15 June 2006

Manulife Investor Day Highlights

  
RBC Capital Markets, 15 June 2006

• Price Weakness A Buying Opportunity. After holding in better than other large cap Financials, Manulife was caught in the market downdraft yesterday, in our view, creating a buying opportunity. We target-price Manulife at 16.5x estimated forward earnings of $2.89, for $43.

• Acquisitions Not Required. At Tuesday’s Investor Day CEO Domenic D’Alessandro stressed organic growth alone should make MFC’s 16% EPS growth and ROE targets. He also reiterated his 5-year employment commitment, reminding there are 3 years to run on that covenant.

• New Disclosure Attests to High Quality Earnings. New disclosure highlighted the diversity inside MFC’s $28B of Provisions for Adverse Deviations (PfADs), including $10.8B in reserves for adverse investment returns, providing a layer of protection against equity and/or fixed income market melt-downs. PfaD’s are now double the pre-Hancock level, and at 16% of General Account liabilities, slightly higher on a percentage basis as well. PfAD reserves currently reflect ~7-10 years of after-tax earnings.

• Sustainable Lead Position in U.S. Life. MFC now ranks 1st in sales among U.S. lifeco’s (past 12-months). In our view, MFC is in an excellent position to hold its top position based on key competitive advantages including brand strength, superior service and leading product innovation.

• Domestic Shifting to Group & Wealth. Group Retirement is gaining market share with honed products and improved roll-over retention. Manulife Bank has grown to $7 billion in assets and now contributes 12% of domestic earnings. MFC is focused on payout annuities and health care benefits as Canadians shift from the wealth accumulation to the wealth distribution stage of life and require additional medical care.

• New Asian Opportunities Abound in Tested Markets. Potential changes to health care legislation in Hong Kong that would shift health care expenses to individuals/employers could lead to a slew of new product offerings. In Japan, MFC is well positioned to increase life insurance sales by leveraging its existing relationships with domestic banks as banks are permitted to begin selling life insurance in 2008.

• Valuation. Our $43 target (unchanged) is based on 16.5x our forward EPS estimate, a 10% premium to our Canadian lifeco peer average of 15x, wider than the historical 3% premium to reflect the superior growth and capitalization as well as MFC’s enhanced global position. EPS risk centers on accelerated USD translation as nearly 2/3 of earnings are USDbased, and not hedged. Also, Manulife could be susceptible to a downturn in claims experience, unusually bad credit markets, or to an acquisition
discount.
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BMO Nesbitt Burns, 14 June 2006

Investment Thesis and Outlook

Manulife held its annual investor day on June 13, 2006. Overall, we believe the outlook for Manulife is unchanged: strong top and bottom line growth in the U.S. and Japan accompanied by continued expense gains and excess capital generation in Canada. We believe the company has at least $4 billion in excess capital and that it has been quite active in its share repurchase program over the last four to six weeks. We continue to expect 15%+ dividend growth from MFC over the next couple of years. Management reiterated its medium- to long-term EPS growth target of 15% and ROE target of 16%.

One clear message that came across during the presentations was the enhanced franchise value that is being created from the merger of Manulife, which provided operational discipline and accountability as well as product development, and John Hancock, which provided a very strong brand name. The beneficial combination shows up clearly in the earnings and business growth results, even analyzing growth in the businesses assuming they were combined prior to the acquisitions (Table 1).

Also noteworthy during the presentations was the company’s enhanced disclosure on the level of PfADs and the composition of PfADs. We applaud this move to crack open, ever so slightly, the “black box” of insurance. Of note is the fact that the relative level of PfADs after the JHF acquisition is higher than pre-JHF. While management ascribed most of the increase in PfADs relative to reserves to the recent strength in equity markets, we believe that the business mix at JHF required relatively higher levels of PfADs.

Manulife remains Outperform rated. In volatile markets, we believe that the shares of global franchises like Manulife are likely to perform relatively well. The company continues to enhance its franchises in North America and Asia and has the financial resources to drive organic growth.

Investor Day Summary

We have summarized the important information from the investor day below.

United States

• Combination of Manulife’s operating discipline, product development and distribution relationships with Hancock’s brand name is creating a formidable franchise. Over the last 12 months, Manulife has been the number one seller of life insurance in non-proprietary channels, up from a combined number four (MFC+JHF) prior to the acquisition. The company has also experienced similar gains in variable annuity sales. JHF’s neglected mutual fund operations have also been generating consistent net inflows and appear poised to have another strong year with the addition of GMO funds in June. While difficult to quantify, Manulife has experienced significant revenue synergies from the acquisition, which is unique in acquisitions in financial services.

• In individual life, the company continues to focus on broadening its penetration in new distribution channels resulting from the acquisition of JHF, particularly JHFN, the M Group and banks. While encouraged by Manulife’s strong sales performance over the last 12 months, it is not sustainable. We suspect that the company has carved out a top three (or five) position in terms of sales in the U.S. over the next few years. MFC is also introducing some new LTC products, which should help rejuvenate sales through this market over the next few years.

• In wealth management (annuities, mutual funds and 401(k)s), business momentum is good in all three segments. The company is moving “up-market” in the 401(k) from the micro-case level ($million, less than 250 lives) to $3–10 million range. The company continues to dominate the very small case market with over 1.4 million participants. In mutual funds, the company has revamped the product offering and increased the wholesaler force to 60 from 28. Net flows have been positive and in a positive trend since the acquisition, and the addition of GMO to the fund line-up should provide a unique new line-up of funds. At the time of acquisition, it was unclear whether MFC would keep the mutual fund operations but it appears that the economics and outlook for the business have improved sufficiently that it is likely to remain among JHF’s suite of products.

• In variable annuities, the company introduced a unique product with attractive withdrawal benefits that have sold extremely well. While products are important, the company has been very successful at nurturing new distribution relationships as a result of the combination with JHF. In all the major channels—banks, regionals, wirehouses, financial planners and JHFN—sales have increased at double-digit rates. Investors should not expect these sales results to be sustainable, as large competitors have introduced competing products that are likely to squeeze out some MFC sales.

Japan

• Results from Japan remain on track to deliver another good year in terms of sales growth and earnings. In wealth management, the success of the BOTM-UFJ relationship continues to drive annuity sales and the company continues to foster new distribution relationships to mitigate its exposure to this one bank. In individual insurance, transplanted North American products adjusted to local customs continue to drive new business. The biggest challenge in Japan is to grow the professional career sales force. Bank deregulation in 2008 offers interesting potential to sell more insurance via bank branches.

Hong Kong

• MFC operates an impressive business in Hong Kong, where it is number two in in-force life premiums and number two in the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) in terms of AUM. The key to growing insurance sales is to grow career agency and the company did add 200 agents in 2005. The real growth opportunity remains in wealth management given high savings rates and small competitors. Health insurance also appears to be a burgeoning market in Hong Kong. The company is hosting an Asia investor day on September 12, 2006, and we expect to get more details at that time.

Other Asian

• Other Asian territories continue to experience high rates of growth, particularly out of China. The key to success is building a career sales force; however, the competition for qualified individuals is intense. While certain regions, like Indonesia, generate reasonable earnings, other areas, like China, are unlikely to generate material earnings over the next few years.

Canada

• Earnings in Canada are reasonably well balanced between individual insurance, wealth management and group businesses. Most of the big three Canadian lifecos have experienced success in the DC market and all are introducing new products to entice retirees to roll over their DC plan assets into a life company annuity or other product. Manulife has been experimenting with different products and we believe that the insurance industry is well positioned to capitalize on this opportunity. Individual insurance continues to perform well and the acquisition of Maritime Life has given Manulife enhanced access to the MGA channel to complement its dominant position in the IDA channel. Pricing in UL remains competitive—a situation that is likely to persist for the balance of 2006. Manulife has experienced good sales growth in mutual funds and seg funds, particularly in income-type products. Overall, Canada is performing well and the oligopoly appears to be behaving favourably for investors.

Actuarial Review

• One of the noteworthy events during the day was the presentation by the company’s chief actuary, Simon Curtis. Manulife disclosed that it has $26.5 billion in PfADs in 2005, up from $24.3 billion in 2004 and $10.6 billion in 2003 (prior to the closing of the JHF acquisition). Relative to general account reserves and segregated fund liabilities, the PfADs rose from 8.9% in 2002 to 10.0% in 2005. The rise in the ratio of PfADs to reserves reflects the positive impact of rising equity markets on reserves required on segregated funds.

• The company also compared the level of reserves in Canadian GAAP versus U.S. GAAP and cash surrender values. CGAAP reserves are $1.1 billion higher than U.S. GAAP reserves and exceed cash values on “surrenderable” policies by 14%. The company also showed the components of PfADs. As one would expect, PfADs on interest rate risks have increased (i.e. lower long-term interest rate assumptions require higher provisions), which were offset by lower PfADs on credit losses (this has been disclosed extensively by the company).

• What does all this mean? The added disclosure should provide investors with greater comfort as to the level of conservatism in the reserves and open a small crack in the “black box” of insurance accounting. We also have another theory. The new investment accounting rules expected on January 1, 2007 have the potential to increase earnings volatility (please see our report released December 14, 2005). Improving disclosure and the understanding of how earnings are released (PfADs are effectively future earnings) should help partially alleviate concerns on increased earnings volatility related to changes in investment accounting rules.

Valuation

The target price of $40 is unchanged, representing 14.4x 2007E EPS and 2.4x2006E BVPS, both in line with current trading multiples.

Recommendation

Manulife remains Outperform rated. The company reiterated its 15% EPSgrowth forecast over the medium to long term and a 16%+ ROE. There was nomaterial new information to impact our outlook on the shares. However, thecompany’s top and bottom line outlook remains robust in the U.S. and Japan.Results from Canada are expected to continue to generate good returns andprovide significant excess capital. We believe the company has been very activein its share buyback over the last month. MFC significantly improved itsdisclosure by not only providing the level of PfADs but also the composition ofPfADs. We applaud the company’s efforts on this front and encourage other life insurers to follow. In these volatile markets, we expect quality institutions likeManulife to perform relatively well. The company has significant excess capital,strong business momentum, growing franchises in the U.S. and Asia, and credit metrics are improving.
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• S&P Equity Research upgraded Manulife Financial Corp. from Sell to Hold. S&P says shares have slipped to our 12-month price target of U$31. S&P is encouraged by MFC's strong variable annuity sales and growing life insurance marketshare from its John Hancock operations. However, competition from banks remains a challenge for fixed annuity products, and a difficult interest rate environment could hamper earnings growth. S&P thinks MFC may benefit from future growth in Asia.

• Keefe Bruyette upgrades Manulife Financial from Market Perform to Outperform.
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Scotia Capital, 14 June 2006

Investor Day Highlights

• Manulife held its annual Investor Day in Toronto on June 13, 2006. As is usual for such events there was no significant new news. In opinion, the breadth and depth of the company's management team, its superior market positioning in growth markets globally, its solid topline growth and its conservative balance sheet and reserving practices continue to support an increasing premium multiple relative to the group. That said, unlike the group the stock has not "corrected" of late, pushing its premium to the group up from 3% to 6% (well beyond its 2% average, but not as high as its 8% peak we saw in 2002), while the others have fallen to discounts below their historical means. While we continue to believe a superior premium, above normal levels, is justified, we believe the likelihood of further significant expansion relative to the group is less likely, as we expect the recent exceptional EPS growth (17% in 2005, ex one-timers, and 16% in Q1/06), in part attributable to the John Hancock synergies, to return to a more moderate 13%-14% level, and the recent pace of the exceptional top-line growth to moderate slightly. We highlight several takeaways below.

• Strong management team - with significant breadth and depth. With a total of fourteen speakers from all divisions of the company, Manulife clearly showed the depth and breadth of its management team. The company definitely has the bench strength for what we believe to be a seamless transfer of duties if and when senior management step down. That said, we believe such an event is several years down the road. President and CEO Dominic D'Alessandro, at age 59, has a minimum of three years left to fulfill his promise of staying at the helm at least five years after the close of the Manulife/John Hancock merger.

• Not in Europe or South America because fully engaged in opportunities the company has in existing markets - likely to continue as such unless significant opportunity presents itself. On Europe, a market that is highly competitive and increasingly consolidating, D'Alessandro said its only entry would be to buy an existing insurer, and on South America, he noted the "promise is greater than the reality". A disciplined acquirer, we expect the company to stick to its current North American and Asian markets, unless a significant market shakeout presents an extremely attractive opportunity. On India, D'Alessandro cited displeasure with joint ventures as the largest deterrent (maximum ownership is currently 49%).

• Potential for more top-line growth in Japan in 2008, when deregulation will allow for banks to distribute life insurance products. Manulife's strong relationship with MUFG, its strategic partner for VA sales and the largest bank in Japan, continues to drive sales growth in the Japanese variable annuity market. The company continues to add relationships of late, including Nomura Securities, the largest security dealer in Japan, and Resona Bank and Saitama Resona Bank, the 4th largest banking group in Japan, and now has over 22 banks and security dealers selling its VA products. The company is extremely well-positioned when sales by banks are further deregulated at the end of 2007 to allow for the sale of life insurance products as well.

• Continued aggressive expansion in China - and with operations in 15 cities, has more licenses than any other foreign insurer. Management remains bullish about this market, where the company has nearly 5,000 agents (up from just over 3,000 two years ago) and has seen 43% CAGR growth in premiums and deposits since 1999.

• Exceptional U.S. VA sales growth likely to return to more "normalized" levels for Q3/06 and Q4/06. As we somewhat expected, management indicated that the 61%, 63% and 60% sales growth in U.S. variable annuity for Q1/06, Q4/05 and Q3/05 would likely not be sustainable, for two reasons. One, we are close to approaching a year following the May, 2005 launch of the Second Generation Product, the highly successful VA product that drove the growth, and two, other competitors have now copied the product to various degrees. We would expect the company to maintain market position and share (#2 in the non-proprietary channel) until its next new product launch, which we anticipate could be late 2006 or early 2007.

• #1 seller of individual life insurance in U.S., up from #4 pro-forma pre-merger - demonstrates the acquisition was indeed a revenue growth story. With strong and diversified distribution relationships, a superior product and superior brand (John Hancock), the company continues to ride the wave of expansion of brokerage in the U.S. individual life insurance market. With a focus on the older affluent market, the fastest growing market, and the brokerage distribution channel, the fastest growing channel (accounting for 36% of sales in 1983 and 60% in Q1/006), the company has climbed to #1 in the U.S. market, a market that overall traditionally grows in the 2%-3% range. While we continue to believe the company's sales growth will outpace the industry (MFC sales were up 78% in Q1/06 and 60% in Q4/05, versus the industry at 12%-15%) we have to believe that as the company's sales get larger the level at which the company outpaces the industry will subside to some degree.

• If we get another Katrina the hit could be in the $0.12-$0.13 per share range - the same level (spit adjusted) as last year. While the company has increased attachment points (from an aggregate one-time catastrophe loss of US$20 billion to US$30 billion before the company would pay a claim), and increased premium rates, a modest increase in capacity at the layer of coverage beyond the attachment point puts the loss for a Katrina-type hurricane at the same level as last year. However, should any one storm have total damages less than US$30 billion, the company's loss on its retrocession business should, in all likelihood, be zero.

• Conservative actuarial practices. The company updated its disclosure from two years ago as to the level of PfADs (provisions for adverse deviation) as a percentage of general account liabilities. Manulife's PfADs, traditionally in the 10%-15% range as a percent of general fund liabilities, have climbed from 14.2% in 2002, to 15.3% in 2003 and to 16.3% in 2005, despite the fact that the acquisition of John Hancock more than doubled the company's balance sheet liabilities. Simply said, the company's reserving practices are increasingly conservative, and remain at the high end of their historical range. The natural release of these PfADs is a large and sustainable driver of earnings and future earnings growth, and has consistently been 60%-65% of pre-tax earnings growth.
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Canadian Press, Rita Trichur, 14 June 2006

Manulife Financial Corp. continues to see plenty of growth opportunities abroad even as industry consolidation in Canada draws to a close, its chief executive officer said yesterday at an investor conference.

"Perhaps in Canada ... the consolidation is nearing completion but there are other developments in Canada that might be of interest in the periods ahead," said Manulife CEO Dominic D'Alessandro.

"I think in the United States there continue to be opportunities and I think, of course, in Asia the organic growth prospects are very, very good."

Asked to elaborate on the Canadian scene, Mr. D'Alessandro pointed to remarks he made last month at the company's annual meeting, advocating that financial institutions should be allowed to merge -- "whether bank with bank, bank with insurer, or insurer with insurer" -- largely without government restraint.

Mr. D'Alessandro -- who reportedly contemplated a combination with Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce in 2002 -- said Canadians need to rethink the financial services industry.

"If you look at it and say, 'How might the financial services industry organize itself going forward?' you'd come up with a different set of scenarios, perhaps," he said.

"I don't want you to conclude from that somehow I'm lusting after acquiring a bank or merging with a bank -- that's not the case at all. I'm just saying that, perhaps, that ought to be a possibility that should be available."

The Conservative federal government has already said that dealing with the issue of big bank mergers, which have been off limits since 1998, isn't a priority.

In the meantime, Manulife considers Asia -- especially China -- to be the "new frontier" for growth.

The company has been opening new branches in China every couple of months, particularly in high-growth coastal areas, and is already in more cities than any other foreign insurer.

"There's still plenty of places for us to open in the next 20 years," said Victor Apps, senior executive vice-president and general manager of Manulife's Asian division.

"We'll keep growing on the branch expansion over the next few years from our current numbers . . . until we have 50 [to] 100 branches in China eventually, I'm sure," Mr. Apps said.

Chinese expansion is also a key priority for chief rival Sun Life Financial Inc., which also has a foothold in the world's most populous country.

For his part, Mr. Apps said Manulife is not influenced by its rival's moves: "The market is huge -- we all know that. The secret of China is to build the business well and profitably."

Its Asian division -- which also includes operations in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam -- produced profit of $141-million (U.S.) in its latest quarter, representing 17 per cent of the total company's shareholders' earnings.
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14 June 2006

Scotia Capital Downgrades TD Bank

  
Scotia Capital, 14 June 2006

Downgrading TD Bank to 2 Sector Perform

• We are downgrading TD Bank to 2-Sector Perform from 1-Sector Outperform based on disappointing performance in the bank's wholesale operations, continued earnings weakness at TD Banknorth, and risk of deceleration in relative earnings growth at TDCT led by a slowdown in insurance revenue growth. The bank is unduly relying on TDCT for earnings momentum, and with disappointing earnings from some of its other businesses.

• TD's share price is expected to perform more in line with the bank group. In addition, with the absence of TD share buybacks and a lower dividend payout ratio, investors will likely begin to require higher returns from the bank's "growth" investments. We view acquisition risk as higher at TD than the bank group.

• We continue to believe that TD's P/E multiple should expand relative to the bank group to a 10% premium over time based on earnings mix, profitability and capital levels. However, given the disappointing performance in the bank's wholesale business, earnings shortfalls at TD Banknorth, and market concerns about its strategic position in the US and return on capital, P/E expansion is expected to be delayed until some of these uncertainties are resolved.

Wholesale Banking Continues to Underperform

• The bank's wholesale operation has been very inconsistent in its results over the past few years with Q2 earnings, in our view, the weakest of the bank group. In Q2, the banks wholesale earnings declined 30% sequentially and 15% from a year earlier versus its major competitors whose wholesale earnings increased 24% from a year earlier. Excluding the impact of security gains, wholesale banking segment earnings declined 40% sequentially in Q2/06.

• Trading revenue was particularly weak at TD declining 21% from a year earlier versus an increase of 28% for the other major banks, due in part to TD losses on global structured products. The bank has taken restructuring charges in this business over the past 18 months as it exits the global structured product area. The losses from exiting this business have been larger than expected and taken longer than expected. The bank indicated on its Q2/06 conference call that it was only 50% complete in exiting this portfolio. We expected the bank to have dealt with this by now.

• The bank's competitive position in wholesale banking remains a concern. It would seem that the bank's competitive position erosion began in 1987 with the bank's strategic decision to build an investment dealer versus buy. TD's 1987 annual report stated that "rather than buy an established full-service investment dealer, we have chosen to build our own in-house securities operation, and capitalize on our existing strengths and expertise". The other major five banks of course all purchased full-service investment dealers.

• If we use 1967 as a base of 1.0, TD's relative performance versus the Bank Index is currently 2.57 representing substantial outperformance since 1967, the best of the bank group. However, it is interesting that this is actually lower than its 1988 performance level of 3.27 with the 1987 strategic decision appearing as a major negative inflection point for the bank.

• It would seem that the bank is struggling to define itself and its market position in this business line, post the $1.45 billion sectoral loan losses taken in 2002. The bank has lowered its risk profile in this business and reduced its overall earnings reliance. It is difficult to gauge the underlying earnings power of this business especially given that the magnitude of the earnings drag of the global structured products area is not known.

TD Banknorth - 2006 Earnings Estimates Decline 12%

• Earnings estimates (IBES) for 2006 for TD Banknorth have been reduced by 12% with earnings expected to decline by a similar amount from 2005 level. In addition the US$ will have declined by 7% in fiscal 2006 versus 2005 based on the current level of the C$/U$ of $1.10.

• TD Bank reported that in Q2/06 its return on invested capital for TD Banknorth was 4.4%. This represents an exceptionally low return on capital especially given that 39% of the current share price of $59.11.

• TD's August 2004 acquisition of Banknorth was not very timely as its book value is estimated to be $2.0 billion or $2.82 per TD share below the recent market value (BNK US$ 28.97). In addition the bank issued 44 million common shares at $44.89 in conjunction with the acquisition with TD's current share price being nearly 30% higher representing an additional $600 million in implied/opportunity costs.

Competition is Increasing

• The Dow Jones News service reported May 26, 2006 that Citigroup is entering the highly competitive Boston and Philadelphia retail banking markets, with plans to open several branches in each city this year and expand in the future. The forays into Boston and Philadelphia are part of an ambitious retail growth plan that Citigroup unveiled late last year. New Jersey is another focal point for Citigroup with the company planning to open 15 to 20 new branches this year.

• TD Banknorth has a solid presence in Boston with plans to expand and grow in New Jersey. Bank of America, Wachovia, Citizens, and Sovereign are formidable competitors in the region. TD Banknorth has also stated that it wants to enter and grow in the very competitive New York market which has very large players such as Chase, Citigroup, North Fork, Bank of America, HSBC, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, Commerce and Sovereign.

TD Ameritrade Earnings Estimates Reduced 5%

• TD Ameritrade earnings estimates (IBES) have been reduced 5% to US$0.91 per share from peak of $0.96 per share going into 2006 due to the announced fee cuts.

TDCT Exceptional Growth - Tough Comps Going Forward

• TDCT and its wealth management businesses have been performing exceptionally well. TDCT has been performing so well it is difficult not to see a deceleration in earnings growth. TDCT results have been aided by significant growth from insurance and we expect a substantial slowdown in growth, further compounding a lower TDCT growth outlook.

• TD Banks' Property and Casualty wholly owned subsidiary Meloche Monex recorded DPW (Direct Premiums Written) 5 year growth rate of an impressive 25% with growth expected to slow significantly to the 5% range. In fact, ING growth is forecast at a very modest 2% - 3% for 2007 versus its 5 year growth of 14% (as provided by Scotia Capital Insurance Analyst, Tom MacKinnon).

Wealth Management - Mutual Fund Sales Weakening

• In addition to slower growth from insurance it appears that mutual fund sales performance is weakening due to higher reliance on fixed income and an asset class shift away from this area given the sharp rise in interest rates. TD has the highest reliance on Fixed Income mutual funds of any bank at 28% of assets versus a low of 11% for RY and 12% for the overall mutual fund industry. TD mutual fund sales of long term assets (LTA) declined 79% year over year. In contrast, Royal Bank's LTA sales increased 40%.

Earnings Estimates and Target Price

• We are reducing our 2006 and 2007 earnings estimates to $4.50 per share and $5.00 pre share, respectively, from our slightly aggressive $4.60 per share and $5.10 per share due to ongoing weakness in wholesale banking and increasing earnings pressure at TD Banknorth.

• We are reducing our 12 month share price target to $70 from $75 per share due to lower earnings forecast and slower P/E multiple expansion.
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Scotiabank to Buy Costa Rican Bank for $330 Million

  
RBC Capital Markets, 14 June 2006

Scotiabank entered an agreement to buy Corporacion Interfin for $330MM (US$294MM). Corporacion Interfin owns Costa Rica’s largest private bank (non-government) – Banco Interfin.

Investment Opinion

• More Expansion in LATAM. Scotiabank is poised to be the #1 (private) bank in Costa Rica with this deal, and continues to be a leading player in Latin American bank consolidation. In our view, Scotiabank has taken another smart and decisive step in its international build-out. This transaction, while seemingly expensive based at 2.7x price/book (BNS bought Banco Sudamericano in Peru for 1.3x last year), is in our view, both financially and strategically rewarding.

• Early EPS Accretion. The deal is expected to be accretive by $0.03/share in year 1, without the benefit of synergies, and $0.04/share in year 3 assuming earnings growth above 10%. ROE of 21% in year 1 and 20% in year 3 is very respectable and exceeds BNS’ hurdle rate.

• Justifiable Price Premium. The bank paid 2.7x book value for a coveted asset reflecting: (i) the high-quality Interfin franchise, (ii) scarcity value (few acquisition alternatives in Costa Rica), and (iii) a high-potential market. When combined with Scotia’s existing Costa Rican bank, BNS Costa Rica will rank #1 of non-government banks by market share in both loans (13%) and deposits (8%).

• Regulatory Hurdles Almost Cleared. The transaction is expected to close by August 2006 subject to regulatory approval. BNS has already obtained OSFI approval and is awaiting a decision from the Costa Rican banking and securities regulators.

• BNS Capital Ratios To Remain Strong. The impact on BNS’ tier 1 capital and tangible common equity ratio is minimal, declining by 20bps and 23bps, respectively, from 10.2% and 8.6% at the end of Q2/06.

• Valuation. Our price target of $49 is set at 13x our 2007 cash EPS estimate of $3.77. Our target P/E is set at sector neutral to our sector target P/E to balance Scotia’s strong long-term growth prospects and disciplined, focused management team, with its above-average credit exposure and current earnings reliance on securities gains, low tax rate and low loan losses.

Scotia’s international operations are clearly outgrowing North American bank norms, though the overall earnings level is supported by a belowaverage loan loss accrual and tax rate. We also estimate Scotia’s excess capital position at ~$2 billion at the end of Q2/06, down from a superior position within the peer group in prior periods. Our price target is also indicated at ~2.8x our projected book value of $17.76 (as at Jan. 31/07).
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The Globe and Mail, Sinclair Stewart, 14 June 2006

Bank of Nova Scotia, which has been burrowing deeper into Latin America for growth opportunities, yesterday agreed to buy Costa Rica's Corporacion Interfin for $330-million, making it the largest privately owned bank in that country.

The acquisition follows a familiar pattern for Scotiabank: spend a relatively modest amount of money to gain significant market share in less developed places such as Peru, Chile, El Salvador and the Caribbean.

The Interfin deal, for example, will more than double the amount of branches Scotiabank operates in Costa Rica to 41, and rank it first among private banks in terms of loans and deposits. The combined operations will have $1.8-billion in assets and 1,250 employees.

Scotiabank said it targeted Costa Rica for several reasons, including its young population, its decent economic growth, and a low penetration of banking services in the country. Interfin is regarded as a strong competitor in both the commercial loan field and the auto leasing market, while its retail operations are only relatively new.

These are the sorts of gambits that have helped transform Scotiabank into Canada's most international bank. Late last year, the bank paid $390-million to create the No. 3 player in Peru. It bought 80 per cent of Banco Wiese Sudameris SAA, and then acquired majority control of Banco Sudamericano.

Unlike some of its Canadian rivals, Scotiabank has eschewed expanding in the U.S. market. The lack of growth prospects at home, however, compounded by a ban on bank mergers, has made the bank more aggressive in building out its global operations.

Yet none of these smaller acquisitions will make much of a dent in the bank's $5-billion worth of excess capital.

In a research note yesterday, Merrill Lynch analyst André-Philippe Hardy said he believes Central American acquisitions are at the top of Scotiabank's list of priorities, since it views this market as less competitive and not as likely to attract other large, global rivals. He pointed out the bank could also likely use a larger platform in Chile.

In the most recent quarter, the bank's international division made $268-million, or almost a third of its entire profit. Interfin is expected to add 3 cents a share to Scotiabank's profit in the first year, and 4 cents a share within three years.

The acquisition is expected to close in August, and is still subject to Canadian and Costa Rican regulatory approval.
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Bloomberg, Sean B. Pasternak, 13 June 2006

Bank of Nova Scotia, Canada's third- largest bank, agreed to buy Corporacion Interfin SA, owner of Costa Rica's largest private bank, for U$293.5 million in stock to double its branches in the country.

The purchase will add 24 offices and 950 employees to Scotiabank's Costa Rican business, the Toronto-based bank said today in a statement. The combined assets will rise to U$1.6 billion.

Scotiabank has invested more than U$1 billion since 2000 to expand abroad, primarily in Latin American countries such as Peru, Mexico and El Salvador. Profit from international banking rose 44 percent in the second quarter, to a record C$270 million.

Chief Executive Officer Richard Waugh, 58, has said the bank will continue to invest in international markets where it already has a presence, to offset slower growth in Canada.

``I think the pipeline of potential acquisitions remains full,'' Waugh said in a June 9 telephone interview. ``Latin America is probably our major emphasis right now.''

The bank will have a 13 percent market share for loans in the country once the purchase closes in about two months, Scotiabank said.

Mexico, Peru

Scotiabank completed a C$390 million purchase of two banks in Peru in March to create the third-biggest bank in that country. The lender also owns Grupo Scotiabank, the sixth- largest bank in Mexico.

Interfin was founded in 1979 in San Jose, and owns Banco Interfin. Scotiabank has been in the Central American country since 1995, and the bank's board met there last month to discuss second-quarter results.

Corporacion Interfin had 2005 net income of 10.26 billion colons (U$20 million), an increase of 46 percent from a year earlier, according to a report on the company's Web site.

The transaction will add 3 cents a share to earnings after the first year, Dundee Securities analyst Susan Cohen wrote in a report to investors today. Scotiabank is expected to have earnings per share before one-time items of C$3.73 in 2007, according to the average estimate of 11 analysts polled by Thomson Financial.
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12 June 2006

Enron Class Action Lawyer vs. RBC & TD

  
Macleans, Colin Campbell, 12 June 2006

William Lerach has been called the "class action king" for his long, controversial career defending aggrieved shareholders in securities fraud cases. He's both feared and reviled by many corporations in the United States. His rough tally from past cases? US$40 billion. If his name is not familiar in Canada, it may be soon. Lerach is the lead attorney in the richest class action surrounding the collapse of the energy giant, Enron Corp. Two weeks ago, a judge approved the largest litigation recovery in history in that lawsuit, a US$6.6-billion partial settlement over the role three banks, including the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, played in Enron's collapse. And Lerach is not done yet. Among the defendants that have yet to settle are two more Canadian banks that had dealings with Enron, Toronto-Dominion and Royal Bank of Canada. At stake are hundreds of millions of dollars that Lerach vows to win in coming months.

Last month's guilty verdict for Enron's founder Kenneth Lay and CEO Jeffrey Skilling closed a major chapter in the Enron saga, but also underscored the unabated lust for blood five years after the company collapsed. The furor will continue to play out in the civil courts, where the class action trial for those who don't settle is set to begin in October. It is one of the last hopes for investors to recoup more of what was lost in Enron's US$60-billion implosion (so far, in total, US$7.2 billion has been collected in Enron settlements, which will eventually be paid to claimants). TD and RBC are not unprepared. Both have already set aside huge legal reserves -- US$500 million for RBC and US$300 million for TD -- for the litigation. Neither the banks nor Lerach would comment on whether there have been talks recently, but with the trial date looming, more settlements among the nine remaining financial institutions seem likely.

Enron's collapse was the result of a series of sham transactions that hid debt and allowed the company to fake its financial results. Bankruptcy examiners have said the banks were partners and enablers, providing the money Enron needed to carry out the fraud. TD and RBC maintain they were bit players in the Enron saga. Indeed, their transactions with Enron were among the more straightforward. "If it hadn't been for the fact that it was Enron, they probably wouldn't have been written about," says an industry source familiar with the litigation.

But the transactions still raise important questions as to how much the banks knew of Enron's widespread accounting fraud at the time, and whether that makes them liable in Enron's demise. While RBC and TD were not among Enron's so-called "tier one" banks, their dealings with Enron were extensively documented by the company's court-appointed bankruptcy examiners. The final examiner's report dedicated almost 70 pages to TD's dealings with the company, concluding that in six transactions, the bank "aided and abetted" the Enron fraud. Similar focus was placed on RBC. Another examiner, outlining several RBC-Enron transactions with code names like Hawaii, Alberta and Cerberus, concluded that RBC also "aided and abetted certain Enron officers in breaching their fiduciary duty."

RBC is sticking to its assertions of last summer that it would "vigorously defend the remaining Enron-related cases against it." TD also said its position has not changed in recent weeks, adding that it is "adequately provisioned" for the litigation. "We should be able to resolve any claim for quite a small amount," said TD's president and CEO Ed Clark in a statement last summer. Both banks have already settled a claim against them by Enron (RBC paid the company US$25 million and TD paid US$50 million). RBC also settled a case in 2004 with Rabobank Group, which had taken over an RBC transaction with Enron worth US$517 million. That transaction is being used as evidence in the class action claim. Rabobank said it was duped by RBC, alleging the bank knew of Enron's fraudulent practices through three employees it hired that had dealt with Enron at a previous employer. The three bankers resigned from RBC shortly before Enron's collapse, and are fighting extradition from the U.K. to the U.S.

The fact that TD and RBC have delayed settling implies they don't feel there is a strong case against them, says Richard Powers, the assistant dean of the University of Toronto's Rotman School of Management. The plaintiffs are likely asking for more than TD and RBC are currently prepared to pay. "It becomes a bit of a game of chicken at this point," he says, adding that such actions rarely go to trial. But Lerach is undaunted, warning with typical aplomb: "Skilling and Lay and the other Enron insiders that have been convicted of crimes or plead guilty to crimes are going to be sitting there in October as defendants in the civil trial right along with the Canadian banks if they don't settle."
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Technical Analysis on the TSX Financial Index

  
The Technical Speculator, Donald W. Dony, 12 June 2006


The early May rally in the TSX Composite now appears likely to be the price top of a bull market that began in October 2002. As the dominant trading pattern of the stock markets, the four year cycle, slowly unfurls towards its anticipated low in October 2006, the trading action of the leading sectors add increasing evidence that the slow decline down for the TSX is already underway.

The weighting of the financial sector equals about 1/3rd of the TSX. It is also normally a leading indicator on the composite due to its sensitivity to rising interest rates. As indicated in the lower portion of chart one, the main three month trading cycle for this key sector bottomed in late May and has started to climb towards its anticipated cycle peak in early August; however, this group has only languished in flat trading under the resistance level of 190. With a cycle peak in early August, the clock rapidly ticks-down for this group to display any strength. And without a forceful move from the Financial Index, the possibility of the TSX Composite staging a summer rally to new highs remains very unlikely.

The TSX Composite Index holds a similar trading pattern to its largest component. In the lower portion of chart two, the main trading cycle was also at a low in late May and is now slowly climbing towards an expected cycle peak in early August. The Composite, which should have moved in coordination with its main trading cycle, has yet to commence any signs of a rally. This action strongly indicates growing weakness with Canada’s foremost Index.

Bottom Line: Without strong participation over the next four weeks from the largest sector of the TSX, Canada’s Composite will likely not be able to move to new highs in the coming months which will signal the end of the current bull market.

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TD Ameritrade CEO Interview

  
BusinessWeek, Karyn McCormack, 12 June 2006

One-time college coach Joe Moglia, now CEO of TD Ameritrade, talks about the discount brokerage's growth, current strategy, and poker pals Warren Buffett and Bill Gates

After living in Omaha for more than four years, Joe Moglia finally met the city's most famous resident -- legendary investor Warren Buffett. "I've actually got a one-to-one dinner coming up with him, and have already had two dinners with him," gushes the 57-year old CEO of TD Ameritrade. Moglia even played poker with Buffett and the Berkshire boss's good friend, Bill Gates.

Perhaps rubbing elbows with corporate titans -- and his long stint as a football coach -- have taught Moglia, a New York City native, a thing or two about winning in the markets. For the moment, the early June swoon in stocks hasn't seemed to rattle the chief of the discount brokerage, which thrives on trading volumes. Moglia admits that the slump in TD Ameritrade shares, recently down 43% from a 52-week high in January, reflects that a typically slow time of year for brokers in general is approaching. "I wouldn't look at any of this as a significant trend one way or the other," he says.

After completing eight acquisitions in five years -- the largest being the $1.7 billion TD Waterhouse deal in January -- Moglia continues to prowl for companies that will diversify the firm's revenues and boost growth. The promising opportunities for the company, he says, are products for financial advisers and long-term investors, such as a portfolio allocation tool that uses exchange-traded funds.

Karyn McCormack of BusinessWeek.com sat down with Moglia last week in New York City, where they talked about his game plan and how he met Buffett. Edited excerpts of their conversation follow.

Do you see more consolidation among discount brokerages?

When I got to Ameritrade in the spring of 2001, there were around 200 firms that had online brokerage presences in the U.S., and about 16 names that everybody would know. Today, that number is about 70 overall, and there's probably five names that everybody would know. There's still some excess capacity in the industry, and that suggests there will still be some more consolidation, but not nearly so much as we've had up until now.

Are you planning more acquisitions?

We would look at doing anything that ultimately winds up in the best interests of our clients and shareholders. If we were working on something right now, I wouldn't be able to tell you. It's part of our standard operating procedure. We're looking at those types of things every day.

What's the company's strategy? What are some growth areas?

We've always been a leader in the space where an individual just wants to buy and sell stock -- essentially the active trader space. With our acquisition of TD Waterhouse, we are becoming far more aggressive in the long-term investor space, as well as the independent adviser area. We think that there's significant growth in those areas.

Are you expanding the branches acquired from TD Waterhouse?

When we bought Waterhouse, we inherited about 145 branches. Today we have around 100. We closed the ones we felt were not productive. We will continue to open branches or grow the branches we have if we think it's going to make sense economically.

From a competitive standpoint, what sets your company apart?

One competitive advantage is we've got tremendous ability to scale [trading volume]. For example, today we're doing approximately 270,000 trades a day. We could do close to 600,000 with a very minimal incremental technology capital spending.

Second, our operating leverage is very powerful. We actually went eight quarters in a row with pretax margins over 50% -- that would put us in the 98th percentile in the S&P 500. So there are a couple of things that I think we do very well that has, ultimately, a good impact on the individual client experience as well as a good return for the shareholder.

Speaking of trading volume, what's the trend? Are are you concerned?

As far as this quarter goes, April was better than March. May saw consistency along that same type of trend, and June is a little bit too early to tell.

But I think when you think about retail trading volumes in general, it's important to keep in mind that the individual investor is a lagging indicator in terms of what goes on in the markets. So as the markets do well, you're going to have people get more involved, do more trades, open up more accounts. And that's primarily what we've been seeing over the last few months.

With the market being weak, your stock has been down along with other brokerages. Do you see a recovery?

If you look at our stock specifically, our market cap in the fall of 2001 was $700 million. Today it's closer to $10 billion. In January, we paid a $6 per share dividend, which was one of the largest in the history of Wall Street. So it's been an incredible run for our shareholders, and I think there are very few shareholders that own TD Ameritrade stock today that aren't delighted with the progress that we've made.

Having said that, there has been a little bit of a lull in the action. Financial services in general have come off. We are entering our seasonably slow time as far as the markets go, and financial services in general goes. So I think that's basically what you're seeing. I wouldn't look at any of this as a significant trend one way or the other.

For consumers, what's the most useful area or tool on your website?

We're trying to do a better job of education. We think that exchange-traded funds are one of the best investment vehicles for individual investors. The ETF market has exploded, but 90% of that market is institutions.

So the institutions get it -- they understand it. The retail investor doesn't quite know what an ETF is. We've created an ETF Center where people can go and learn. It's in our best interest to do as much as we can to better educate the investor, because nobody else is going to.

And for the individual trader or investor, we try to provide products and services that better allow them to construct a portfolio that's in line with their risk or better manage their risk.

What is that product?

We created a portfolio-allocation service called Amerivest. First you establish your goals, then your risk tolerance. That then gives you a customized asset allocation where you have diversification amongst asset classes -- like cash, bonds, stocks, and within each of those components, diversification. This all gets funded through ETFs, so you get market-like returns at a low cost.

As the market moves and the portfolio gets off track with regards to your asset allocation guidelines, you press a button and it will tell you what you need to sell and what you need to buy to get back in sync. If you have $100,000, we can do that for 35 basis points. There's nobody that can do that. We're excited about it.

Before coming to Wall Street, you were a former a football coach.

I coached football for 16 years. My last coaching job was defensive coordinator at Dartmouth. In fact, I wrote a book on football. And I wrote a book published a couple of years ago on investing. You may know a lot of people that have written books on football, and you may know a lot of people that have written books on investing, but you don't know anybody that has written books on both of those topics!

Do you see similarities in the two?

There are similarities. At the end of the day, as far as coaching goes, your objective is to win. Your objective is to be able to pull together a program that combines the skill sets of a lot of different individuals, and understand what your strategy is vs. other teams' strategies.

In business, your job is to figure out how to bring groups together with different skill sets in a way that will benefit the experience for your clients and deliver good shareholder value. And you have to be able to provide sustainable, profitable growth over a period of years.

You live in Omaha. Have you ever met Warren Bufffet?

Yes, we met for the first time recently. I suggested to Liz Clayman, one of the anchors at CNBC, that she interview Buffett for a book she's writing on investing. When she got the interview with Buffett, my name came up and he said he had not met me...so I called and asked him if we could get together.

I've actually got a one-to-one dinner coming up with him, and have already had two one-on-one dinners. One day we played a poker game where he had Sharon Osberg, who's a two-time world champion bridge player and his bridge partner, and Bill Gates. It's great, he's a wonderful guy.

Is he investing in the company, or planning to?

No. If he is, he hasn't shared that with me.... Maybe he just likes me.
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TD Executives' Political Donations

  
The Globe and Mail, Sinclair Stewart & Paul Waldie, 12 June 2006

Ten of the most senior officials at Toronto-Dominion Bank, including chief executive officer Ed Clark, met just weeks before the last federal election and agreed to make nearly $100,000 worth of personal contributions to the Liberal and Conservative parties, according to recently filed documents with Elections Canada.

This is believed to be the first time since 2004, when the federal government overhauled its political contribution rules, that one company's executive team has made such a concerted effort to donate money as a group.

The new rules prohibit companies from giving money to political parties, and were designed to ward off the possibility of influence-peddling. TD's actions, however, have sparked concern companies may be able to bypass new rules by organizing donations from employees.

Only two of these TD officials had previously donated to a political party, according to election records, but their collective contribution this year was nearly double what the entire bank gave in 2003, the last year companies were allowed to make donations.

Mr. Clark said the bank was not trying to buy influence with these payments, and pointed out that each of the senior executives agreed to fund both parties.

"I guess we made a principled decision that with the new funding rules, that meant that the democratic system was getting deprived of what had been historically a source of funds, and therefore we ought to contribute to the democratic process but not choose a political stance," Mr. Clark explained, adding that people who earn as much as bankers do are obligated to become involved.

"I obviously favoured the idea, or we wouldn't have done it. I do think it's the right idea."

Mr. Clark said he held a meeting with his senior managers before the Jan. 23 election and discussed how they could participate in financing the political process. Most of the team, including the heads of the bank's main operating units, agreed to donate $5,000 apiece to each party, close to the $5,200 maximum for individuals. Chief financial officer Colleen Johnston was an exception, giving $2,500 to both the Liberals and the Tories, while a couple of others gave $4,000.

In total, the group contributed over $93,000, split evenly between the Liberals and Tories. The bank gave a total of $53,802 to these parties, along with the defunct Canadian Alliance party, in 2003.

Although Mr. Clark stressed that this was a non-partisan exercise, his group only backed the two most powerful parties. He conceded that there may have been some people amongst his executive team that would have liked to support the New Democratic Party, but said in general terms it was difficult to back a party that "doesn't like anything to do with the financial services business."

Mr. Clark said he was not concerned by the optics, much less by the fact that other bank CEOs have not made similar efforts.

"Go ask the other people why they don't think they should support the political process," he said. "That would be my question."

A handful of executives at other financial institutions did make individual contributions to a single party during the recent election campaign. But none of the banks held meetings amongst their top brass to co-ordinate a funding effort. Indeed, some observers in the banking industry suggested many senior executives might feel compelled to join in an effort that was being pushed by their CEO.

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, for example, issued an internal memo to staff last December outlining its political contribution policy. The bank said that while individuals could make donations, they were barred from any political activities at work.

"Further," the memo warned, "employees must not pressure other employees (especially subordinates) to make a political contribution and must not try to influence any vote or political activity."

Mr. Clark countered that there was no pressure at TD for other executives to take part, citing a few members of the team who opted not to contribute.

"We have exactly the same discussion every year on United Way," he said. "And there's some people that don't contribute at the level that I think is appropriate, but I obviously am not averse to saying to people: 'I think if you want to be a leader, in general, you have obligations beyond your own personal consumption habits.' "

But other banks said they draw a clear line between charitable giving and politics.

"When we organize this kind of activity we do it for United Way, for instance, but not for political parties," said Denis Dubé, a spokesman for National Bank of Canada. "The bank prefers to stay neutral and we don't want to be involved in any political activities."

Fundraisers for both major parties mounted an aggressive campaign this winter, according to sources, who said they sought lists of executives they could contact directly.

Bank of Montreal, for example, has a policy against handing out names, to guard against privacy concerns. It also steers clear of the kind of meetings organized by TD.

Ralph Marranca, a spokesman for BMO, said the bank would not "direct any employees, or even suggest, that they make personal political donations -- again, because of our obligation to adhere to the Canada Elections Act and out of respect for the personal privacy of our employees."

TD executives donations
Contributor's nameTitle/ DivisionLiberal Donation (Jan 6)Tory Donation (Jan 13)
Ed Clark Chief Executive Officer $5,000 $5,000 (n/a)
Bob Dorrance CEO, TD Securities$5,000 $4,000
Bernie DorvalCo-Chair Retail Bank $5,000 $5,000
Bill Hatanaka CEO, TD Waterhouse $5,000 $5,000
Tim HockeyCo-Chair, Retail Bank$5,000 (Jan 12)$5,000
Mike MacBainPresident, TD Securities$5,000 $5,000
Rob MacLellanChief Investment Officer$5,000 $5,000
Bharat Masrani Chief Risk Officer $5,000 $5,000
Fred TomczykVice Chair, Operations$4,000 $5,000 (Jan 30)
Colleen JohnstonChief Financial Officer$2,500 $2,500
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Wells Fargo CEO Interview

  
Business 2.0 Magazine, G. Pascal Zachary, 12 June 2006

Received wisdom in the business world has it that there are "devil customers" and "angel customers" - and your company's profits, if not its very soul, ride on your ability to rid yourself of the first and attract the second.

That's nonsense, according to Dick Kovacevich, CEO of Wells Fargo. He says there's no such thing as an unprofitable customer - just one you haven't figured out how to make money on yet. And, he argues, if a customer is truly unprofitable, that's the company's problem, not the customer's.

Following theories like this is just another way the $40.5 billion San Francisco-based banking and mortgage giant has defied convention under Kovacevich and outperformed the rest of the industry. (Wells Fargo shares have grown three times faster than other bank stocks since Kovacevich became CEO in 1998.) From charging into online banking before other big banks to opening branches while rivals were shutting theirs, Wells Fargo has zigged where others zagged.

Kovacevich also shows unconventional thinking about diversity in the ranks of both his employees and his customers. While most CEOs reflexively nod toward diversity as good for public relations, Kovacevich unabashedly says that recruiting employees who reflect your customer base is a strategy that drops straight to the bottom line. He laid out the math for Business 2.0 in a recent interview.

Wells Fargo thinks of itself as a retailer - you even call your branches "stores." But most retailers are heavily segmented: There are customers they want and customers they don't want. When I walk into one of your branches, I see all kinds of customers. How do you pull that off and make money?

There is an altruistic part of it, in that we do think that we need to do our part in the community and serve all. Also, our team members don't want to be in an elitist organization. But we also fundamentally believe that we can be profitable with all segments of society.

Perhaps we have to work harder at the lower income levels. But it's our fault if a customer is unprofitable. It's because we haven't done a good enough job of convincing them to give us all their financial business instead of just a piece. And when you believe that, then you get more internally focused. You're the problem, not the customer.

Why isn't the rest of the industry following your lead?

I think a lot of banks are very shortsighted. They look at their profitable customers today and make big assumptions: that all those customers were profitable when they first started banking with them, or that they could distinguish at that time which ones were going to become profitable. And I don't believe either of those is the case.

We believe that by serving a large group today, even if some customers turn out to be unprofitable over their lifetime with us, there will be a lot of others who will be even more profitable than we expected. By not segmenting, the challenge we have is effective execution, not so much changes in the economy or not having enough opportunities for revenue. And we'd rather be rewarded for what we can manage than what we can't manage. We like our model. It's definitely harder, but if we execute it effectively, it should outperform the others through all economic cycles and time frames.

Branches - sorry, stores - are an expensive way to conduct transactions. Why are they still important?

Every transaction is an opportunity to engage a customer - both to satisfy a transactional need and also to sell him something. And the transaction actually gives you an understanding of customer needs or another new opportunity. If you come in and cash a check from Fidelity, one of our tellers or someone should ask "Could we introduce you to an investment consultant to see if we can do a better job for you than Fidelity?" and so on. So store traffic is good even though it can be more costly, because transactions give us an opportunity to understand and satisfy a customer's need, and therefore make new sales.

And I would just ask two rhetorical questions: Who over time have been the better merchandisers, retail stores or banks, in terms of their ability to attract customers and serve them well? Most people would say retailers have been more effective than banks. And I'd ask the second rhetorical question: How many retailers don't want customers in their stores?

I've banked with Wells Fargo for a long time, and I remember when the branches were like mausoleums. Now they're buzzing. What are all those people doing?

Besides what you might call traditional bankers, you're seeing a mortgage consultant, an insurance agent, and brokers. We've also roughly doubled the number of bankers in our stores over the past four or five years.

Now a lot of that's predicated on having a capable workforce. And, let's be frank, teller jobs don't pay very well. How do you get the quality of people you need?

I think we're an employer of choice for several reasons. Most of these jobs we would describe as entry-level jobs, but that is not necessarily where someone is going to end up. We've got personal bankers who handle customers with money-market accounts and CDs, and private bankers who are more like relationship managers for investments, insurance, and so on. When we're recruiting for those positions, our No. 1 source of personal bankers is our tellers, and our No. 1 source of private bankers is our personal bankers.

I know firsthand that in California you have a very diverse workforce. In some branches, I'd guess one in three workers is foreign-born. Have you thought about why you employ so many immigrants?

Well, first of all, our customer base is that way too. So we need a diverse workforce to better serve our customer base. There's certainly a lot of cultural familiarity that is important, as well as language skills.

And unfortunately, there are corporations that aren't as welcoming to diversity. There's accidental and not-so-accidental discrimination. We will go out of our way to help with issues related to diversity - for example, we'll give people language classes, and we'll make sure our supervisors know that they may ask more questions and have some problems for a while.

How does that pay off for Wells Fargo?

We think it's the right thing to do, but also these people, if they become loyal to Wells Fargo, are going to tell a lot of people about their positive experience working here. Once you have people saying "Hey, this is a great place to work, I love it" - well, word of mouth in these communities is much more effective than advertising.

One of our fastest-growing areas is mortgages for first-time homeowners, and more than half of first-time homeowners come from minority groups. Almost all of that is done by word of mouth. That's going to do nothing but grow. We may make a little more money or lose a little money in that today, but it's definitely going to pay off in the future.

You've recently introduced some new Internet-based tools, like a report that categorizes spending whether it's done through a checking account or credit card and scanners that let small businesses deposit checks electronically. Why don't we see that kind of innovation in banking more often?

You know, I started in business working at General Mills. I don't think the banking industry is particularly at the leading edge. We probably learn more from other industries than we teach them. That's why I'm on the Target board. I think retailers are 20 years ahead of banks in their thinking.

Please don't tell your readers, but our checking accounts aren't really much different than Bank of America's, OK? It's the way we distribute our products that's different. We have a lot more in common with other distributors of commodity products than we do with other banks. Most of the products that Target and Wal-Mart carry are similar, and the way you buy them is similar. Or take Home Depot. The products aren't what distinguishes Home Depot; it's the way they put a plumbing store and a paint shop and so on under one roof.

And so we're doing that with financial services. We're taking what were commodity products delivered through multiple sales forces and putting them all under one roof so the consumer can come in and choose which products make sense. Before, you had to go to a banker, a broker, or an insurance agent for a CD, a mutual fund, or an annuity, and yet they were all trying to satisfy some sort of a long-term savings need. The risks and rewards are different, and you had to pay three different salespeople to bring those to you, and then you had to decide which one made sense because you figured the salespeople were all biased, right?

Now you can come to a Wells Fargo and we can talk to you about the costs and benefits of a mutual fund vs. a CD vs. an annuity and give you some advice - and we're agnostic because we're not just selling CDs. We can say "OK, what's best for you?" Other businesses have figured out how to do that in retail, and we have now figured out how to do it in banking. Eventually, maybe some of our competitors will too.
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08 June 2006

Manulife Financial's May 2006 Share Buybacks

  
For the month of May 2006, Manulife Financial's share buyback amounted to 11,123,800 shares (post-split basis); the average price is $36.40.

3.5 million shares (pre-split basis) were repurchased in Q1 2006. 2 million shares (pre-split basis) were repurchased in April 2006.

As at today's close of business, Manulife Financial edged Royal Bank of Canada, as Canada's largest corporation, in terms of market capialization:

• Manulife Financial Corporation : $57,794,844,502 Quoted Market Value, per TSX
• Royal Bank of Canada : $57,759,545,976 Quoted Market Value, per TSX

Sources: SEDI, Company reports, TSX
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Power Financial's Discount to Net Asset Value

  
The Globe and Mail, Derek DeCloet, 8 June 2006

Deals, deals, everywhere a deal: The mining crowd can't enough of them. The oil guys in Calgary are crazy for them. Every big Canadian bank except CIBC has got money to spend. Manulife Financial is shopping.

But where are the Desmarais boys? They've been awfully quiet lately. Their insurance unit, Great-West Lifeco, hasn't made a major acquisition since it snatched Canada Life three years ago. IGM Financial, formerly known as Investors Group, hasn't bought anything since Mackenzie Financial in early 2001. Money's cheap, yet they sit on their hands.

That might soon change -- and a little bit of mergers and acquisitions activity might be just the catalyst investors are looking for in Power Financial, the holding company that controls both Great-West and IGM.

Power Financial used to be one of those stocks that always seemed expensive, yet just kept going up. No longer. The company is in the doghouse. Power Financial is one of the worst-performing Canadian financial stocks in the past year, earning nothing, including dividends. Manulife is up 29 per cent; CI Financial is up 83 per cent. That doesn't automatically mean Power Financial is a bargain, but it's starting to look like one.

Any analysis must begin with what the individual parts are worth, which is fairly easy because the biggest subsidiaries are publicly traded. By far the most important is Great-West, of which Power Financial owns 73 per cent (directly and indirectly). That's worth about $18.2-billion, using the insurance company's current stock price. Power's stakes in IGM and Pargesa Holding, a Swiss investment company, are worth more than $9-billion. It also has some other small assets that aren't public. BMO Nesbitt Burns analyst John Reucassel pegs their value at close to $700-million.

The result, once you subtract debt and other liabilities, is that Power Financial's pieces are worth about $37 a share. The stock closed yesterday at $31.38, or 15 per cent less. That's not a particularly huge discount. Onex, BCE and Quebecor, to name three other Canadian holding companies, often trade at discounts of 20 or 30 per cent to their asset value -- or more, if investors turn really sour on them.

But suppose you felt the stock market had it wrong. Suppose you felt Great-West itself was undervalued. Then you could make the case that Power Financial's assets are actually worth $42 or $45 a share, and the discount is much wider than it appears -- in other words, that this really is an inexpensive blue-chip stock.

Great-West is a bit of a mystery. It's a big company ($25-billion in market cap) with a habit of producing stellar returns on equity -- usually 20 per cent or better. Yet Bay Street is lukewarm. Analysts complain that the firm is too secretive, that disclosure is awful, that chief executive officer Ray McFeetors has the personality of wet cement.

To these, you can add two more complaints. Great-West derives about one-third of its profit from the United States, so it's hurt by the falling American dollar, and the U.S. unit is arguably too small to be effective. The health insurance business has about two million customers, not nearly enough in a country of nearly 300 million people. Worse, it hasn't really grown since 2004, according to BMO.

The U.S. problems are a big reason why Great-West, which has always carried a premium valuation, now trades at a lower price-to-earnings multiple than Manulife. This is where the M&A part comes in. Great-West, with its balance sheet recovered from the Canada Life deal, needs a U.S. fix. It needs to buy another insurance company, or sell that business to someone larger, in return for a substantial minority stake.

There's risk in either, but the Desmaraises are nothing if not good deal makers in a company that has a surfeit of them. Last year, they installed Jeffrey Orr as Power Financial's CEO, a former investment banker who helped them navigate the Mackenzie acquisition. They didn't put him there just to manage what they've already got.

And if a deal doesn't happen, you've still got a stock that pays 3.2 per cent and has been one of the most reliable dividend-raisers on the Toronto Stock Exchange. "I don't think we've seen Power Financial at these kinds of dividend yields for years," says Saxon Financial's Suzann Pennington, who has been buying. Sure, there are a few warts, and the brokerage firms don't like it much. So what? That's always the way it is when great companies go on sale.
;

06 June 2006

Price Targets for Cdn Banks

  
Bank of Montreal
• BMO Nesbitt Burn maintains "market perform," 12-month target price is $70.00
• CIBC World Markets maintains "sector perform," 12-month target price is $67.00
• Desjardins Securities maintains "buy," 12-month target price is $75.50
• Dundee Securities maintains "neutral," 12-month target price is $71.00
• National Bank Financial maintains "underperform," 12-month target price is $67.00
• RBC Capital Markets maintains "sector underperform," 12-month target price is reduced to $64.00 from $67.00
• Scotia Capital maintains "sector underperform," 12-month target price is $72.00
• TD Newcrest maintains "hold," 12-month target price is reduced to $66.00 from $72.00
• UBS maintains "hold," 12-month target price is $70.00

Bank of Nova Scotia
• BMO Nesbitt Burns upgrades to "outperform," 12-month target price is increased to $51.00 from $50.00
• CIBC World Markets maintains "sector perform," 12-month target price is $49.00
• Credit Suisse downgrades to "neutral,"
• Desjardins Securities maintains "top pick," 12-month target price is $53.50
• National Bank Financial upgrades to "sector perform," 12-month target price is $48.00
• RBC Capital Markets maintains "sector perform," 12-month target price is reduced to $49.00 from $51.00
• Scotia Capital maintains "sector perform," 12-month target price is $53.00
• TD Newcrest upgrades to "action list buy," 12-month target price is raised to $51.00 from $49.00
• UBS upgrades to "buy," 12-month target price is $54.00

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
• Desjardins Securities maintains "buy," 12-month target price is $96.50
• Dundee Securities maintains "neutral," 12-month target price is raised to $88.00
• National Bank Financial maintains "outperform," 12-month target price is $95.00
• RBC Capital Markets maintains "sector perform," 12-month target price is $85.00
• Scotia Capital maintains "sector underperform," 12-month target price is $85.00
• TD Newcrest maintains "hold," 12-month target price is reduced to $86.00 from $88.00
• UBS maintains "neutral," 12-month target price is reduced to $92.00 from $94.00

National Bank of Canada
• BMO Nesbitt Burns maintains "outperform," 12-month target price is $70.00
• Dundee Securities maintains "outperform," 12-month target price is $68.00
• RBC Capital Markets upgrades to "outperform," 12-month target price is raised to $68.00 from $66.00
• Scotia Capital maintains "sector perform," 12-month target price is $72.00
• TD Newcrest maintains "buy," 12-month target price is $71.00

Royal Bank of Canada
• BMO Nesbitt Burns maintains "market perform," 12-month target price is $52.00
• CIBC World Markets maintains "sector perform," 12-month target price is $52.00
• Credit Suisse upgrades to "outperform,"
• Desjardins Securities maintains "hold," 12-month target price is $54.50
• Dundee Securities maintains "outperform," 12-month target price is $53.50
• RBC Capital Markets maintains "outperform," 12-month target price is raised to $55.00 from $53.50
• Scotia Capital maintains "sector outperform," 12-month target price is $58.00
• TD Newcrest upgrades to "action list buy," 12-month target price is $53.00
• UBS upgrades to "buy," 12-month target price is $55.00

Toronto-Dominion Bank
• BMO Nesbitt Burns maintains "outperform," 12-month target price is reduced to $70.00 from $71.00
• CIBC World Markets maintains "sector outperform," 12-month target price is reduced to $71.00 from $72.00
• Desjardins Securities maintains "top pick," 12-month target price is $73.50
• Dundee Securities maintains "outperform," 12-month target price is $70.00
• National Bank Financial maintains "outperform," 12-month target price is reduced to $70.00 from $71.00
• RBC Capital Markets maintains "outperform," 12-month target price is reduced to $70.00 from $72.00
• Scotia Capital maintains "sector outperform," 12-month target price is $75.00
• UBS upgrades to "buy," 12-month target price is $75.00
;

05 June 2006

Life Insurance Co Growth Rates

  
Scotia Capital, 5 June 2006

• Acquisitions have historically fuelled growth in Canada but those days are largely behind us - organic growth in Canada has been slowing and should continue to slow going forward. In our view, gone are the days of 30% earnings growth for the Canadian divisions of these companies, largely driven by acquisitions. We estimate that the 28% average earnings CAGR for all the Canadian divisions of the Canadian lifecos from '00 to '05, driven largely by the acquisitions of Clarica, Canada Life, and Maritime Life (as part of the John Hancock acquisition), was around 16% on an organic basis. We estimate the organic growth rate actually declined to 12% over the last two years. We look for a 12% CAGR for '06 & '07, and 11% on an organic basis.

• We estimate Manulife will have the best earnings growth prospects in the Canadian market. In '06 & '07, we expect Manulife's Canadian division to be the fastest growing of all the Canadian divisions of our lifecos, with 16% earnings CAGR, (14% on an organic basis), followed by Great-West Lifeco at 12%, Industrial-Alliance at 12% (10% organic), and Sun Life at 8%.
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More Cdn Banks Seen Lifting Dividends

  
Duncan Mavin, Financial Post, 5 June 2006

Investors could see more banks following the lead of Bank of Montreal by hiking their targeted dividend payout ratios, say the authors of a new report that trawls though 175 years of BMO's dividend history.

Canadian banks have been reinvesting their earnings to pay for growth plans over the past 30 years, said Stephen Foerster, a professor at the Richard Ivey School of Business at the University of Western Ontario in London.

But that could be about to change because of a lack of growth opportunities in a mature Canadian banking sector and because retiring Baby Boomers want steady dividend increases rather than capital gains, said Mr. Foerster, who is the co-author of a report that looks at trends in Canadian dividends and uses data about BMO from as far back as the 19th century.

BMO surprised analysts late last month by announcing it aims to pay out between 45% and 55% of earnings to shareholders in the form of dividends, an increase of 10 percentage points on its previously stated target, and the highest level of any Canadian bank.

But the new target doesn't even come close to the average amount BMO has paid out over its entire history, Mr. Foerster said.

Before 1975, BMO's average dividend payout ratio was 80%, more than double that for most Canadian banks today.

Mr. Foerster and co-author Stephen Sapp cross-checked the historic dividend payment trends they found in BMO's records with other major Canadian banks and found they were broadly similar.

Now, Mr. Foerster said, "I wouldn't be surprised if other banks start to raise their payout targets as well."

Anil Tahiliani, head of research with McLean & Partners Wealth Management Ltd, said all the Canadian banks are in a similar dividend cycle and BMO's rivals will likely increase their dividends too.

Dividend hikes would be in line with the requirements of ageing investors.

"As the clients get older we see a switch as they go into more of a capital-preservation mode," he said.

Retiring Baby Boomers, who are expected to live much longer than previous generations, could change the nature of investing. There will be a greater number of older investors who want steady income and a safe bet rather than growth that might require riskier strategies such as big acquisitions.

"People are saying that if I can make equal to or better than inflation based on my dividend then they'll be happy with that, knowing that there isn't much downside," he said. "Even in a slowdown, [the banks] still make money. Their earnings aren't as cyclical as other industries and their fees are still going up."

Mr. Tahiliani does not own BMO, but he does own Toronto-Dominion Bank and Bank of Nova Scotia, because he likes their U.S. and International growth plans. He said banks that don't have similar plans outside of Canada will become "more or less a utility stock," with little risk, but little prospect of capital growth either.

Genuity Capital Markets analyst Mario Mendonca said BMO and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce in particular lack significant growth plans and that could be behind dividend increases at both banks during the latest round of quarterly earnings that has just been completed.

"What BMO might be saying is that retail banking is spewing out so much capital and we can't necessarily put it back to work," said Mr. Mendonca.

Not only that, he said, but with a growing array of wealth management products, especially life insurance products, offering steady income streams for retirees, banks could be under more pressure to increase dividends.

Also, he said, with interest rates moving higher, the banks will be tempted to raise their dividends to be more competitive with bonds.

"If people see banks as being bonds with a little bit of potential then you have to raise your dividend," said Mr. Mendonca.

Meanwhile, John Kinsey, who helps manage about $800-million at Caldwell Securities, offered another reason for dividend payout ratios at some banks to creep upward.

When a bank has a less-than-stellar quarter, he said, "token" dividend increases are given to thank investors for their patience.

Messrs. Foerster and Sapp's report, "The Changing Role of Dividends," is to be published in the Canadian Journal of Economics this year.
;

03 June 2006

RBC's Strategy vs. TD's Strategy

  
The Globe and Mail, Sinclair Stewart & Derek DeCloet, 3 June 2006

If you still think Canada's big banks are an indistinguishable lot, lumbering along in more or less the same direction, consider a couple of remarks from the recent earnings season.

First up was Ed Clark, the chief executive officer of Toronto-Dominion Bank, who has been plowing money into U.S. acquisitions about as fast as he can find a bank willing to sell to him.

"We feel that the window of opportunity in the United States is actually fairly short," he told analysts during a conference call late last month, explaining the urgency of his southward push. "The very conditions that are making it tough for Banknorth [TD's U.S. beachhead] are throwing up more opportunities."

The next day, a near identical question was put to Gord Nixon, the head of Royal Bank of Canada, whose U.S. retail expansion plans have essentially been locked in the deep freeze. Here's what he had to say: "I'm not suggesting there's not a window of opportunity right now. I just don't see it closing, and I just don't see a huge amount of consolidation," he said during a call to discuss RBC's quarterly results. "I tend to be a little bit more pessimistic, perhaps, than others, and I think that patience will provide opportunity and that's the way we intend to play it."

Hmmm. Get in while you still can. No. Bide your time on the sidelines until something presents itself. Are these guys looking at the same market?

"The pace of consolidation in the U.S.; the importance of scale; and the ability to compete globally in the capital markets: Their public statements would suggest they disagree on all of these things," said Robert Wessel, an analyst with National Bank Financial Inc.

"They are absolutely different approaches, no question," said another analyst who covers the sector.

Let's put things in perspective for a moment. These are the two most dominant retail banks in Canada. Of all the domestic banks, they have the two most substantial U.S. wealth management platforms, to go along with established U.S. branch networks. Both have investment banks that compete vigorously with one another for underwriting and advisory business.

On the surface, it looks like Canada's two biggest banks are following the same course. Yet when it comes to their vision of the future, when it comes to deciding how to spend that excess capital that has been hanging like a millstone around the industry's collective neck, one could argue their CEOs are blazing starkly different paths that could have long-term implications for investors.

TD, on the one hand, is buying heavily in the U.S. market and exiting some of its derivatives businesses, a bet that the market will reward it for a retail-heavy, and presumably less volatile, earnings stream.

RBC, meanwhile, has forgone another U.S. purchase in favour of using its capital internally, and bulking up its global capital markets business. Banks are complex beasts, but their various businesses can be boiled down to a relatively simple proposition: They are in the game of pricing and managing risk. TD could easily flame out in the United States, either by paying too much for assets, or buying the wrong bank, or fouling up the integration. RBC has been the stock market darling of the two, and recently produced what one analyst called a "mind-boggling" performance from its investment banking unit. Yet these results have been accompanied by whispers that the bank may be assuming more risk to drive its bottom-line growth. For investors, it's a question of which strategy they can stomach.

It is mid-afternoon on a Thursday, and the atmosphere inside the cavernous trading floor at RBC Dominion Securities is relaxed. This is not how trading floors look in the movies. There's no one waving his arms or giving inscrutable hand signals, no yelling or cheering -- not much noise at all, really.

You'd never be able to tell that this room -- 40,000 square feet, about half the size of a Canadian football field -- is the heart of one of the most important profit centres at the country's largest bank. For a lot of investors, it's also a source of mystery. No one is quite sure exactly how they do it; all they know is that Royal Bank of Canada, more than any of the other big domestic banks, is taking full advantage of the prosperity and optimism that has dominated the world's capital markets for the past three years.

RBC's astonishingly good second-quarter results suggest one of two things: It is getting more aggressive, or it got very, very lucky. The bank made $586-million in revenue from trading alone -- easily a record -- including $57-million in a single day. In that 24-hour stretch, RBC's traders earned one-third of what the trading team at archrival CIBC World Markets produced in three months.

"We had a good day," shrugged Mr. Nixon, the bank's chief executive officer, unable to suppress a grin.

Chuck Winograd, the man who heads up RBC's investment banking and trading division, was even more oblique. "I'm not going to talk about just what happened, because we don't talk about trading days. But it was an unbelievable day," he acknowledged. "I was just in China, at the Great Wall. It's a great wall. We had a great day."

That's not the kind of answer that will help analysts with their forecasts, and it's little surprise that there have been questions on Bay Street as to whether RBC, long viewed as Canada's most conservative bank, has a growing appetite for taking risk, especially in trading esoteric financial instruments such as structured products.

"I've got suspicions. In those businesses, you don't see the good rewards without added risk," said Murray Leith, director of investment research at Odlum Brown Ltd., a Vancouver brokerage that invests heavily in financial services stocks. "But is it manageable?" Probably, he said.

Others have their suspicions, too, but say the bank doesn't give enough information to confirm them. Mr. Wessel, at National Bank Financial, argues that RBC's disclosure is lacking, "but based on what they do disclose, it would certainly seem that, more than any other bank, they have substituted market risk for credit risk over the past couple of years."

RBC is certainly no Goldman Sachs, whose whole business is focused on the capital markets. The bank's trading operation is still dwarfed by the size of its consumer businesses, such as personal banking, credit cards and mortgages. Even in the second quarter -- which Mr. Nixon calls "an aberration" -- trading still represented only about a 10th of the bank's revenue. And the CEO emphatically denies he has made a conscious decision to take on more risk.

"Absolutely not. Absolutely not. I couldn't say it more clearly," Mr. Nixon said. "You listen to these analysts too much. They're not always right." He did acknowledge, however, that the trading business at RBC is "the most difficult area for the analysts to get their arms around"

It may sound like these analysts are unduly picking on RBC, especially considering that TD has made some very sizable gambles: after all, the U.S. market has not exactly been a playground for Canadian banks. The difference is the market seems to have a better grip on the risk TD is taking; it's easier to see where the money is going, and one either accepts the risk or doesn't.

To be fair, no one is suggesting RBC is courting catastrophe. There are questions, however, as to whether the bank's stock should reflect some aspect of a heightened risk profile, especially when compared with a rival like TD.

Mr. Clark, a retail evangelist, has been on a mission to strip market and credit risk out of TD ever since taking the helm in 2002, and at the same time make it more reliant on plain old branch banking and wealth management. Little wonder: He inherited a balance sheet that was charred by billions in bad loans to the telecom industry, courtesy of an overly aggressive investment banking culture.

He has spent billions of dollars on three U.S. banks and orchestrated a major discount brokerage merger in hopes of creating a cross-border retail banking juggernaut. The investment bank is still there, but in a streamlined, more focused version of its former self.

As one might expect, the bank's credit risk profile has shrunk dramatically, much as it has for the other Canadian banks, all of which have slashed their corporate lending. TD's capital markets risk, measured as a percentage of the bank's entire risk-weighted assets, has also dropped substantially. It was just 2.6 per cent at the end of the second quarter, down from 8.5 per cent at the end of 2000. RBC's, by contrast, has headed in the opposite direction. It was 6.9 per cent at the end of the second quarter, up from 2.2 per cent at the end of 2000.

"There's no question that investors are buying a different set and character of earnings [with TD and RBC], but who knows over the next 10 years which will turn out to be better or worse," Mr. Clark said in an interview. "You just say 'let's just keep on pounding away and doing what we said we were going to do . . . It may be that the Royal will also just keep pounding away and doing what they're doing, and produce terrific results, and I say well, Godspeed to them, too."

If Mr. Clark's mantra is focus, Mr. Nixon's is diversification. Instead of taking another shot at a U.S. acquisition, Mr. Nixon, a former investment banker, is allocating capital around all of his business lines, and wading into some of the areas that TD's scaled-down capital markets group recently abandoned: exotic derivative instruments such as structured credit and interest rate products.

Call it Gordon Nixon's Third Way. After taking the heat two years ago over the disappointing results from the U.S., it seemed he had two options: To double his bets in that market by buying even more assets, or withdrawing to Canada.

But Mr. Nixon checked the "neither-of-the-above" box and chose a more subtle, gradual approach to building. In U.S. consumer banking, that has meant adding branches to RBC Centura, its North Carolina-based retail bank. In Mr. Winograd's department, it has meant a bunch of things. It's a major player in selling and trading bonds in Europe and Asia, and almost overnight it became the largest dealer of so-called "Maple bonds," debt issued by foreign companies but denominated in Canadian dollars. It pushes around Australian and New Zealand currencies with the same comfort as Canadian dollars.

Yes, Mr. Nixon acknowledges, the traders are placing bigger bets, but not disproportionately to the growth of the bank. RBC has also offset risk by ruthlessly culling its loans to corporate customers, by far the biggest source of trouble for a bank during an economic downturn.

So far, the strategy has worked gloriously. The bank is on pace to shatter the $4-billion annual profit mark for the first time, and investors are getting giddy on the quarterly fix: RBC, despite the furtive musings about risk in some corners, is trading at a clear premium to its peers, including TD.

Suzann Pennington, a portfolio manager with Saxon Mutual Funds, credited RBC's diversification as a primary support for the stock's value. The bank's retail and wealth management business is so powerful, she said, that it's capable of smoothing out a lot of trading mistakes.

"Maybe it's not such a bad thing," she said of Mr. Nixon's strategy. "I don't know the answer to that yet."

Mr. Clark repeatedly insists that he "doesn't get too fussed" that his stock trades at a discount to some of the other banks, such as RBC, although some who know him insist he most definitely is fussed by it. Whatever the case, he seems resigned to the fact that TD won't get a primo price-to-earnings multiple until it can prove its mettle when the credit picture darkens.

"Until there's a [downturn in the] credit cycle, I don't think that our strategy will drive a superior P/E," he said, "because right now the markets are saying there's virtually no risk."

TD's Ed Clark

RBC's Gord Nixon

• On the analysts
'We had a blowout operating quarter, and the fact that a 23-per-cent profit increase didn't satisfy them, you sit there and say you can't get too fussed by that, because you the start to do dumb things in running your institution.' 'You listen to these analysts too much. They're not always right.'
• On risk and valuation
Until there's a credit cycle I don't think that our strategy will drive a superior P/E, because right now the markets are saying there's virtually no risk. And so, in fact, people who extend up the risk curve are getting those earnings without having to pay a big price for those earnings.' 'I think the real question is if your look at those [capital markets] businesses, what are the relative values of those businesses compared to retail banking U.S., retail banking Canada, etc? Because the jury is out on that.'
• On each other's bank
'If someone else has a magic formula that produces even better returns, I say well good for you. But don't think TD could run those strategies. I know we couldn't run those strategies.''They've never had an investment banking franchise like we have in Canada: mergers and acquisitions, new issues, equity trading, equity derivatives, global fixed income, all of these businesses... What I will give you is that we've been more committed to the capital markets, globally, than TD has.'
• On the U.S. retail market
'I'd rather put the energy into figuring out how I can make the retail bank compete with Bank of America successfully, because I don't have to put the energy into that. I can import intellectual capital throughout the organization, because it's the main game that we're in.' 'We also believe that we should be patient in the U.S. If you look at acquisitions in the United States, they're still expensive. We have concerns about the performance of that market relative to Canada and other markets where we've been investing.'
• Capital markets profit

The following graph shows how much of the banks' overall profit is derived from their capital markets units, which include investment banking and trading, among other businesses. TD's reliance on capital markets has decreased dramatically, while RBC's has increased modestly.

RBC
2000 - 23% - $508-million      2006* - 33% - $770-million
TD
2000 - 39% - $778-million      2006* - 21% - $339-million       * First 6 months of fiscal 2006

• Market risk

Banks are required to set aside capital according to how risky their assets are. This graph shows what percentage of a bank's total risk-adjusted assets is represented by capital markets risk.

RBC
Q4, 2000 - 2.2%      Q2, 2006 - 6.9%
TD
Q4, 2000 - 8.5%      Q2, 2006 - 2.6%;

02 June 2006

ATM Move in US Riles TD Customers

  
Financial Post, Duncan Mavin, 2 June 2006

Customers of Toronto-Dominion Bank's U.S. subsidiary will get refunds of charges if they use other banks' ATMs but there will be no break for Canadian clients.

TD announced the U.S. move yesterday but made it clear Canadian customers will continue to pay service fees of about $1.50 per transaction for using non-TD cash machines.

TD Banknorth, located in the U.S. Northeast, is introducing a 'no ATM fees' card for customers in New Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and metropolitan New York. The bank is striving to gain market share in the region, where it bought Hudson United Bancorp this year.

"We knew coming into these highly competitive markets would require a different strategy for TD Banknorth, so we did our homework, starting with consumer and competitive research," said Thomas Dyck, director of marketing for TD Banknorth. Findings from the research were behind the no ATM fees card offer, he said.

The Hudson Bancorp branches operate in a very competitive market, said spokesman Jeff Nathanson. The No ATM Fees card may be the first to give bank customers free transactions at any cash machine in the world, he said.

Banks generally do not charge customers for using their own bank's ATM machines, or automated teller machines. However, there's usually a fee of about $1.50 at an ATM belonging to a different bank. TD Banknorth will effectively refund its customers for those fees.

TD said it has no plans to offer a similar deal to its Canadian customers. So, while TD Banknorth customers can use any ATM in Canada for free, TD's customers will have to continue to pay to use ATMs belonging to rival Canadian banks.

"It's interesting they can find a way to eliminate [ATM] fees in certain jurisdictions and not others," said Sue Lott of consumer rights group Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC.) "What is the difference in cost to their U.S. subsidiary than here?" she said.

PIAC has been trying for several years without success to get a good answer for the justification for ATM fees, said Ms. Lott.

The fees are "a continuing irritant" for Canadians, she added.

Duff Conacher, chair of the Canadian Community Reinvestment Coalition (CCRC) said the anomaly is "one of the clearest signs that [ATM] fees are unjustified." He said, "Self-service banking should not cost the customer, because the customer is doing all the work."

CCRC is lobbying Ottawa for regulation of bank fees, including ATM fees, in the run up to the government's review of the Bank Act, scheduled for early 2007.

Dianne Salt, vice president of Corporate Communications at TD in Toronto said TD is focused on offering good service and products customers want. "We feel that TD does have competitive products," she said.

Customers of the U.S. subsidiaries of other Canadian banks, including Royal Bank of Canada's RBC Centura bank and Bank of Montreal's Harrisbank, are charged fees for using ATMs belonging to other banks, according to their websites.
;

CIBC Q2 2006 Earnings

  
The Globe and Mail, Paul Waldie, 2 June 2006

The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce is on track to cut costs by more than $500-million this year, double the bank's own target.

Gerald McCaughey, CIBC's president and chief executive officer, has made cost cutting a top priority and vowed last year to bring the bank's efficiency ratio -- a measure of how much the bank has to spend to earn one dollar of revenue -- in line with its competitors. To reach that goal, Mr. McCaughey set a target of cutting $250-million in annual costs by the end of this year.

Yesterday the bank reported that costs had dropped by $132-million to $1.82-billion in the second-quarter ended April 30, 2006. Some analysts calculated that at that rate, CIBC costs could drop by as much as $524-million this fiscal year.

During a conference call with analysts, Mr. McCaughey said the bank will review the target at the end of the year and see how it compares with other banks. "I'm very confident we will achieve the $250-million [target] and there are strong signals we will exceed it," he said, noting that the strengthening dollar has helped.

The cost-cutting initiative was one of the few bright spots for analysts in the bank's second-quarter results.

Over all, CIBC reported a profit attributable to common shareholders of $552-million, up 34 per cent from the same quarter a year earlier. However, that included a number of one-time items. Excluding the extra items, the bank's profit translated into $1.54 a share, a penny below many analysts' expectations. Revenue fell to $2.77-billion from $2.82-billion. Analysts found the results disappointing.

"This should be viewed as a fairly wide [earnings per share] miss, in our opinion," James Keating, an analyst at RBC Dominion Securities Inc., said in a note.

The bank's two main divisions -- CIBC World Markets and retail banking -- reported weak results.

Profit at World Markets fell by 4 per cent to $110-million from a year earlier. Revenue dropped 18 per cent to $607-million. The bank blamed a slow investment banking market in the United States for much of the shortfall, but said its Canadian business remained strong this quarter.

Retail banking profit surged to $432-million from $341-million a year earlier, but that included a number of one-time items. Revenue was flat at $1.96-billion.

The bank said it lost market share in several retail banking categories amid intense competition from other lenders. But part of that was also due to a strategic shift in some areas. For example, CIBC is moving away from unsecured consumer loans and looking to attract more secured loans. So far, the bank said that is paying off and growth in that area is exceeding the market.

Credit quality remains strong and the bank set aside $138-million for bad loans, down 13 per cent from $159-million a year earlier.

CIBC increased its dividend to 70 cents a share from 68 cents. Mr. McCaughey said that while CIBC is committed to paying out up to 50 per cent of its annual profit in dividend, the bank is using much of its excess cash this year to buy a 43.7-per-cent stake in Barbados-based FirstCaribbean International Bank, which cost $1.1-billion (U.S.).

Mr. McCaughey was asked how the bank will continue to meet its efficiency ratio objectives if it cannot generate substantially more revenue. He replied that cutting costs was a logical first step toward bringing the bank's efficiency ratio up to the median of other banks, but that revenue growth will come.

"I feel very strongly that we are on track with the program," he said. "It is our view that we will be able to perform adequately on the revenue side."
__________________________________________________________
Bloomberg, 1 June 2006

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, the country's fifth-biggest lender, said second-quarter profit rose 33 percent because of lower expenses and a tax refund. The bank boosted its dividend for the first time in five quarters.

Net income for the period ended April 30 climbed to C$585 million ($529 million), or C$1.63 a share, from C$440 million, or C$1.20, a year earlier, the Toronto-based bank said today. Revenue fell 1.9 percent to C$2.77 billion, the lowest in at least nine quarters.

Non-interest expenses fell for a third straight quarter, down 10 percent to C$1.83 billion. Chief Executive Officer Gerald McCaughey is trying to lower costs by C$250 million this fiscal year by cutting about 950 jobs and reducing advertising and bonuses.

"They have really tried to reduce their costs," said Juliette John, who helps manage the equivalent of about $15 billion at Bissett Investment Management in Calgary, including CIBC shares. "A concern further down the road is how they're actually going to maintain or grow market share."

CIBC began cutting costs last year after the bank posted its first annual loss since 1987 because of $2.4 billion in expenses to settle Enron Corp. claims. McCaughey, 50, took over as chief executive in August.

The bank is on track to surpass its C$250 million savings target, said Chief Financial Officer Tom Woods, on a conference call with analysts. Robert Wessel, an analyst at National Bank Financial, estimated the bank may cut costs by twice that amount this year, based on the savings so far.

The stock has gained 3.7 percent this year, the best performer among the country's six biggest banks.

The cost cuts, lower provisions for bad loans and reduced taxes helped counter slumping revenue from consumer and investment banking. The bank set aside C$138 million for bad loans, down 13 percent from C$159 million a year earlier.

"Credit quality is a positive," said John. "It reinforces that the environment continues to be benign, and that problems are not going to be nearly as critical to the banks in the second half" of 2006.

Consumer banking profit rose 27 percent to C$432 million, mostly because of a tax recovery. Revenue was little changed, and the bank's overall net interest margin -- the difference between what it earns and pays out in interest -- slumped to 1.47 percent, the lowest in at least nine quarters.

Margins Decline

Margins at most Canadian banks have fallen after the Bank of Canada raised its main interest rate seven straight times, including an increase last week. Net interest income fell 15 percent to C$1.04 billion, also the lowest in at least nine quarters, CIBC said. Revenue from personal and small business banking slumped 20 percent.

Lending growth is likely to decline because "competitive pressures are likely to continue to compress net interest margins," and consumers become "more conservative" because of higher rates, the bank said today in a statement.

Earnings from the CIBC World Markets investment bank fell 4.3 percent to C$110 million on lower revenue in the U.S. and losses from corporate loan hedging programs. Revenue from investment banking will likely be higher in the third quarter, Woods said.

Higher Trading

That was offset by higher trading revenue and brokerage fees, after volume on the Toronto Stock Exchange rose by a third this year as commodity stocks rose. CIBC World Markets ranks first among Canadian banks for managing new equity offerings this year, and is ninth for merger advice, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Capital markets fees rose 8.9 percent to C$354 million at the investment bank.

"The outlook for capital markets, investment banking and wealth management businesses is positive, driven by expectations for moderate growth in the North American economy and continued strength in equity markets," the bank said.

Profit in the quarter was boosted by a C$35 million tax recovery following an audit in its retail bank, and a C$25 million reversal of loan loss provisions. The earnings were lowered by C$9 million for accounting provisions and C$7 million for an adjustment on mortgage fees.

National Bank Financial's Wessel said the bank earned C$1.55 a share before these one-time items, below his estimate of C$1.58 a share. The bank was expected to earn C$1.55 a share on that basis, based on the median estimate of seven analysts polled by Bloomberg News.

Raised Dividend

The bank boosted its dividend 3 percent to 70 cents a share, from 68 cents.

"I think that because the growth wasn't there, they gave a little bit of a carrot to shareholders, saying `thank you for bearing with us'," said John Kinsey, who helps manage the equivalent of about $800 million at Caldwell Securities in Toronto, including CIBC shares. "It wasn't a great quarter."

CIBC's Tier 1 capital ratio -- the amount of assets that the bank must set aside for regulatory purposes -- was 9.2 percent, up from 9 percent in the fiscal first quarter. That ratio fell as low as 7.5 percent last year following the Enron reserves.

CIBC reported the highest increase this quarter among the country's six main lenders. Bank of Nova Scotia, the country's third-biggest bank, said on May 29 that earnings climbed 8.2 percent to a record C$894 million on higher profit from Latin America.

Last week, Bank of Montreal, Canada's fourth-biggest bank, said earnings climbed 7.3 percent to C$644 million, or C$1.24 a share on higher investment banking and trading revenue. National Bank of Canada said profit climbed 5.9 percent to C$214 million, or C$1.26 a share.

Toronto-Dominion Bank, the second-biggest lender, said earnings rose 23 percent to C$738 million, or C$1.01 a share on higher mutual fund sales. Royal Bank of Canada, the country's No. 1 bank, said that earnings climbed 23 percent to C$1.12 billion, or 85 cents a share, led by trading revenue and mergers.
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