08 March 2008

BMO Leads Decline as Bank Stocks Sideswiped

  
The Globe and Mail, Derek DeCloet, 8 March 2008

Bay Street has the memory of a goldfish, so when the place is still buzzing with talk of a deal that happened two weeks ago, you know that people were caught by surprise.

Royal Bank of Canada's $1.4-billion score of Phillips Hager & North, the venerated, privately held Vancouver money manager, is that type of deal. Sure, it's only $1.4-billion. But in financial circles, a sense of shock lingers. Up and down the Street, they shake their heads. Can you believe PH&N's partners sold? Can you believe who the buyer is? Gordon Nixon, of all people. As if he needs it.

In banking, the rich have always gotten richer. But never before have we seen the kind of disparities that are emerging. Ten years ago, RBC, the biggest bank, was about $8-billion bigger by market value than the smallest member of the Big Five. How the gap has grown: the blue gorilla is $14-billion larger than anyone else and three times the size – nearly $38-billion larger – than Bank of Montreal. Hard to fathom that the two were plotting a “merger of equals” in 1998.

Why did this happen? It's easy enough to say that RBC went on an acquisition binge and BMO didn't. But why? Because it could and BMO couldn't, even if it wanted to.

The PH&N deal underscores the difference. The firm's partners were not forced to sell and, as a owners of a trophy asset, could have been mercenaries. But RBC had the inside track because it wasn't just about money; it was about culture, too. Those close to the situation say it's unlikely PH&N would have sold to BMO or Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce – even at a higher price. Winners like to be with winners, after all.

Some investors are getting a hard lesson in BMO's culture, and its shortcomings, after a 10-day period in which its stock price dropped 21 per cent. There is no financial crisis at the bank but it's not a stretch to say there is a full-blown crisis of confidence. And that is a direct consequence of a serious cultural flaw: BMO seems to have a very hard time admitting mistakes.

Most other banks, when in trouble, try to get it out of the way at once. Several years ago, when Toronto-Dominion Bank began sinking in the quicksand of the telecom bust, it swallowed hard and wrote off $2.5-billion in corporate loans in a single year. CIBC took a $2-billion loss on subprime mortgages in January and announced a capital infusion the same day. But with Bank of Montreal, bad news is delivered like water torture.

Drip: One day the bank says it lost up to $450-million on natural gas trades. Drip: A few weeks later it's $680-million. Drip: The bank announces a grab bag of nearly $500-million in writeoffs, including some related to trusts called Apex and Sitka. Drip: Ten days later, it says those trusts are in trouble and more writeoffs seem likely. Drip: Here's another small loss on another structured investment called Fairway Finance. (By the way, try searching BMO's annual report for any mention of Apex, Sitka, or Fairway. You won't find it.) Now, at least one analyst is musing about a dividend cut (unlikely) or an equity sale to improve the balance sheet.

Is it any wonder that the market is expecting the worst? But poor disclosure is not the most insidious consequence of BMO's defensive, insular culture. When a company – any company – hates to own up to its mistakes, it usually declines to hold accountable the people who made them.

The bank seems deathly allergic to getting rid of the old guard or bringing in fresh talent. Check out the executive team – they're BMO lifers. Chief executive officer Bill Downe has been there since 1983. So has the woman who runs the Harris Bank division. The guy who runs the retail bank has been a BMO employee since about 1985.

If the bank was a stellar performer, some management stagnation would be understandable. But BMO's growth in revenue has been slow – below the average of other Canadian banks in each of the past three years. In retail banking, it has been losing market share. But it's hard to think up new ideas for fixing these problems when it's the same people sitting around the table. Even the recent management “shakeup” brought in only one new face, an interim chief financial officer.

So the talent, and the good assets, go elsewhere. BMO doesn't get to buy PH&N; Royal Bank does. BMO doesn't get Mike Pedersen, the highly regarded Barclays banker who returned to Canada last year; TD hires him instead. Good culture begets success, which attracts good people, which brings more success. This is the virtuous circle RBC and TD have created. BMO doesn't have it. What it desperately needs is some new blood.
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The Globe and Mail, Tara Perkins, 8 March 2008

If Bay Street were a high school, Bank of Montreal would have been the kid who was always hanging out in the library. A little small for its age, it had earned a reputation for staying away from trouble. That is, until last year.

Canada's fourth-biggest bank has been shedding its reputation for risk aversion at a tremendous clip, and its problems have coincided with the tenure of Bill Downe, who marked his first anniversary at the helm on March 1.

A couple of months after taking over, Mr. Downe was forced to announce mysterious troubles in BMO's U.S. natural gas trading operations that wound up costing the bank more than $800-million. More land mines emerged when the credit crunch erupted and BMO's first-quarter earnings were shaved by $490-million as a result. Needless to say, BMO is no longer the bank you would bring home to meet the parents. BACK TO BASICS

Mr. Downe, 55, is embarking on a plan to bring it back to basics. “We're a fundamentally different company going into 2008 than we were going into 2007,” he said in a telephone interview yesterday. That ought to be a source of confidence, he added.

His plan includes a renewed focus on consumer and business banking, something that Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce is also doing as an antidote to the injuries it has suffered in capital markets.

“We really have been shifting the centre of gravity in the company toward our personal and commercial banking business in Canada and the United States, and rebuilding our competitive position in those areas,” Mr. Downe said. Coupled with wealth management, he expects this area to grow to make up 65 to 70 per cent of the bank, up from roughly 60. “You're talking about an organization that has a $390-billion balance sheet and so a seven point shift in proportion is very large.”

But even if this means BMO's investment banking operations eventually shrink, for now they continue to eat up much of management's time – and the market's concern.

Mr. Downe's team is negotiating to restructure two Canadian asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) trusts, collectively known as Apex. The bank faces a $500-million writedown if talks fail. One of Apex's investors is hanging on to a $400-million funds transfer that BMO wants back, while a counterparty isn't paying back $600-million BMO claims it's owed.

“We are offering to provide additional support to Apex in a controlled amount. We would expect other investors to do the same,” Mr. Downe said. “The parties have been basically sitting in a standstill mode, and I don't think you can stay that way forever. So, it's my hope that we'll actually see resolution of these things in the next couple of weeks. I think people will come to terms or they won't.”

If they do, BMO will have provided a level of financial support that's still up for debate, but Mr. Downe said the bank can resolve Apex and still have more than enough capital to satisfy regulators.

There has been talk the bank might sell a chunk of equity or cut its dividend. But Mr. Downe suggested neither option is in the cards. “The size of the issues that we're dealing with relative to the earning power of the bank needs to be kept in perspective,” he said.

In fact, he suggested BMO expects to have enough left over after the Apex restructuring to be able to participate in a backup credit line for the frozen $33-billion third-party Canadian ABCP sector. “I think both Apex and the Montreal Accord will get resolved relatively soon, they need to be resolved, and when Apex is resolved then we will signal that we're supporters of the Montreal Accord once again and we'll participate with the other Canadian banks.”

Analysts are also concerned about a U.S. ABCP conduit, Fairway Finance Company LLC, because BMO was forced to take some troubled mortgage assets on its books. “I would stand behind the quality of this portfolio,” Mr. Downe said.

One of the most surprising things to come out of BMO's reporting this week was a large increase in its provisions for bad loans. As the economic outlook diminishes, BMO has combed its books and put many companies with outstanding borrowing on a watch list. “I think, personally, it's going to be an industry-wide phenomenon,” he said.

Mr. Downe is splitting his time these days between customers, investors and employees, all of whom require extra attention.

Many want to know whether more nasty surprises lurk.

“The things you worry about are the things you don't know you don't know,” he said. But it comforts him that all of the recent trouble spots were already on his radar in August.

“They all fell into the category of ‘we knew what we didn't know,' and that was exactly how long markets were going to be difficult, what the resolution would be, [and] where the problems would show up outside of BMO that would impact us.”

He said that he and the team have benefited from the past six months because they've gone through the portfolios and balance sheet “in excruciating detail.”

The next couple of quarters will be rocky, no doubt, and challenges in the financial sector will continue. Most of the stimulus that's been applied to the U.S. economy doesn't kick in until the third quarter, and “there's clearly a huge volume of subprime debt sitting in different portfolios that people are going to have to deal with.”

But Mr. Downe, who has shuffled his management teams in risk management and investment banking, said “my optimism is born of the changes that are under way in the company.”
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The Globe and Mail, Tara Perkins, 6 March 2008

Bank of Montreal bore the brunt of investor concern over Canadian banking's credit crunch woes yesterday, leading a dramatic stock market drop across the sector.

Speculation that Swiss bank UBS has sold a massive mortgage portfolio at a large discount, coupled with news that Citigroup Inc. plans to cut its U.S. consumer mortgage portfolio by about one-fifth in the next year, helped to drive down the shares of many banks around the world.

But while the Canadian banking sector fell roughly 4 per cent, BMO's shares lost 6.7 per cent to close at $41.97, as investors struggled to understand its latest troubled spot, a U.S. asset-backed commercial paper conduit it sponsors called Fairway Finance Company LLC.

The bank has lost $5.2-billion in market value over the past week as its stock dropped $10.38. While the sector is down about 10 per cent over that period, BMO shares have lost nearly 20 per cent.

Investors are increasingly lumping Bank of Montreal in the same camp as Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, which was punished for its oversized exposure to the struggling U.S. subprime mortgage market.

When it comes to the Big Six banks, "we are truly, truly in a freefall now," said Genuity Capital Markets analyst Mario Mendonca.

"If you want to be invested in banks, there are only two that will keep you from embarrassing yourself this year — TD and Scotiabank."

He places Royal Bank of Canada in the middle of the banking pack.

National Bank Financial analyst Robert Sedran downgraded BMO's shares to "underperform" this week, saying that the falling outlook for its earnings and continuing issues related to the liquidity crisis will likely weigh on its stock.

Some investors are waiting for another shoe to drop.

"There are obviously a lot of issues with their structured products, and now a new one has occurred — the Fairway one," said Shane Jones, managing director of Canadian equities at Scotia Cassels Investment Counsel Ltd. "What else is there?"

BMO said this week that it had taken a $39-million provision in the first quarter relating to Fairway Finance, which creates commercial paper by gathering up loans, mortgages and other interest-paying assets and repackaging them to be sold to investors as short-term paper. Fairway's problems stem from a $459-million deal it did with a company that buys troubled mortgages at a discount. Falling U.S. house prices caused the assets to fall below investment grade, so BMO took them onto its own balance sheet. The bank provides a $10.2-billion backup liquidity line to Fairway, and $624-million had been drawn at the end of the quarter.

RBC Dominion Securities Inc. analyst André-Philippe Hardy wrote in a note that BMO might have to take more of Fairway's assets on to its books, increasing the chance of writedowns. Genuity's Mr. Mendonca told investors to prepare for a charge of at least $400-million from Fairway.

Mr. Hardy added that he's worried investors in the commercial paper might be less attracted to it if they don't trust the underlying asset quality.

BMO says less than 0.5 per cent of the assets are subprime mortgages. Fairway does have about $2-billion of assets guaranteed by bond insurers, but none of the guarantees come from beleaguered ACA Capital Holdings. Fairway was established in 1997 by a team led by Jeff Phillips, currently the executive managing director of the bank's U.S. securitization group in Chicago.

That group parted ways with some key investment bankers early last year. Five former employees, led by Pete Walsh, who had been co-head of origination and structuring for about seven years, went on to start their own hedge fund and are still in the midst of a lawsuit with BMO over bonuses they say they are owed.

Investors are also fretting because BMO is still in negotiations to restructure two Canadian ABCP trusts. If the talks fall through, it will take a $500-million writedown in the coming quarter. And one of the trusts' investors is fighting BMO's demand that it return a $400-million funds transfer, while the bank is fighting a counterparty for $600-million it says its owed.

BMO has long been the big fish in Canada's ABCP market and is now dealing with its share of the problems.

"This is a good business," chief executive officer Bill Downe said after the bank's annual meeting Tuesday.

While many analysts say they would not rule out an equity infusion, Mr. Downe said he has not considered one.
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Reuters, Lynne Olver, 6 March 2008

Shares of Bank of Montreal plunged 6.8% on Thursday, extending this week's slide, on concerns about the health of the bank's structured-credit investments and the higher provisions for loan losses it announced on Tuesday.

"The number that really spooked people was the jump in specific provisions," said Ohad Lederer, an analyst at Veritas Investment Research in Toronto.

That was just the latest in a string of bad news from BMO dating back a year, he noted.

If loan-loss provisions had been the sole issue, "investors would have taken the stock down a peg and that would have been the end of it, but this is coming on the back of what has been a pretty dismal year," Lederer said.

Bank of Montreal stock tumbled to $41.97 on the Toronto Stock Exchange on Thursday, down $3.05 on heavy volume. During the session it dropped as low as $41.57, its lowest level since June 2003.

The stock has lost just over a quarter of its value year-to-date, the worst showing among its peers in 2008. This week alone BMO shares have fallen 15.5%.

Last year, BMO took hundreds of millions of dollars in natural gas trading losses and missed many of its full-year financial targets as a result.

In 2008, ripples from the global credit crunch have hit various BMO sponsored asset-backed commercial paper and structured investment vehicles, prompting more writedowns.

And then the credit-loss provisions: BMO said on Tuesday that its specific provisions jumped in the first quarter and the bank raised its forecast for specific provisions to about $680 million for the year, well above its earlier estimate of $475 million.

Some analysts even suggest the bank, Canada's fifth-largest by market capitalization, may be forced to issue new shares or cut its dividend if things worsen.

Mario Mendonca, an analyst at Genuity Capital Markets in Toronto, said he "would not rule out" an equity issue or dividend cut if BMO faces additional charges from its exposure to several ABCP trusts, known as Apex, Sitka and Fairway Finance.

Asked about a potential stock issue or dividend cut on a conference call this week, president and chief executive Bill Downe said "it's not something that we have contemplated."

At the annual meeting in Quebec City on Tuesday, Mr. Downe said that his bank was not alone in taking structured-credit writedowns because of global events, but he acknowledged the bank's positions had grown too large for its risk tolerance.

With the slide in BMO's share price, its dividend yield rose to 6.7% on Thursday, double the Canadian industry average.

"A 6% dividend yield should offer some support at these levels against greatly reduced expectations, but operating challenges remain," TD Securities analyst Jason Bilodeau said in a research note.

Another analyst disagreed.

"Although it boasts a dividend yield of over 6%, we do not expect the bank's yield will provide much support or create a floor, despite our faith that the dividend remains safe," Dundee Securities analyst John Aiken wrote in a note.

Things may brighten if BMO can resolve its problems with the Sitka and Apex commercial paper trusts, another predicted.

"There is upside to the bank's share price, in our view, if BMO can quickly restructure these assets," RBC Capital Markets analyst Andre-Philippe Hardy said.

Canadian financial stocks retreated 3.4% on Thursday as part of a broad market decline.

The S&P/TSX financials index has fallen 13.5% year-to-date, outpacing the 3.4% drop in the S&P/TSX composite index.
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07 March 2008

CIBC's $100 Million+ Retention Plan for Its Stockbrokers

  
The Globe and Mail, Andrew Willis & Boyd Erman, 7 March 2008

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce rolled out a $100-million-plus retention plan Thursday aimed at preventing defections among 1,300 stockbrokers at the bank, which has been battered by U.S. credit woes.

CIBC will advance up to $300,000 to its financial advisers in the form of a loan that will be forgiven over 10 years, providing the stockbrokers stay with the firm, according to documents distributed internally to staff. CIBC has not publicly released details of the compensation plan, which is scheduled to take effect in June.

Top producers at the bank's brokerage division, CIBC Wood Gundy, who already make more than $1-million a year by generating more than $2-million in commissions, would be eligible for the $300,000 loan. The average financial adviser generates revenues of $867,000 for the bank, takes home $400,000 and would be able to borrow $125,000. At the low end of the scale, a new, green broker who takes home $50,000 could borrow $30,000.

"This plan is part of an ongoing investment in our high-value Wood Gundy brokers and our investment advisers," a spokesman for CIBC said.

This type of retention scheme has been used before at many financial institutions. CIBC unveiled the loans in the wake of a quarter that saw the bank lose $1.46-billion, after extensive writedowns of U.S. subprime mortgages and other credit holdings.

CIBC stockbrokers are partly paid in bank stock, which is down 36 per cent in price over the past year, and that has created unrest in the ranks.

"They are very worried about clients and brokers being so disgusted with CIBC that there could be a mass exodus," said one executive at the bank, who asked for anonymity.

CIBC's new compensation plans is seen as a sound business strategy by analysts. "The forgivable loan is a pretty popular tool in the industry," said Robert Sedran at National Bank Financial. "The broker network is highly valued all over the Street, everyone is trying to add stockbrokers and it's very important to retain your best people."

Rivals have stepped up efforts to hire away CIBC stockbrokers in the wake of the bank's recent troubles, which began in October. Executives at rivals say the new loan plan plays on the psychology of financial advisers, and should limit recruiting by rivals.

"Brokers are like the general public: Guys go out and spend it, and then they're left saying 'Jeez, if I leave the firm I have to pay back this $200,000 or $300,000 loan, so I'm just going to stay where I'm at,'" said the head of wealth management at another dealer. He said the amounts involved are enough to deter poaching, as a rival trying to hire from CIBC would have to shell out a bonus to help repay the loan.

CIBC's chief executive officer, Gerry McCaughey, introduced a lucrative retention plan in 2001 when he brought aboard 1,000 Merrill Lynch stockbrokers. That scheme, which expired this year, is seen as successful, as there were relatively few defections.

The bank now employs 1,300 stockbrokers who oversee $121-billion in client assets. Internal documents show CIBC is targeting $210-billion of assets, with the same-sized adviser force, in five year's time.

What CIBC's stockbrokers receive up front, in the form of forgivable loans, they may lose down the road, suggested executives at several rival dealers. They said the bank, and rivals, may try to offset the cost of retention schemes down the road by reducing commissions or other compensation for brokers.

Stockbrokers are typically paid on what's known as a grid, with the percentage of commissions they take home rising as they bring in more money. One rival executive said: "I bet you dollars to doughnuts that within six to nine months they will cut their grid to pay for this."
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05 March 2008

Scotiabank Q1 2008 Earnings

  
RBC Capital Markets, 5 March 2008

Scotiabank's Q1/08 GAAP EPS of $0.82 were below our estimate of $1.05 and consensus of $1.00, primarily because of write-downs related to capital markets activities, although international and domestic banking were also below our expectations.

• If adding back the capital markets write-downs, EPS would have been $0.17 higher.

Lowering EPS estimates and target price

We maintain our Sector Perform rating but are lowering our 12-month target price per share by $1 to $49 to reflect lower estimated EPS.

• Our core cash 2008E EPS is down $0.10 to $4.20 while our 2009E core cash EPS is down $0.05 to $4.45, in large part reflecting higher estimated loan losses given rapidly deteriorating economic conditions in the U.S.

• Management is maintaining its diluted EPS growth objective of 7-12% which translates into approximately $4.30 to $4.50 per share. Our 2008 GAAP EPS estimate of $4.00 is below management's guidance, as is the case with most other banks.

• Our 12-month target price per share of $49 implies multiple compression from today's levels; from 2.5x to 2.3x on a P/BV basis.

• Scotiabank has, in our mind, above-average medium- and long-term growth prospects compared to its peers due to its presence in Latin America and the Caribbean, and it is seemingly less exposed to headline risk in the near term. The bank's 10.9x 2008E P/E and 2.5x BV is at the high end of Canadian banks, which we believe caps potential expansion in relative valuation given its greater exposure to business lending and the rising Canadian dollar, while the domestic franchise lags the two leading banks' and credit headwinds are rising in Mexico, in our view.
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Financial Post, Grant Surridge, 4 March 2008

Bank of Nova Scotia said on Tuesday its first-quarter earnings dropped 18%, due mainly to substantial volatility in global financial markets.

Bank of Nova Scotia's first quarter profit fell 18% to $835-million (82 cents per share) from a year earlier, the bank said on Tuesday.

"While we had anticipated the first quarter to be difficult, results were weaker than expected," stated chief executive Rick Waugh."This was due primarily to substantial volatility in global financial markets. Our exposure to these stressed markets is modest and well diversified, but our portfolios did experience some valuation writedowns."

The bank said it took charges of $158-million on its structured credit portfolio and $80-million on its swap exposure to a monoline insurer.

Analysts had expected Scotiabank to earn $1.01 a share before exceptional items, according to Reuters Estimates.

Provisions for credit losses, which are rising across Canada's bank sector after years of record lows, increased 23% to $91-million.

Scotiabank said net income at its domestic banking unit rose 1.7% to $367-million.

Profit at Scotiabank's international operations, which include businesses in the Caribbean, South America and Mexico, fell 10.7% to $282-million.

Profit at Scotia Capital, the group's investment banking and capital markets unit, slumped 36% to $187-million from a year earlier as trading revenue fell.

Scotiabank has targeted earnings per share growth of 7% to 12% in 2008.
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The Globe and Mail, David Ebner, 5 March 2008

Roiled global credit markets helped drive down Bank of Nova Scotia's first-quarter profit by 18 per cent, but the bank said it was not hit as hard as its rivals and should be able to take advantage of the turbulence to make acquisitions.

"We are in a strong position to take advantage of opportunities that present themselves — opportunities that arise at uncertain times such as this," Rick Waugh, Scotiabank chief executive officer, told shareholders at the company's annual meeting yesterday in Edmonton.

In a session with reporters later, Mr. Waugh said Scotiabank, which has the broadest international focus among the domestic banks, would look to add to its assets in countries where it already operates. It has spent at least $2-billion on foreign acquisitions in the past two years. "It's more and more turning into a buyers' market," said Mr. Waugh, who left yesterday afternoon for several days of work in Brazil, one of the more than 40 countries in which the bank does business.

In the first quarter, Scotiabank profit fell to $835-million or 82 cents a share, down 18 per cent from $1.02-billion or $1.01 a year earlier. While Scotiabank's Canadian business posted a small gain to $367-million from $361-million, its investment brokerage, Scotia Capital, was hurt by what the bank called "unsettled" capital markets, seeing profit fall by roughly a third to $191-million from $296-million a year earlier. The bank's international business profit also fell, though less so, coming in at $282-million, down from $318-million, undercut by the higher Canadian dollar.

The first-quarter decline will "pose a challenge" for the bank, chief financial officer Luc Vanneste told shareholders, but added the company is maintaining its targets.

Analyst John Aiken of Dundee Securities Corp. said the bank's international business is a great long-term asset but "is also currently one of the areas of rising near-term concern," citing volatility, such as lower profits from Mexico. Mr. Aiken, in a report yesterday, added that concerns around Scotiabank are "nowhere near as severe as some of its peers."

Despite the lower profit, Mr. Waugh was upbeat yesterday, saying he was confident the bank's outlook was improving. "Crises do end and this one will," he told shareholders. Later, he told reporters that strong demand for the bank's various services and a steadier Canadian dollar are factors that underpin his confidence that the latter part of this year will be better for the bank.

In his address to shareholders, Mr. Waugh reiterated several themes he has promoted, led by the call for government endorsement of domestic bank mergers, as well as scrapping foreign ownership limits on Canadian banks.

Speaking with reporters, Mr. Waugh said he has always felt that domestic bank mergers are a matter of "when, not if," though he added that "when could be a very long time."

Mr. Waugh said the Canadian financial services business is competitive and broad — pointing to participants such as independent wealth management companies — and said he didn't feel competition is a fundamental issue in any debate over bank mergers.

Finally, at the annual meeting, one resolution on the "say-on-pay" question — where investors would have an advisory vote on executive pay — was supported by 39 per cent of those shareholders that voted. The result follows Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce shareholders voting 45 per cent in favour of the same idea last week, and 42 per cent of Royal Bank of Canada investors doing the same.

Arthur Scace, Scotiabank chairman, appeared surprised by the result, telling shareholders the bank would now look at it again closely.
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BMO Q1 2008 Earnings

  
Scotia Capital, 5 March 2008

• BMO reported an 8% decline in cash operating earnings to $1.21 per share from $1.31 per share a year earlier, below expectations. Reported cash earnings were $0.49 per share including $548 million ($362 million after-tax or $0.72 per share) in pre-announced charges.

What It Means

• The weak operating earnings were due to a $0.15 per share drag from the tripling of loan loss provisions along with weak earnings momentum from Canadian Retail. A 2% decline in revenue (excluding writedowns) compounded weak earnings growth.

• Uncertainty about potential losses on Apex/Sitka and SIVs persist

• We are reducing our 2008 and 2009 earnings estimates to $5.05 per share and $5.65 per share. We are reducing our 12-month share price target to $65 per share from $75 per share based on lower earnings outlook.

• Maintain 3-Sector Underperform due to continued concerns about relative earnings growth prospects.
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Financial Post, Jonathan Ratner, 5 March 2008

Bank of Montreal’s shares have fallen a whopping 14.5% in the last six trading days, dipping further on Tuesday after its first quarter results disappointed. They ended the day down just 3% at $46.89, after falling as low as $45.96.

RBC Capital Markets analyst Andre-Philippe Hardy, who shaved $5 off his price target to $49 per share, noted that BMO’s first quarter core cash earnings per share (EPS) came in at $1.21, lower than his estimate of $1.42. Roughly half of the shortfall was a result of higher-than-expected loan losses. The consensus estimate was $1.36.

The analyst cut his estimated core cash EPS for both 2008 and 2009 to reflect expectations for higher provisions for credit losses and lower estimates for the bank’s wholesale division.

While BMO’s valuation is now much lower that it has been in the recent past at 1.65 times book value, Mr. Hardy’s target price for the shares implies a valuation of 1.6 times.

“We believe that Bank of Montreal’s stock will underperform its peers as earnings revisions are likely to be more severe,” he said in a research note, adding that structured finance (Sitka and Apex) concerns may lurk over the stock for some time.

But if BMO can quickly restructure these assets, there is upside to the share price, he added.
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Financial Post, Duncan Mavin, 4 March 2008

Under the chandeliers of the Verchères ballroom in the historic Chateau Frontenac, Bank of Montreal's chief executive warned that BMO will not meet its profit targets for 2008 and also reflected on his turbulent first year at the helm of Canada's oldest bank.

"Where we fell short, I take responsibility," said Bill Downe at the bank's annual meeting in Quebec.

During Mr. Downe's first year in charge, BMO lost $850-million on a natural gas trading scandal, cut 1,100 positions at a cost of $159-million as it restructured a domestic retail franchise that has failed to keep pace with its peers, and took a $318-million writedown related to the credit crunch.

"It is hard to deny that this has been a challenging year for Bill," said BMO chairman David Galloway.

Those words will be of little comfort to investors who have seen BMO's stock price fall 14.5% in the last six trading session, to $46.89, a more sudden decline than any of its Canadian rivals have suffered since financial markets were gripped by uncertainty last year. It is the worst six-day performance for a Canadian bank stock in more than five years and the second steepest drop since the Asian financial crisis a decade ago.

If 2007 was bad, the continuing decline in BMO's stock price is because things have not become much better in the first quarter of 2008. Yesterday, the bank announced its profits for the quarter fell 27% compared to last year to $255-million. Mr. Downe said management no longer expects to meet earnings growth targets for the year.

"It is difficult to find many positives in the quarter," said Dundee Securities analyst John Aiken. "The outlook for Bank of Montreal is much weaker than it was at the end of the fourth quarter," he added.

BMO's capital markets group continues to be the source of most of the concerns.

The bank took $490-million of credit crunch writedowns in the quarter and admits it is likely to take another charge of $500-million if it can not restructure two struggling asset-backed commercial paper trusts known as Apex and Sitka.

Restructuring negotiations are ongoing, and the bank says there is still "underlying economic value" in the assets of the trusts.

But both Apex and Sitka have been downgraded and put under review by rating agency DBRS, and the bank revealed yesterday that there are disputes with two parties involved in the trusts worth a combined $1-billion.

BMO also confirmed it now has a definitive agreement to provide more than $12-billion in liquidity support to two structured investment vehicles (SIVs) that have been hit by the credit crunch. The quality of the assets in the two SIVs is high, the bank said.

BMO's management acknowledges further capital markets writedowns are possible, though Mr. Downe said the bank is not contemplating raising equity or cutting its dividend to shore up its balance sheet.

Still, there are other concerns for management, notably the impact of the slowdown in the U.S. economy on banking results in Canada and the U.S., especially higher than anticipated provisions for loan losses.

"About half of the shortfall [in first quarter earnings] versus estimates was due to higher than expected loan losses," said RBC Capital Markets analyst Andre Hardy in a note.

BMO said specific provisions for credit losses of $170-million is indicative of what should be expected for the rest of the year, implying provisions of $680-million for all of 2008. BMO had previously forecast lower specific loan losses of $475-million for the year.

"Credit quality is typical for this stage of the credit cycle, when we start seeing emerging deterioration in the performance of customer accounts," Mr. Downe said. "We have seen an increase in delinquencies which, while still below the industry average, is an early indicator of coming credit losses."
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The Globe and Mail, Tara Perkins, 4 March 2008

Bank of Montreal's board of directors is shopping for some extra expertise in risk management, as the bank seeks to return to its low-risk roots in the wake of several trading and investment stumbles.

The move, which follows a shuffle in senior management, came as chief executive officer Bill Downe acknowledged that the bank must change the way it handles some of its businesses.

"For us, 2007 was a year of transition — a year of many successes but also of challenges that tested and confirmed the resilience of BMO and the people who work here," Mr. Downe told shareholders yesterday at the bank's annual meeting in Quebec City.

"Where we fell short, I, as CEO, take responsibility."

The bank's first-quarter 2008 earnings further disappointed the market yesterday, despite its announcement weeks ago it would report $490-million worth of writedowns related to a host of problems stemming from the credit crunch.

Dundee Securities Corp. analyst John Aiken called it a "stunning earnings shortfall."

BMO chairman David Galloway told investors "the board has overseen a complete review of risk management systems and procedures in the bank.

"We are looking to strengthen our board with individuals with strong expertise in risk management," he said. "I've learned never to say never, but we are confident that we've taken positive steps forward."

Mr. Downe said it's now clear that, in a number of businesses, "our positions grew beyond what was in line with our risk tolerance and strategic direction."

And he promised change, including a reduction of capital in those businesses, a reduction in the size of the bank's off-balance-sheet business, a better balance between risk and return, tighter procedures and strong management oversight.

But Mr. Downe dismissed suggestions that there is something culturally amiss in BMO's investment banking division, BMO Nesbitt Burns.

The natural-gas-trading problem that cost the bank more than $800-million last year was a one-time issue that's separate from the current credit-crunch-related problems, he said.

Mr. Downe recently shook up his management ranks, and the new team will be in operation as of today.

But it's not yet clear when the end of the writedowns might come.

BMO is still in negotiations to restructure two asset-backed commercial paper trusts it sponsors, collectively known as Apex. If no deal is reached, the bank expects to take a $500-million writedown next quarter.

It also said yesterday that one Apex investor is fighting BMO's demand for the return of a $400-million funds transfer, while a counterparty is "disputing its obligations" to provide up to $600-million to the bank under a previous deal. Mr. Downe said he views those two amounts as "ordinary commercial transactions," rather than potential writedowns.

The bank said that while it "is confident in its position and will vigorously pursue its rights in these matters, it is not possible to determine the amount or probability of losses, if any, or whether any potential charges will be taken in the quarter ending April 30."

As it awaits the outcome of these negotiations and grows increasingly cautious about the outlook for the U.S. economy, the bank chose not to raise its dividend yesterday. And it's not likely to raise the dividend, or make any notable U.S. acquisitions, for the next while.

"Our first responsibility is to make sure the remaining issues are put behind us," Mr. Downe said. "I don't think that you have to rush to take advantage of those opportunities in the U.S."

BMO is also in the midst of looking through its lending portfolio to see whether it can reduce some of its business with "non-core" clients.

After reporting a 27-per-cent drop in first-quarter earnings to $255-million, BMO said yesterday it no longer believes it can meet its profit forecasts this year. However, Mr. Downe said the bank is not going to revise its target range. "Our management has to keep a focus."
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Dow Jones Newswires, 4 March 2008

Bank of Montreal down 16% in the past five sessions and it doesn't look like the slide is over. Whack of credit-related charges in 1Q chopped EPS by 72 Canadian cents, the third consecutive quarter of lower earnings. But analysts point to continued risks, including potential to move troubled SIVs on to balance sheet, and possible write-down of C$500M related to sponsored trusts facing margin calls. Potential litigation risks also. Loan-loss reservers higher, and BMO is exposed to US through Harris subsidiary.
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The Globe and Mail, Tara Perkins, 3 March 2008

Bank of Montreal executives will likely face tough questions from investors Tuesday as the bank failed to reach a restructuring deal on two asset-backed commercial trusts it sponsors by the close of business Monday, leaving the trusts vulnerable to meltdown as early as Tuesday if creditors seize assets.

Credit-rating agency DBRS placed the notes of Apex Trust and Sitka Trust, which are sponsored by BMO, "under review with negative implications," as the bank's negotiators continued talks with several banks that are counterparties to the trusts.

In total, the trusts face more than $500-million in potential collateral calls.

One counterparty to Sitka is now allowed to seize collateral, while a counterparty to Apex will be in a similar position Tuesday as grace periods to make payments expire.

"Counterparties to several additional transactions will be in a position to seize collateral before the end of this week if the trusts fail to fund outstanding margin calls or otherwise reach an agreement" with the counterparties, DBRS warned.

Bank of Montreal, which is holding its annual meeting in Quebec City Tuesday as it reports its first-quarter results, cautioned last month that it faced a $495-million writedown if the trusts were not restructured. More recently it added that there is also the risk of lawsuits.

Combined, investors including BMO hold $1.9-billion worth of paper from Apex and Sitka.

The bank has already taken $210-million in charges because of the trusts, which have become BMO's most pressing credit crunch-related problem. The bank has also disclosed that it will be taking a $160-million writedown Tuesday because of its exposure to beleaguered bond insurer ACA Financial; a $25-million hit due to structured investment vehicles and a further $175-million charge due to other issues related to the credit crunch.

Sources have told The Globe and Mail that BMO's credit troubles have pushed the bank to re-examine whether it can provide support to a backup line of credit for the restructuring of the $32-billion third-party asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market. That market has been frozen since it seized up in August as a result of the credit crunch, and a committee led by Toronto lawyer Purdy Crawford is still working to salvage it.

In early February, the committee announced that BMO, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada and Bank of Nova Scotia had each agreed in principle — subject to certain conditions — to join National Bank and other investors and asset providers who were providing support to a $14-billion backup credit line that's critical to a successful restructuring of the market. Canada's big banks were asked to contribute $2-billion in total.

The committee, which has repeatedly missed its self-imposed deadlines, was struggling to get firm commitments from the big banks in December as a key date loomed and so its financial adviser, JPMorgan Chase & Co., promised that if the banks didn't come through it would canvass the market for financing and, as a last resort, step in itself.

As the talks drag on, pressure is now mounting for the committee to turn to that alternative.

"The time is now to reassure the market and have JPMorgan come forward publicly with support and liquidity," said Ross Hendin, chief executive officer of Hendin Consultants. "If a bank like BMO is ready to suffer the public embarrassment of letting its conduits melt down, this is a clear indication of a very tough time in the market."

His associate Daryl Ching, managing partner of Clarity Financial Strategy, said that there's a growing chance the entire third-party ABCP committee will disband, given the problems.

"I would urge the committee to get it done as soon as possible," Mr. Ching said.

With all of the noise in the market concerning the credit crunch and bank writedowns, "it's a very scary time and the margin facility is much less attractive today than it was in December," he added. There's talk that the margin facility might become more expensive, because banks would want to hedge their exposure to it and that's becoming increasingly difficult to do, he said.

The committee said in December that it would likely pay 160 basis points for the credit line.

Other Canadian banks have indicated that they're still willing to contribute to the line.

"The issue has always been about the exact amount" that each bank would contribute, one source said Monday.

Mr. Crawford could not be reached for comment.

Prior to DBRS's announcement BMO shares fell 2.7 per cent, or $1.34, to close at $48.36 on the Toronto Stock Exchange Monday after suffering their biggest one-day drop in more than six years on Friday.

Influential Citigroup Inc. analyst Shannon Cowherd downgraded the stock to "hold" because of its significant exposure to the credit crunch.
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The Globe and Mail, Boyd Erman & Jacquie McNish, 29 February 2008

Bank of Montreal has signalled it may pull out of an effort to restructure $33-billion in stranded asset-backed commercial paper, as mounting woes in the global credit market leave the bank facing margin calls of more than $500-million on two of its own ABCP trusts.

According to sources, bank officials recently advised the group of ABCP investors seeking a fix for the market, known as the Crawford Committee, that BMO may no longer be able to honour its commitment to contribute to a $14-billion line of credit.

That credit line is the centrepiece of a plan to swap the frozen notes into new long-term bonds.

Bank of Montreal's specific commitment to the so-called liquidity line has never been disclosed, but it is one of four Canadian banks that agreed in December to provide as much as $2-billion in total. The remaining $12-billion is backed by a group of international banks.

Global credit markets have sold off so much more since December that financial institutions are facing the renewed prospect of additional losses on such structured products as ABCP.

Yet, if banks balk at helping the Crawford Committee, they raise the prospect of a fire sale of assets that would further drive down credit markets and exacerbate losses in other areas of their businesses.

BMO's problems are particularly acute, with the bank last week announcing $490-million in writedowns and this week facing as much as $495-million more because of the unravelling of two trusts that it runs.

"We are no longer in the same world that we were in December," said a person familiar with the discussions between the banks and the committee.

"We are struggling to hang on."

A spokesman for the committee said the group is still expecting all Canadian banks to support the restructuring.

"The negotiations with the banks are still ongoing, and Bank of Montreal is still very much a part of that," spokesman Mark Boutet said.

"The discussions are taking longer than we anticipated back in December given that market conditions are tougher than they were then."

The result is more delay for a restructuring process under way since August.

That's when the ABCP market went into convulsions as buyers boycotted amid concern that the paper was tied to U.S. subprime mortgages. The committee won't be able to send out documents detailing the planned restructuring this week, as planned, and sources said instead it will aim to do that by mid-March.

BMO's troubles are a vivid illustration of how the disintegration of so-called structured products like ABCP is undermining the financial industry's ability to cure its ills and aid clients stuck with foundering investments. More and more banks are finding that they don't have the capital because all available money is tied up plugging holes in their own balance sheets.

BMO is facing demands to post more than $500-million in new collateral for two trusts that it runs, known as Apex and Sitka, because their assets have slumped in value, sources said. The trusts have about $1.9-billion of paper outstanding that could be at risk if BMO doesn't ante up, because the financial institutions on the other sides of the derivatives in Apex and Sitka can begin to seize assets.

Ratings firm DBRS Ltd. yesterday slashed the ratings on the paper to the last grade before default, saying that the collateral calls were "significant." Bank of Montreal and DBRS both declined to comment on the size of the exposure.

BMO is facing a stark choice. On the one hand, if BMO decided to save its own trusts by anteing up to meet the collateral calls, it would avoid a $495-million writedown. That option comes with a heavy cost, because it would leave the bank with less capital to lend to its clients and for the liquidity line desired by the Crawford Committee.

If, on the other hand, BMO declines to save its own trusts, more money will be free to help the Crawford Committee bail out ABCP sold by smaller, non-bank companies such as Coventree Inc. This move would expose the bank to criticism that it sacrificed its own customers to aid those of other players.

Being part of the liquidity line "is hard to justify if you're a BMO executive or if you are a shareholder," said Colin Kilgour, who formerly ran a business setting up conduits such as ABCP trusts and is now helping ABCP investors navigate the restructuring. Analysts said it's likely that BMO has already decided to let Sitka and Apex go down, even though it would probably damage the bank's larger business in the securitization sector. BMO is the largest player in Canada and securitization generated $296-million in revenue for the bank in the last fiscal year.

Even if the bank propped Sitka and Apex up now, after one near-collapse and the downgrade from DBRS there would be likely be few buyers for the paper issued by the trusts and they would likely have trouble surviving for much longer anyway. Already, Apex paper is going unsold.
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The Globe and Mail, Boyd Erman & Tara Perkins, 27 February 2008

Bank of Montreal is facing the prospect of as much as $495-million in further writedowns unless it can find a way to save two asset-backed commercial paper trusts that are facing big losses.

The bank, which sponsors the trusts, was in last-minute talks Wednesday night to save them from a fire sale. Credit-rating company DBRS Ltd. said that BMO had until the “close of business” Wednesday to reach an agreement with a counterparty to swaps agreements held by Sitka Trust, otherwise the trust could end up facing a collateral call that could trigger losses.

Officials at BMO, which warned of the potential losses last week, declined to comment on the state of the talks Wednesday evening. DBRS said that it would provide an update as soon as more information became available.

Unless the bank reached a deal or anted up more collateral, after a grace period, “the swap counterparty will be entitled to seize the existing collateral” which could “lead to substantial losses for note holders,” DBRS said.

One of those note holders is another BMO-backed ABCP trust known as Apex, which has more than half its assets tied up in Sitka paper. Between the two trusts, there were about $1.9-billion of notes outstanding as of August, when the market went into crisis as buyers of the paper disappeared and the value of assets in the ABCP trusts began to fall.

BMO is in a tough spot because if it supports the trusts, it opens itself up to further losses should credit markets continue their downward spiral. If the bank doesn't offer up more collateral, and instead cuts the trusts loose, losses would be likely be limited to the $495-million in writedowns the bank warned of last week, but buyers of Apex and Sitka paper likely would be furious with BMO.

BMO has more than one counterparty seeking collateral, sources said, meaning that that even if the bank does get a deal in with the one party that set the Wednesday deadline, there could be more tense negotiations ahead with other financial institutions.

“The issue here is that, not only will BMO lose money, but so will the other investors in the notes of Sitka and Apex,” said Mario Mendonca, an analyst at Genuity Capital Markets. “I'm not sure BMO can stomach having these investors lose a lot of money.”

The trusts run by BMO were created to earn money by selling short-term notes that paid relatively low interest rates and investing the proceeds in so-called swaps that brought higher returns. The value of those swaps has plunged in the past six months as credit markets have swooned, leading the parties on the other side of the swaps to demand more collateral.

Toronto-based BMO has already taken charges in the past two quarters that total $210-million in relation to Apex/Sitka, leaving a net position of $495-million that could be written off if there was no restructuring of the trusts, the bank said last week.

The problem may bode ill for the restructuring of the $30-billion non-bank ABCP sector that's taking place under the auspices of the Crawford Committee. Some of the same counterparties that are pushing BMO are also involved in the other ABCP trusts, sources said.

A similar standstill with the swap counterparties to the non-bank trusts covered by the Montreal Accord expired on Feb. 22, with no word since on an extension. Those working on a deal say that an update should be forthcoming soon and that talks are productive.

“If the delay is due to swap counterparties becoming less supportive of the restructuring and they ask for margin to be posted, it could derail the restructuring,” said RBC Dominion Securities analyst Andre-Philippe Hardy.
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The Globe and Mail, Tara Perkins, 25 Feburary 2008

The Canadian credit card market is starting to show some signs of strain, but it would take severe cracks before banks backed off from this lucrative but little-understood business.

Rising credit card delinquency rates in the United States have reportedly prompted banks to tighten up their lending standards, making it hard for some consumers with maxed cards to borrow more.

Losses and delinquencies have also been ticking upward in Canada, according to credit rating agency Moody's Investors Service Inc. It has an index that tracks about $59.9-billion, or more than 80 per cent, of the Visa and MasterCard credit card receivables outstanding in Canada. It found that the charge-off rate – a measure of credit losses – climbed to 2.8 per cent in the third quarter of 2007 from 2.49 per cent a year earlier. The 90-plus day delinquency rate rose to 0.73 per cent, from 0.63 per cent a year earlier.

Moody's is still waiting for fourth-quarter data, but it's safe to say the market here is not eliciting the same level of concern as in the United States, where the agency has a negative outlook for the weakening credit card sector.

Canadian bankruptcies increased marginally in the fourth quarter, but employment levels were very strong, said Moody's vice-president Sumant Inamdar.

“We have no concerns about any of the Canadian credit card transactions that we rate,” echoed DBRS Ltd. senior vice-president Jerry Marriott.

In fact, it's clear banks here are salivating over this business and there's plenty of room for growth.

“Every bank suggests that the competition is more intense now than it has been in some time, and there's some evidence of that simply because you see all the loyalty programs offering more and becoming a little more creative,” said Genuity Capital Markets analyst Mario Mendonca.

One big new growth area is prepaid cards. “The marketing guys haven't even really turned their brain to how they can use MasterCard and Visa in that world,” said one industry veteran.

An example is Bank of Montreal's recent experiment with a prepaid travel Mosaik MasterCard, a type of hybrid between a credit card and a traveller's cheque.

Part of the reason for the lack of concern in the Canadian market is the relative strength of the economy.

There are also major differences between the businesses on either side of the border. The average Canadian adult has half as many credit cards as the average American, but uses each more often.

Canadians held 61.1 million credit cards at the end of 2006, up from 50.4 million in 2003. The annual amount spent on them rose to $214.70-billion from $150.49-billion during that period.

Importantly, it's estimated that roughly two-thirds of Canadian cardholders pay off their balances regularly, making cards more a payment tool than a method of borrowing.

That means less money to be made from interest payments, but banks also make large profits from fees that are paid by retailers when consumers pay with credit cards.

Banks that issue cards recoup about one to 1.5 per cent of the value of each dollar spent on the card through these fees. And there's more money to be made on foreign exchange when consumers shop abroad.

Add it all up, and there's still plenty of room for growth in the Canadian credit card market, where the number of cards has been increasing in recent years as the number of cards in the United States dropped.

“The big competition to card payments is cash, and cash is still king,” said the industry veteran.
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The Globe and Mail, Boyd Erman & Derek DeCloet, 23 February 2008

Inside his boardroom, Prem Watsa keeps an unusual artifact: a bronze bust of Sir John Templeton, the 95-year-old legend of value investing.

The item was a 50th birthday gift for the chairman of Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd., but also serves as a source of inspiration. The Templeton principles, after all, underpin much of Fairfax's investment philosophy: Be flexible; search around the world for the best bargains; and above all else, go against the crowd - buy when others are pessimistic, and sell when optimism rules.

It's the last of these that led Mr. Watsa - until recently one of the most beleaguered executives on Bay Street - to one of the most stunning investments of his career, and has given him a way to silence his many critics.

Fairfax this week disclosed an annual profit of $1.1-billion (U.S.) for 2007, nearly four times what the insurance and investment company had earned in its best year the year before. Much of that was the result of a single, contrarian bet the firm made that the world had got it wrong about risk.

Starting in 2003, and continuing through early 2007, Fairfax began to buy credit default swaps on U.S. companies. The buyer of such a derivative is essentially betting that the company's debt is overpriced - that the market has underestimated the odds of a financial failure.

Some of Fairfax's swaps were against the debt of so-called monoline insurers, companies like MBIA Inc. and Ambac Financial Group Inc., that guaranteed U.S. municipal bonds but had massive exposure to subprime mortgages and other risky debt.

"All you had to do was take a prospectus or you take their 10-K and you open it up and you say, 'Let me look at the risk factors,' " Mr. Watsa said. "It's all there. And what's amazing is that when you read it, you can't believe that these guys did what they did.

"They never worried about risk."

Neither did a lot of other people, until the credit crunch exposed tens of billions in toxic consumer debt, high-risk business loans, and complex, structured investment products. Some have called the U.S. mortgage crisis the biggest risk-management failure in financial history. Soothed by triple-A credit ratings, a strong economy and intricate risk-management plans, financial institutions and investors took on far more risk, and paid a much higher price, than they realized at the time.

The cause of their complacency, Mr. Watsa said, was the low volatility that prevailed between 2003 and 2006. "The only way that that could happen is we have to have a long period of stability - a long period where there wasn't any accidents. You'd never take that risk otherwise."

It also happened because too many banks, insurers, hedge funds and rating agencies were given a false sense of security by statistical models that told them the probability of a financial "accident" was low. Where they used spreadsheets and algebra, aging investors like Mr. Watsa, 57, relied on their instincts and decades of experience to tell them something was amiss. And the grey-hairs won.

"We were shocked at how low the risk premiums went," Mr. Watsa said.

"People thought, if there were any problems, the Federal Reserve would fix the problem. After all, we'd gone through the Russian crisis, we'd gone through Long-Term Capital Management, Asia went into [crisis], the tech bubble - we'd gone through a whole bunch of things and it seemed like it was okay. It's not that bad."

Risk, what risk?

Risk has a price, just like anything else. For the right return, people will take almost any chance.

Until last summer, as the economy and credit markets boomed, investors were clamouring for risk, taking on more and more for less in return. Optimism ruled.

The most tangible result was that market interest rates dove to record lows relative to government bonds, with even risky products such as junk bonds earning investors a scant premium to "risk-free" debt such as Treasury bills.

Fairfax won its bet when that trend reversed, starting last summer, as investors spooked by U.S. mortgage defaults once again demanded more compensation for taking chances.

For winners like Fairfax and U.S. hedge fund manager Bill Ackman, the windfalls are tremendous, but for the losers, the costs are staggering.

The Group of Seven recently estimated that the total writedowns stemming from the mess may reach $400-billion (U.S.) - equivalent to about a third of Canada's annual economic output.

Right now, the financial sector is only about a third of the way there, but with more writedowns coming almost every day, the tally is mounting fast.

Bank of Montreal this week unveiled $490-million (Canadian) of pretax writedowns and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce has been hit even harder, with more than $3.2-billion of writedowns so far. The chief risk officers at both firms have stepped down.

But those are mere bruises relative to what's happened in the United States and Europe. The British government nationalized mortgage lender Northern Rock PLC after failing to find a buyer for the bank, which was crippled by a liquidity squeeze. In America, financial giants such as Citigroup Inc. and Merrill Lynch & Co. have been forced to sell stakes to foreign sovereign wealth funds to shore up their capital.

How could this happen?

Many of the answers lie in the uncertain science of risk management, which banks depend on to avoid pitfalls.

As markets flourished, financial institutions poured vast intellectual and electronic resources into creating fancy new products such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). At the same time, in a parallel universe also populated by PhDs and supercomputers, risk managers used statistical models in hopes of simulating what sudden market moves would do to the value of those securities and derivatives.

In all financial institutions, there is a daily battle between the risk takers and the risk managers. The takers push for bigger positions to make bigger profits, while the managers push for prudence and caution.

But as their warnings of potential loss were proved false each day by the soaring financial markets, many risk managers lost the ear of management teams focused on the vast profits generated by the people in the business of creating the structures. That led banks to take bigger and bigger bets.

"In a lot of these organizations that have had difficulties, the chief risk officer's role wasn't that meaningful or the business lines had more power and authority than the risk function did," said Brian Porter, 50, chief risk officer at Bank of Nova Scotia, which has largely avoided the financial mess.

But some of the fault also lies with risk managers who relied too much on their tools, the statistical models, which were rapidly eclipsed by the rapid innovation in financial markets that begat complicated structures such as CDOs, so-called CDO squareds and structured investment vehicles (SIVs).

"Risk management tools are blunt instruments, which calls for prudence," said Louis Gagnon, a former Royal Bank of Canada risk-management executive who now teaches business at Queen's University. "If you know you are driving your car on a foggy evening, you are supposed to go easy on the gas, but it's not necessarily what happens."

Correlation's domino effect

Banks reeling from the massive losses are coming to realize that two of their key tenets of risk management - diversification and dependence on the so-called "normal distribution of events" - have been weighed in the balance of the credit crisis and found wanting.

Diversification has proved illusory because of a greater degree of correlation between asset classes and world markets than almost anybody expected.

The concept of avoiding correlation through diversification stems from the world of insurance. If you're going to insure homes, you have a greater chance of a big loss if all the houses you protect are on one street, or even in one town. There's too much risk of correlation, because a single hurricane or big fire could wipe them all out. One answer is to seek wider geographic diversification to cut correlation. Another is to insure in different markets, perhaps adding life or auto coverage to reduce the chance that all your customers will make claims at once.

In investing, money managers and risk officers seek to spread their risks over different geographies and markets for precisely the same reason.

The problem is, what works in insurance doesn't necessarily work in financial markets, because markets are prone to contagion.

A house fire in Saskatoon won't spark a conflagration in Tokyo, or any reaction at all, for that matter. But faced with something that shocks the financial world, such as falling U.S. home prices, investors on all continents and in all markets tend to react in a similar manner. Stocks, bonds, fancy CDOs and credit default swaps - the knee-jerk reaction is to sell them all, whether they trade in Toronto or New York or Tokyo.

In statistical terms, markets that don't show much correlation on good days can be very correlated in bad times, and there are no current models that reflect that fact.

"Historically, you see correlation between markets is not that high," said John Hull, a risk-management specialist who teaches at the University of Toronto's Rotman School of Management. "But it's dangerous to base your risk management on those correlations because when things start to go wrong, the correlations start to go up."

Tripping over the tail

Along with correlation, another term has come to haunt risk managers: "tail risk."

It's an odd name for the statistical chance that returns on any given investment will fall outside the normal probability of events. (When plotted on a graph, the statistically probable events are grouped in a bell curve, but there's a long tail of improbable events that trails off to one side, hence the name.)

In other words, most of the times markets behave normally. But every so often they don't. Those abnormal events fall in the "tail" of the risk curve.

Many risk managers, especially those at banks, use the normal probability concept to develop a yardstick called Value-at-Risk (VaR), which measures the amount a position taken by traders could lose on any statistically "normal" day. Normal is defined as a move of less than three standard deviations from the mean, and the assumption is that normalcy will reign for all but one day in a hundred, or even a thousand. That's when the tail comes into play.

Most banks look back three or four years to determine the likelihood of loss - meaning that just before last summer's blowup they were looking only at years of unnatural calm. Markets fooled the models.

"The tail events happen far more often than we would predict," Mr. Gagnon said. "But what are the predictions based upon? The normal distribution of events."

As a result, VaR failed investors. For example, CIBC had a daily VaR in the third quarter of 2007 that averaged $9.9-million, according to the bank's quarterly investor presentations. Yet three times in that quarter, as the credit crunch picked up steam and the bank booked writedowns, it lost more than that in a single day, including one loss of $120-million.

"The tails are always fatter than you think and the correlations are always higher than you expected," Mr. Hull said.

Terra incognito

Financial institutions augment VaR with stress tests, in which a range of possible outcomes are run through the models to see what happens. What if interest rates rose three percentage points in two months and the price of oil doubled?

Scotiabank, for example, can run 75 stress tests a day on its balance sheet. In fact, if Mr. Porter, the chief risk officer, thinks of a potential situation that worries him, he can have a test turned around by his team in as little as 24 hours.

But even stress testing fell short at many institutions during the credit crisis.

"VaR, stress tests and other risk measures significantly underestimated the magnitude of actual loss from the unprecedented credit market environment," Merrill Lynch said in its third-quarter earnings filing, which revealed a writedown $8.4-billion of CDOs, mortgages and loans.

The problem, risk managers now say, is that there were no models that could accurately predict how the products would react because of the way that innovation had outpaced risk controls. In such a situation, there was no hope of coming up with an accurate estimate of the losses.

"When you're dealing with an opaque structure, there's no amount of stress scenarios that will reveal the true exposures you're putting on the balance sheet," Mr. Gagnon said. "It all becomes a theoretical exercise. There's just no model."

The problem, however, is not just with the models. It's also with the human brain. Because of the way humans think, they are unlikely to dream up the kinds of havoc that markets can wreak. People are just too programmed to think within the box, Mr. Hull said.

"The unfortunate thing is that human beings have this tendency to latch on to the most likely scenario, and as soon as they start thinking about that scenario they convince themselves that's what's actually going to happen," Mr. Hull said. "That's the danger, that you become complacent, and you don't think about the range of alternative outcomes."

The experience premium

The answer, then, may be a renewed deference to grey hair. The same experience that helped Mr. Watsa make his winning bet may help keep financial institutions on the right side of the risk curve.

The result is a renaissance for the credit officers who came of age in an era when banks largely only needed to focus on the risk of a client skipping out on a loan, only to be eclipsed by youngsters versed in the markets and slicing, dicing and repackaging loans for trading.

Those experienced managers were around to see the crash of 1987, the Russian debt crisis and, in many cases, the sky-high interest rates of the early 1980s. In other words, they have been around long enough to have seen markets move irrationally. That makes them invaluable for their ability to dream up scenarios to test the balance sheet, because they are unlikely to say: "That could never happen."

"We have about a dozen PhDs in mathematics," says Scotiabank chief executive officer Rick Waugh, 60. "We probably need about another dozen PhDs in human behaviour. And we probably need at least 12 risk officers with grey hair, because you need this balance."

The result of the newfound respect for grey hair is that risk managers are starting to win the fight on at least one front - the cultural battle. Headhunters report that top risk managers have become one of the hottest commodities in the financial world.

Merrill Lynch CEO John Thain reached out to a veteran of Goldman Sachs Group Inc., home to perhaps the top risk culture, making him co-chief risk officer. The new risk czar, a 20-year veteran of markets named Noel Donohoe, will report directly to Mr. Thain, giving him the clout that risk managers need.

The pendulum is swinging back from the risk takers to the risk managers.

"If we eliminate risk, we eliminate the bank," Mr. Waugh said. "We have to make money. But they [risk managers] have to have an independent voice. They have to call it the way they see it."

Contagion and crises

Tail risk and correlation have reared their heads before, with at least four major occurrences in the past 21 years of an unexpected risk causing contagion in financial markets.

1987

On what's now known as Black Friday, U.S. stocks unexpectedly plunge, with the Dow Jones sliding 508 points, triggering similar drops around the world. The causes are still open to debate - many blame a confluence of program trading - but the result is not: It was a global contagion.

1994

Mexico's peso is suddenly devalued in a surprise move by a new government. The move triggers selloffs in currencies and stocks across Latin American, and sends tremors through Asia.

1997

The Thai government abandons a peg to the U.S. dollar for the baht, another surprise move. The effects reverberate through stock and currency markets all across Asia.

1998

The Russian government shocks the world by defaulting on debt, causing a massive flight to quality. Investors flee any market with risk, including stock markets around the world, and snap up government bonds. This unlikely event leads to the failure of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management.
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Bank Dividend Increases On Hold

  
The Globe and Mail, John Heinzl, 5 March 2008

Are bank dividend hikes drying up?

For years, Canada's banks raked in ever-increasing profits, which they shovelled back to shareholders in the form of rising dividends. Royal Bank of Canada, the largest of the Big Five, raised its dividend at a sizzling 20-per-cent pace over the past five years. Bank of Montreal, the fifth-biggest bank by market value, raised its dividend by about 18 per cent annually.

But suddenly, banks aren't in such a hurry to share the wealth with investors. That's because, with the credit crisis hammering their earnings and the economy in a downward spiral, there's less wealth to share. And it may get worse before it gets better.

Yesterday, after warning it will miss its 2008 profit targets, Bank of Montreal left its quarterly dividend unchanged at 70 cents a share, the third consecutive quarter at the same rate.

That broke with its well-established pattern over the past four years, when it raised its dividend at least once every two quarters.

BMO isn't the only bank putting dividend hikes on hold.

Last week, RBC also held its payout steady after first-quarter profit tumbled 17 per cent, the first time since 2004 that it went more than two quarters without a hike. As expected, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Bank of Nova Scotia also didn't raise their dividends.

The only bank to raise its dividend was Toronto-Dominion Bank, which declared a token 2-cent increase.

By forgoing dividend increases, “banks are giving you a message that things are not as good, and that paying out a higher dividend is not the best use of their money right now,” said Norman Levine, managing director Portfolio Management Corp., which holds BMO and National Bank of Canada shares.

“In the long run, the Canadian banks are probably your best … investment in Canada. However, they do go through periods where they're awful, and this is one of those periods,” he said.

If the banks are indeed heading into a period of stagnant dividend growth, it wouldn't be the first time. During the recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s, some banks went for years without raising their payouts. RBC's annual dividend didn't budge from 1982 to 1986, or from 1991 to 1994. And in the 10 years from 1983 to 1992, BMO raised its dividend only twice.

That serves as a reminder to investors that the juicy dividend hikes of recent years aren't necessarily the norm.

David Cockfield, fund manager at Leon Frazer & Associates, remembers the early 1990s when trust companies were imploding because of soured real estate loans and people were worried that one or more of the banks could also bite the dust.

This downturn is relatively mild in comparison, but he thinks it could be up to a year before banks start increasing their dividends again.

“What the lack of increases is telling us is that, looking ahead, the banks are not seeing earnings growing the same way they have over the last five or six years. We're looking at a period of flat to down earnings,” he said.

The last thing a bank wants to do is boost its dividend too high, only to find out that its payout ratio – dividends divided by profit – has exceeded the bank's internal target. That could force the bank to cut its dividend to bring the ratio back into line, Mr. Cockfield said.

Bank dividend cuts are rare in Canada, but several U.S. financial institutions, including Citigroup and Washington Mutual, have slashed their payouts because of the subprime loan debacle. According to Standard & Poor's, the number of companies that decreased their payouts in January and February rose to 24, up from eight in the same period a year earlier. That's out of about 7,000 North American-listed companies that report dividends to S&P.

On a brighter note, 382 companies raised their dividends, although that was down from 445 in January and February of 2007.
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04 March 2008

Only the Best Customers Getting Rate Deals on Loans

  
The Globe and Mail, Tara Perkins, Boyd Erman, Kevin Carmichael, 4 March 2008

The rate-cutting spree by Mark Carney and Ben Bernanke isn't doing much to help Canadian consumers and corporations because banks fighting higher borrowing costs of their own are keeping the cost of money high no matter how much policy makers slash.

Despite the rash of interest rate reductions by Mr. Carney at the Bank of Canada and Mr. Bernanke at the U.S. Federal Reserve, borrowers, from first-time mortgage seekers to steady corporate customers, are finding their banks aren't passing along the full extent of the rate cuts. For some businesses facing high debt loads, rates are even rising.

The problem is that banks are paying more to borrow from investors because of concern about the financial sector. The banks are trying to hold lending rates as high as possible to preserve profit margins. For the central banks, it means that the full measure of stimulus isn't making it into the economy at large.

“The rate cuts may not be as powerful from a consumer perspective as they have [been] in the past,” said Frank Techar of Bank of Montreal's Canadian personal and commercial banking. Consumers may get off easy, he said, because competition in personal lending is so hot. Businesses aren't so lucky.

“Most of the increase in funding costs that we're all experiencing is really having an impact on the large corporate sector and the large commercial sector,” Mr. Techar said.

Roughly one-third of the banks' own financing comes from the credit market, where it has become much more expensive for them to obtain money. For example, the cost of so-called “senior deposit notes” that banks use to raise funds has soared since the credit crunch began last summer by more than a full percentage point relative to the price of Government of Canada debt, according to figures from Royal Bank of Canada.

The rest of the financing comes from deposits. Even there, banks have been forced to pay more, though the effect has been less pronounced.

“So, while the administrative rates come down, the rates at which corporations and individuals and small businesses are borrowing are not necessarily coming down, and certainly the rates at which banks are funding are not coming down as much, either,” said RBC chief executive officer Gord Nixon.

For consumers, the most tangible result is fixed-rate mortgages are not dropping as fast as central bank rates. Mortgage broker Gary Siegle reckons he will be able to find a variable-rate mortgage at about 4.75 per cent compared with a fixed-rate five-year mortgage of about 5.84 per cent. The spread, now almost a full percentage point, used to be only a quarter or a half point.

“The lenders seem to be looking for more spread,” Mr. Siegle of Invis, Canada's biggest mortgage brokerage firm. “There does seem to be a difference between what we've seen [from the central bank] and what's going on in markets today.” Most businesses are finding that rates have nudged up when looking to borrow via the bond market or directly from banks.

A Canadian Federation of Independent Business quarterly survey in December showed access to credit worsened for 13 per cent of respondents and improved for 7 per cent. “We are seeing some deterioration in access to credit for companies, but not enough to ring any alarm bells,” said Ted Mallett, CFIB's head of research.

The issue for corporations isn't a lack of available money. In fact, while corporate bond sales have slowed by about 20 per cent in Canada since July 31 when the credit crunch blew up, banks are taking advantage of the higher prices to lend more. RBC, for example, reported a 30-per-cent increase in business loans by its capital markets unit over the past six months. “For the banks that are smart, this is an excellent time to lend,” said John Aiken of Dundee Securities. “They are now getting paid for risk.”

The problem for many borrowers is banks are being selective, lending only to their best customers. “Spreads have widened and pricing has increased generally for all but the best credits, who generally don't have a liquidity problem anyway,” said one senior corporate banker. “What you've seen is a lot of lenders retreat to the investment-grade market, so some of the terms there have improved for borrowers.”

The borrowers hit hardest are those that need money most – companies that are deep in debt and facing serious liquidity problems. Traditional lenders are shunning risky loans, and hedge funds that are lenders of last resort have begun to demand “floors” on floating-rate loans to prevent their returns from falling with rate cuts.

For many troubled companies such as AbitibiBowater Inc., rates have soared so much that boards of directors find it hard to stomach. With $350-million (U.S.) of debt maturing in the next four months, Abitibi is in talks with lenders to round up more cash. It warned last month that it may not be able to find financing on “satisfactory” terms.

“It's one of those things where reality is so painful you almost don't want to acknowledge it,” said the banker.
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03 March 2008

RBC Q1 2008 Earnings

  
• RBC was cut from Market Perform to Underperform by BMO Capital Markets
• RBC target price was cut from C$58 to C$52 by CIBC World Markets
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RBC Capital Markets, 3 March 2008

RY's Q1/08 GAAP diluted EPS of $0.95 were ahead of our estimate (by $0.06). Core cash EPS was $1.11 versus our estimate of $1.06, which was the same as consensus.

• Domestic banking net income was close to our expectations, wholesale was much better than expected and wealth management was slightly below.

• Trading revenues were stronger than expected; $461 million of revenues was down from $652 million in Q1/07, but Q1/08 figures included $430 million in pre-tax writedowns related to U.S. sub-prime exposures, U.S. municipal finance, U.S. CMBS and U.S. auction rate securities.

• Credit quality continued to deteriorate as we expected, as specific loan losses rose to $281 million compared to $250 million in the prior quarter and $162 million a year ago.

Maintain Outperform rating

We maintain our Outperform rating, 12-month target price of $55 per share and 2008 and 2009 EPS estimates. We believe that Royal Bank's premium valuation is sustainable (1.1x on 2008E P/E) and it should grow earnings at a more rapid rate than its peers in 2008 (7% versus an industry median of 4%), based on:

• Leading retail banking and wealth management franchises, the two highest multiple businesses Canadian banks participate in. We also expect bottom line growth in retail banking to benefit from slower expense growth.

• A more diversified capital markets business, which should lead to lower volatility in revenue and earnings than some other Canadian banks' investment dealers. The resiliency of revenues in Q1/08 and disclosure on "topics of interest" also give us comfort that Royal Bank's greater exposure to non-Canadian capital markets businesses does not put the bank's earnings growth or capital strength at risk relative to its Canadian bank peers.

• Credit quality is deteriorating for all banks, and we believe Royal Bank is more exposed to the early stages of deterioration in its loan book (i.e. U.S. retail/construction lending). We estimate that, following the acquisition of Alabama National, Royal Bank will have 2.3% of its total loan portfolio in U.S. construction lending, highest of the Canadian banks (TD and BMO would also have exposure, representing about 1.6% and 1.2% of their loan portfolios).
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Scotia Capital, 3 March 2008

Q1/08 Earnings Solid

• Royal Bank (RY) reported Q1/08 cash earnings of $0.97 per share. Underlying operating earnings declined 3% YOY from record Q1/07 to $1.12 per share excluding $0.15 per share in write-downs. The $430 million in write-downs included $201 million on U.S. sub-prime with monoline insurers (ACA), $87 million on other sub-prime and $142 million on U.S. asset backed paper. These charges reduced earnings $187 million after-tax and related compensation adjustments or $0.15 per share. These charges were in line with expectations.

• Earnings were driven by extremely strong trading revenue offset by earnings drag from 16% appreciation in the Canadian dollar, lower Insurance earnings, flat earnings from Wealth Management and weak US & International earnings. Return on equity was 24.7% versus 27.5% a year earlier. Return on risk-weighted assets was 2.32% versus 2.55% a year earlier.

• Canadian Banking earnings increased 8% from a year earlier on a comparable basis led by Canadian Retail earnings up 15% with Insurance declining 26%. Wealth Management earnings declined 14%. RBC Capital Markets increased 24% (excluding CDO write-down). Wealth Management earnings declined 14%, U.S. & International earnings were weak.

• We are disappointed the bank did not increase its dividend although the bank did repurchase $55 million in shares at an average price of $49 per share.

High Operating Leverage

• Overall bank operating leverage was solid at 9%, with revenues (excluding write-downs) and non-interest expenses adjusted for insurance and VIEs increasing 10% and 1%, respectively.

Canadian Banking Strong

• Canadian Banking (excluding Global Insurance) increased 8% on a comparable basis. Earnings were led by Canadian Retail earnings increasing 15% to $674 million from $588 million a year earlier due to robust domestic demand and solid Canadian housing market activities.

• Revenues in the Canadian Banking segment increased 8% (excluding Global Insurance), with non-interest expenses increasing 4%, resulting in positive operating leverage of 4%.

• Global Insurance earnings were weak this quarter at $89 million versus $102 million in the previous quarter and $185 million ($120 million excluding unusual items) a year earlier due higher costs and less favourable disability claims.

• Loan loss provisions (LLPs) increased 18% to $214 million versus $182 million a year earlier due to higher provisions in credit cards and business loan portfolios.

Canadian Retail NIM Declines 2 bp

• Retail net interest margin (NIM) declined 2 basis points (bp) sequentially and 11 bp from a year earlier to 3.08%.

Wealth Management Earnings Decline 14%

• Wealth Management cash earnings declined 14% to $186 million from $217 million a year earlier.

• Revenue declined 4% primarily due to the strong Canadian dollar impacting the U.S. denominated portion of revenue. Operating expenses declined 2% for negative operating leverage of 2%.

• The revenue decline was concentrated in transactional and other which declined 21% due mainly to lower retail brokerage activity.

• U.S. Wealth Management revenue growth was strong at 13% with Canadian Wealth Management modest at 2%.

• Mutual fund revenue increased 6% from a year earlier to $375 million. Mutual Fund assets (IFIC) increased 11% from a year earlier to $81.6 billion.

U.S. & International P&B Earnings Decline

• The operating performance in the U.S. was disappointing as earnings declined to $47 million from $80 million a year earlier but improved from a disappointing $36 million in the previous quarter. LLPs increased sharply to $71 million from $10 million a year earlier but were flat from the previous quarter of $72 million relating to U.S. residential builder finance.

• Revenue growth was 9%, with expense growth high at 9% due to higher processing and staff costs.

• Net interest margin declined 20 bp from a year earlier to 3.41% but in a positive development improved 1 bp from the previous quarter.

RBC Capital Markets Earnings Strong – 24% Growth

• RBC Capital Markets earnings were strong, increasing 24% (excluding $187 million in write-downs) to $492 million from $397 million a year earlier. Including write-downs earnings declined 23% from a year earlier. Trading revenue was a major driver this quarter.

Underlying Trading Revenue Extremely Strong

• Trading revenue was a record $891 million (excluding $430 million in write-downs) versus and $517 million in the previous quarter and $652 million a year earlier. Interest rate and credit trading revenue was particularly strong.

Capital Markets Revenue Declines

• Capital markets revenue declined to $549 million from $625 million in the previous quarter and from $611 million a year earlier.

• Securities brokerage commissions increased 3% to $333 million from $323 million a year earlier, with underwriting and other advisory fees at $216 million, declining 25%.

Security Gains/Losses Negligible

• Security gains/losses remain low at a loss of $20 million or $0.01 per share versus a loss of $0.01 per share in the previous quarter and a gain of $0.02 per share a year earlier.

• Unrealized security surplus was not available versus the $105 million surplus at the end of the previous quarter and the $135 million a year earlier.

Loan Loss Provisions Increase to 45 Bp

• Specific loan loss provisions (LLPs) increased to $293 million or 0.45% of loans from $162 million or 0.28% of loans a year earlier. LLPs in Canadian Banking increased 18% to $214 million from $182 million due to higher provisions in credit cards and personal unsecured credit line portfolios. RBC Capital Markets LLP provisions were $28 million versus recoveries of $8 million a year earlier.

• We are increasing our 2008 and 2009 LLP estimates to $1,000 million or 0.40% of loans and $1,200 million or 0.47% of loans from $900 million and $1,000 million, respectively.

Loan Formations Increase

• Gross impaired loan formations increased to $715 million versus $589 million in the previous quarter and $311 million a year earlier. Net impaired loan formations increased to $604 million versus $435 million in the previous quarter and $237 million a year earlier.

Tier 1 Ratio Solid at 9.8%

• Tier 1 capital under Basel II was 9.8% versus 9.2% under Basel I. Tier 1 in the previous quarter was 9.4% and 9.2% a year earlier.

• Risk-weighted assets were flat at $241.2 billion from a year earlier under Basell II. Market at risk assets were also flat at $19.1 billion.

• The common equity to risk-weighted assets (CE/RWA) ratio was 9.5%, versus 9.0% in the previous quarter and a year earlier.

Additional Disclosure on Monolines and Credit Derivatives

• The bank provided additional disclosure on its exposure to U.S. Insurance monolines and credit derivatives. The exposure to these areas is in line with expectations with the quality slightly better.

• Mark to market losses on the RMBS/CDO portfolios if counterparty (high quality monoline - MBIA) fail is estimated at approximately $900 million or $585 million after tax or $0.45 per share versus our previous estimate of $0.50 per share.

Share Buybacks

• This quarter RY repurchased 1.1 million shares at an average price of $49.11 per share for a total of $55 million.

Recommendation

• Our 2008 earnings estimate remains unchanged at $4.50 per share. We are trimming our 2009 earnings estimate to $5.00 per share from $5.20 per share based on our higher LLP forecast and slightly lower retail NIM.

• Our 12-month share price target remains unchanged at $75, representing 16.7x our 2007 earnings estimate or 15.0x our 2008 earnings estimate.

• We maintain our 1-Sector Outperform rating on the shares of Royal Bank based on strength of franchise and operating platforms, particularly retail banking and wealth management and higher than bank group ROE.
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The Globe and Mail, Tara Perkins, 29 February 2008

After reporting a 17 per cent drop in first-quarter profits, the Royal Bank of Canada is battening down the hatches as it waits for what it hopes is a sunnier second half of the year.

Canada's biggest bank is reining in its expenses and did not increase its dividend this quarter.

“We're watching our costs,” said chief executive officer Gord Nixon. Not increasing the dividend was the “prudent thing to do” given the current environment, he added.

It's the first time since 2004 that Royal Bank has gone three quarters in a row without boosting it, making RBC's dividend “the first official casualty of the more difficult environment facing the banks,” Dundee Capital Markets analyst John Aiken wrote in a note to clients.

Royal's earnings were hit by $430-million in pre-tax writedowns related to U.S. subprime mortgages, the bank's municipal GIC business, its U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities business and its U.S. auction rate securities portfolio. The hit will result in a $132-million reduction to employee bonuses at the bank.

“Some of the businesses, there have certainly been shrinkage and changes,” Mr. Nixon said of the work force in areas of the bank where problems arose.

He said the bank remains committed to its capital markets business. “As a bank, you can't pack your bag and go home because the market is competitive and rates are low and so forth,” he said. “What you have to do is try to manage your business with good overall risk standards and processes.”

Mr. Nixon cautiously predicted an economic recovery in the second half of this year.

“There's so much uncertainty in the marketplace that if you're an economist you could be bullish or bearish and you'd have a 50 per cent chance of being right,” he cautioned. “While I do believe there are still signs of further weakness, and that it will take years for some of these financial assets to recover, I do expect the aggressive action by monetary authorities will provide a floor for markets and eventually pave the way for a recovery, hopefully, in the latter half of this year.”

The bank is still working to try to meet its profit goals for 2008, he said.

Mr. Nixon even suggested that, eventually, some of the charges that are hurting the banks now could be reversed. Accounting rules require the value of many assets to be ratcheted down on paper even if their value should recover in the long term, he suggested.

Meanwhile, Royal Bank's loan loss provisions rose more than 80 per cent from a year ago because of weakness in its U.S. corporate loan book and its U.S. home builder portfolio, noted Credit Suisse analyst Jim Bantis. “Higher provision levels are likely to persist given the continued deterioration within the residential and commercial real estate markets in the U.S. Southeast and the incremental risk from the recent Alabama National acquisition,” he wrote in a note to clients.

On Friday, Royal Bank reported first-quarter profit of $1.245-billion, 17 per cent less than a year ago. The cash earnings of 97 cents per share fell short of analyst forecasts of $1.06 per share.

The profit, which was $249-million lower than a year ago, was hurt by $430-million (pretax) in writedowns related to U.S. subprime mortgages, the bank's municipal GIC business, its U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities business and its U.S. auction rate securities portfolio.

The charges amount to $187-million after taxes and the resulting lower bonuses for employees are factored in.

“Almost all of our businesses within our four segments delivered solid performance this quarter and while a few have been affected by the difficult market conditions, our diversified business mix, proactive approach to risk management and rigorous operational discipline continue to underpin strong earnings,” Mr. Nixon said. The bank's profit one year earlier had been a record high.

The investment banking, or capital markets, division of RBC saw profit fall $92-million to $304-million primarily as a result of the writedowns. The stronger Canadian dollar also took a $24-million bite out of its earnings.

RBC's core Canadian consumer banking division showed no growth from a year ago, contributing $762-million to the bottom line, but profit was up 8 per cent once insurance gains a year ago are excluded.

Profit from the bank's insurance operations dropped by $96-million, or 52 per cent, to $89-million. Wealth management was down 14 per cent, or $30-million, at $181-million.
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Financial Post, Duncan Mavin, 27 February 2008

A recent observation from Canada's banking industry watchers is that the sky-high Canadian dollar coupled with depressed U.S. bank stocks could make now the ideal time for the big Canadian banks to do a deals south of the border.

But, according to one U.S. report, Royal Bank of Canada at least is not looking to add to its U.S. operations any time soon.

RBC's U.S. retail banking operation — which recently announced it is changing its name from RBC Centura to RBC Bank (USA) this spring — closed its acquisition of Alabama National for US$1.6-billion last week. That deal came at the end of somewhat of a spending spree — in the past 14 months, RBC has also picked up Flag Financial Corp. of Atlanta and 39 branches of the former AmSouth Bancorp.

But the focus for RBC Bank (USA) is now on consolidation according to comments made by the unit's chief executive Scott Custer to American Banker.

"We have to be careful to get our own health in order," Mr.Custer is reported to have said. Acquisitions would be hard to value right now, he reportedly said. "This is a time for patience and prudence, which we feel is the better course here."
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