I am -- we're normally people that enjoy dealing with other people and, therefore, we get quite involved in the community," he said.

In fact, Mr. Kimball has been president of the local rotary club, president of the downtown business association and president of the community Crime Stoppers association. He also does an annual stint as Santa Claus delivering gifts to nearby retirement homes and is well-connected to just about everyone in the community through his business, including those who run sports teams or other community activities.

Similarly, IBAC executive Mr. Danyluik is mayor of the small Saskatchewan town where he lives and runs his business.

"Being small-business people, we are very much part of the community," Mr. Danyluik said.

It's true that such insurance giants as Manulife Financial Corp. also weighed into the debate on the side of the brokers. But the real influence was on Main Street, not Bay Street.

Brokers are often among the wealthiest local businessmen in a small community, said one Bay Street corporate communications specialist with a big bank.

"They are politically active to begin with. They are part of a sales culture that has them increasing their local profile because it's part of their local customer base."

In contrast, local bank managers no longer have the same sort of influence. Often their discretionary lending limits are restricted and they are rotated around different branches every few years, which means they are not as connected to the communities in which they work.

Some in the financial-services sector argue the influence of the brokers is unfair.

A two-time candidate for federal government said in both the 2000 and 2004 campaigns, he was targeted by three or four local insurers who donated campaign funds and expected a private audience.

"They'd say how important it is for their business to thrive and continue to thrive," he said. "I got a decent-sized cheque from all of them." Parliamentary candidates from all parties probably got similar cheques that provide "a pretty important boost" to campaign funding, he said.

Stephen Ledrew, a Toronto lawyer and former president of the Liberal party, says the power of the insurance brokers shows the key to politics is local.

"The big banks get to speak to whoever they want in the Ottawa government," he said. "But instead of being top down, influence is bottom up."

Thirty years ago, banks could make big donations to help get their voices heard. But thanks to reforms in campaign-funding regulations, that is no longer possible. Now, he says, influence weighs most heavily at the riding level, where the insurance brokers are among the most polished lobbyists.

In other words, the campaign contributions of each of the big six banks do not have the same clout as those of thousands of individual brokers.

Although the debate had been due to rage all summer, the Tories seemed to have closed the door on the banks even before the financial services white paper in mid June.

After speeches in New York and Toronto in May, for instance, Finance Minister Jim Flaherty told reporters there would be no change to existing regulations along the lines the banks were pursuing.

There were similar comments at the Rideau Club in Ottawa from Tory grandee Hugh Segal, who was the guest of honour at the annual dinner of the Insurance Bureau of Canada (IBC), which represents Canada's insurance companies.

Mr. Segal, a respected and long-standing member of the Conservative caucus, told the assembled politicians and financial-services bigwigs the banks would not get their way.

One member of Ottawa's financial-services community who was in attendance said, "What was said was not entirely a surprise, but if it's Hugh Segal saying it, I thought, 'well [the brokers] really have cemented their position here.' "

In fact, their position on insurance reflects that the Tories' loyalties lie with small businesses rather than large corporations with centralized power.

Still, though the battle might have been won by the brokers this time around, there are plenty of observers from both sides who think the war is not yet over.

On June 20, RBC chief operating officer Barbara Stymiest told an audience at the Economic Club of Toronto the bank was "not discouraged" from its pursuit of changes to insurance regulations, despite the government white paper.

Although other banking insiders admit there will likely be no change in the government position without a majority in Ottawa, the significance of Ms. Stymiest's comments is not lost on the insurance brokers.

"I don't think the debate has come to an end," said IBAC's Mr. Danyluik. He said the banks will continue to come after the brokerages. In the meantime, he said, the brokers will continue to push their arguments with individual MPs, and they will be ready for a rematch.
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07 July 2006

Cdn Banks vs. US Banks

  
BMO Capital Markets, 7 July 2006

Highlights

• After an extended period of annual outperformance, Canadian banks have so far in 2006 lagged their U.S. peers. We believe that the relative correction between the two groups should be largely complete given the current relative valuation.

• Canadian banks deserve to trade at better relative metrics than they have in the past—their ROEs have trended higher and their Tier 1 ratios have also improved dramatically. These changes have not only occurred in absolute terms, but also on a relative basis when compared to U.S. banks. Today, compared to their U.S. peers, Canadian banks are producing higher ROEs on better balance sheets. We believe that this justifies some relative revaluation premium for Canadian banks.

• The conventional wisdom is that Canadian banks are currently more expensive than their U.S. peers. This is certainly a debatable point, given the recent relative correction. From a P/E perspective, Canadian banks are trading on par with U.S. banks—roughly in line with the longer-term averages. On P/BV, Canadian banks have certainly moved to large premium valuations, but this simply reflects the better balance sheets and ROE. When one considers price to tangible book value, the Canadian relative valuations are higher than in the past, but appear essentially in line with their U.S. peers.

• We believe that Canadian banks are likely to have better earnings performance going forward than their U.S. counterparts. Canadian loan growth is accelerating, as business demand for credit is increasing and as consumer demand for credit remains strong. Over the past year, earnings revisions for U.S. banks have been flat or negative while the trend for Canadian bank earnings estimates has been positive.

Canadian Bank Relative Valuation Has Changed Somewhat

After trading for most of the 1990s at material discounts to their U.S. peers, Canadian banks stocks have clearly moved to more expensive relative valuation metrics. Charts 1 and 2 show this to be the case, particularly in the case of P/BV.

We should note that it is impossible to look at U.S. bank valuations over long time periods without appreciating that there is a heavy “survivorship” bias to any U.S. bank series: the smaller banks are acquired, while the bigger ones do the acquiring. In the Canadian situation, there is little, if any, such bias—Canadian banks have been, and will likely for the foreseeable future continue to be, restricted from further consolidation.

We believe that outside of this issue, the changes in Canadian bank fundamentals continue to warrant some revaluation. Specifically, we point to two variables: better balance sheets and improved ROEs, both driven by shifting business mix. We address these points later in this report.

One metric that receives less attention (largely because it is difficult to track) is price to tangible book value (P/TBV). This subtracts goodwill and intangibles from book value, and therefore is more consistent with the regulators’ definition of Tier 1. On this basis (see Chart 3), Canadian banks appear to be similarly priced at a 5% discount to their U.S. peers, but more expensive than they have been in the past. Again, we believe that the improved ROEs and Tier 1 ratios of the Canadian banks actually argue for even higher P/TBV multiples.

Canadian Banks Have Been Building Balance Sheet Strength

Canadian bank balance sheets have become meaningfully better than their U.S. peers’ (see Chart 4). Canadian bank Tier 1, the most useful metric in establishing balance sheet strength, has improved materially because of a fundamental shift toward lower risk businesses. Specifically, Canadian banks have moved away from high-risk corporate loans (100% risk weighted) to lower risk residential mortgages (50% risk weighted, or 0% risk weighted if insured). This has allowed Canadian banks to limit risk-weighted asset growth and to retain excess capital, which bolsters Tier 1 ratios.

On the U.S. side, banks have generally been less successful in shifting loan mix away from business lending. Furthermore, the extensive amount of M&A activity in the U.S. has resulted in dramatic increases in the amount of goodwill on bank balance sheets. As this is subtracted from common equity in the calculation of Tier 1 capital, it has had a materially negative impact on U.S. balance sheet strength.

Whatever the cause, the reality is that Canadian bank balance sheets have improved versus their U.S. peers’. This is one reason why Canadian bank stocks should trade at better valuations than U.S. banks.

We note that some analysts who attempt to consider leverage continue to focus on assets to equity rather than a risk-based metric such as Tier 1. We find this extremely simplistic. While the risk-weighting approach of Basel I is clearly very primitive, the approach of ignoring the riskiness associated with assets borders on pre-historic. The only benefit of focusing on assets to equity is expediency—it requires less work.

Canadian ROEs Have Improved While U.S. ROE Have Been Stagnant

A second fundamental change that warrants better valuations for Canadian banks is the relative change in ROE. As we show in Chart 5, Canadian bank ROE have risen significantly over the past few years, while the U.S. peers’ have remained relatively stable.

This trend has occurred because Canadian banks have been shifting their business mix toward higher ROE operations such as wealth management. In addition, banks continue to grow their mortgage book as a percentage of overall loans. Given the 0–50% risk weighting of these assets, the ROE can remain solid despite tight margins—especially if mortgages are used as “anchors” to cross-sell other products.

The improved performances on both an ROE and Tier 1 basis are clearly correlated. Shifting to lower risk-weighted assets results in higher ROE, but also drives up Tier 1. The higher ROE (allowing banks to generate and retain more capital), in the face of stable RWAs, have bolstered the balance sheets.

We Believe the Relative Performance Gap Will Continue

The past is history. Improved fundamentals warranted a revaluation of Canadian banks. The issue for investors is how the difference plays out in the future. As we look at it, there are several reasons suggesting that the better relative performance of Canadian banks should continue in the coming years.

1) Earnings revisions are still to the upside in Canada

As we show below, over the past year, Canadian bank earnings revisions have, broadly speaking, been positive, on the back of better than expected loan loss experiences and excellent core loan growth. In addition, spreads have essentially stabilized. In the U.S., however, spreads (particularly on the deposit front) remain under pressure, offsetting strong loan growth. This has led to minor or negative earnings revisions.

2) Canadian banks are less vulnerable to an Inverted Yield Curve

Canadian banks typically do not “play” the yield curve—the core retail book in Canada is profitable enough that Canadian banks have shied away from taking the inherent interest rate risk that can arise from customer preference for shorter-duration deposits and longer-duration loans. For perspective, we note that Canadian spreads have been declining for five years—even during a period of a relatively steep yield curve. The driving factor behind spread compression is largely mix: higher levels of thin-margin secured lending. We believe much of this mix shift is now complete and that, even if the flat yield curve continues, Canadian bank spreads will be stable to rising.

3) Canadian banks are less vulnerable to a broad-based North American economic slowdown

Canadian banks have shifted meaningfully from business lending to personal lending and from unsecured to secured lending. While Canadian banks have largely felt the impact of this shift through tighter spreads, we believe the benefit—structurally lower loan losses—will become more apparent in the next slowdown. Essentially, we believe that Canadian bank loan losses will be less sensitive to a broad based economic slowdown.

4) Further U.S. dollar weakness would mitigate any relative performance for U.S. Banks

Over the past several years, Canadian dollar strength has benefitted Canadian bank investors. It is noteworthy that even so far in 2006, half of the relative move in U.S. banks versus Canadian banks has been erased by currency revaluation. While we don’t expect material additional weakness in the U.S. dollar against the “loonie,” we believe the bias is still in favour of the Canadian dollar.

Which U.S. Banks Are the Right Comparison?

Canadian banks are essentially a hybrid of their U.S. bank peers. They are more like US Money Centers than U.S. regional banks, but they are more like regional banks than are the U.S. Money Centers. In addition, they have large wealth management and fee based components – which is quite different from most U.S. banks.

As such, any comparison of U.S. and Canadian banks must first establish valid benchmarks. Our approach was to establish a core group of U.S. banks that are, in aggregate, similar to Canadian bank business models. This list (shown in Table 2) includes the Money Center Banks (Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase), numerous regional banks (such as BB&T, Key, Regions, etc.), several super-regionals (Bank of America, Wells Fargo, etc.) and a handful of private banking/custody banks (Northern Trust, Bank of New York, State Street, Mellon, etc.). We have also included some broker-dealers. For our analysis, these were equally weighted so as to limit the exposure to mega-cap banks such as Citigroup and Bank of America.

Consistent with this approach, we have also equally weighted the six Canadian banks. While this provides National Bank with more importance than a cap-weighted average would, it is probably a reasonable approach, as it reduces the volatility created by any one of the five larger banks. Furthermore, the approach is used over the entire time period.

One concern we have with our U.S. database is the reality that it has an ongoing survivorship bias. As we have indicated previously, the extensive amount of consolidation in the U.S. means that any long-term data series is skewed toward the companies that are bigger and are acquirers, rather than ones that are smaller and are acquired. In Canada, the lack of consolidation activity means that this is not an issue.

A further point of note is that our Canadian data are a simple average of six names. The small number means that a meaningful jump in valuation in a single bank could distort the averages. The good news is that there have not been meaningful variations across the six other than National has typically traded at a discount, while TD has typically traded at a premium.

To ensure that a specific event at a specific bank doesn’t skew the P/Es, we have analyzed the data and removed any individual bank for a time period where it dramatically distorts the data. Specifically, we removed Royal during its commercial real estate debacle, TD during its “sectoral phase” and CIBC after the Enron fiasco. Including these periods would argue that Canadian banks are even cheaper today than historically (i.e., we removed periods when earnings were low and P/Es were elevated).

A similar situation occurs within the U.S. data when considering Tier 1 ratios. Some of the U.S. group—mainly the brokers Merrill and Morgan—can occassionally skew the data and were therefore removed from our list for analysis purposes.

Finally, we have tried to use identical time frame and data series for all our analysis. This was not always possible but when using different data sources, we back tested (and, where appropriate, extended the data ourselves) to ensure consistency.
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RBC to Grow in Georgia, Florida

  
Triangle Business Journal, Lee Weisbecker, 7 July 2006

Downtown Raleigh may be RBC Centura's choice as prime real estate for its headquarters, but a new plan for accelerated branch growth continues the bank's focus on areas outside North Carolina - in Atlanta and south Florida.

Bank officials, including RBC Centura President Scott Custer, initially had targeted 2007 for a growth spurt of up to 15 to 20 branches in high-growth markets in Georgia, primarily the Atlanta area, and in south Florida.

Under the altered scenario, RBC will develop 12 branches in those areas by the end of the summer with an additional 10 in fiscal 2007. "The plan has been accelerated," says spokesman Cameron Kelly.

As of March 31, RBC Centura, which is the U.S. retail banking operation of Royal Bank of Canada, had 277 branches - a large majority, 186, in North Carolina. In Georgia, the current tally stands at 30 branches, with 37 in Florida, according to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

The addition of branch offices is intended to help spur both deposits and market share for RBC Centura, which lost money in 2004 but began turning around its bottom line in 2005.

In the period from March 31, 2005, to the same date in 2006, total assets climbed by 6 percent, to $20.5 billion, deposits and loans advanced by 9 percent and 10 percent, respectively, and net income shot up by 28 percent, to $27 million, according to the FDIC.

The only fly in the ointment was a 40 percent rise in loans either 90 days past due or classified as being in non-paying status.

That item rose from $77 million in 2005 to $108 million as of March 2006. Expressed in terms of noncurrent loans to total loans, the $108 million figure gave RBC Centura a performance ratio in the category of 0.84 percent - not yet cause for alarm.

"Generally you begin to get concerned when this number gets above 1 (percent)," says University of North Carolina at Charlotte finance professor Tony Plath. "And I would doubt that Centura has a systemic problem with its entire loan portfolio. Banks generally are not struggling with loan quality issues in the Southeast."

Kelly says the rise in nonperforming loans can be attributed to "two large credits" and doesn't reflect any deterioration in the bank's overall portfolio.

Since Royal Bank's purchase of Centura in 2001, the bank has expanded south either by building new branches or buying multiple branches in small acquisitions.

Kelly says acquisitions won't play a role in the next expansion phase.

The new offices, following the general rule of thumb in the industry, can cost up to $1.5 million each to outfit and/or build and staff. They generally are expected to lose up to $250,000 in the first year and begin to turn a profit after 18 months.

As far as the bank's overall strategy is concerned, analysts say Centura is right on the money in terms of its geographic choices of Atlanta and south Florida.

But Centura is far from alone in targeting those areas, and the concern is becoming whether both will become over-banked.

In Atlanta, for instance, as of June 30, 2005, that city and its environs had $94 billion in total deposits and was being served by 138 different banks.

Centura has 28 offices in the greater Atlanta area with $819 million in deposits and a 12th place market share of 0.87 percent.

Peyton Green, who covers southern banking for FTN Midwest Research in Memphis, says that when economic conditions and credit quality are good, as they are now, there is always a rush to add offices.

"The bigger banks do it, and there are a lot of new startups in these markets, so new branches are coming from both sources," he says. "When things turn softer, they'll begin realizing their numbers aren't living up to expectations and the market is rationalized. It's the normal cycle."

Neither Green nor members of his family own shares in Royal Bank.
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