09 May 2006

CS to Settle Enron Claims for U$90M

  
Enron has now settled with at least six banks accused of helping its managers hide debts and inflate results.

Reuters, 9 May 2006

Credit Suisse will pay $90 million to Enron to settle claims that it helped the energy trader commit fraud, Enron said Tuesday.

Houston-based Enron has now settled with at least six banks in its "MegaClaims" litigation. It accused the banks of helping prior management hide debt and inflate results, contributing to the company's December 2001 bankruptcy.

Enron said Credit Suisse's payout is lower than payouts by some other banks because it was involved in fewer transactions with the company.

Credit Suisse confirmed the settlement, and did not admit wrongdoing. It said it has set aside enough money for the payment.

Enron said it will allow $92 million of Credit Suisse's claims, and that another $237 million of claims will be subordinated, and receive no distribution from Enron's estate.

John Ray, Enron's chairman, said he remains eager to settle with the remaining banks in the MegaClaims case.

These banks include Barclays, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Fleet National Bank and Merrill Lynch, Enron said.

Enron emerged from Chapter 11 protection in November 2004, and exists to liquidate assets and pay debts. Its bankruptcy is the second largest in U.S. history, after Worldcom.

Closing arguments are set for May 15 in the trial of former Enron chief executives Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, who are accused of conspiracy and fraud in Enron's collapse.

In previous MegaClaims settlements, JPMorgan Chase agreed to pay $350 million, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce $250 million, Toronto-Dominion Bank $70 million plus $60 million for claims it transferred to third parties, Royal Bank of Scotland Group $41.8 million and Royal Bank of Canada $25 million.

The MegaClaims case is separate from investor lawsuits over Enron's collapse. The University of California, the lead plaintiff in that case, has recovered some $7 billion from banks on behalf of Enron investors.

Credit Suisse's settlement requires approval by the U.S. bankruptcy court in Manhattan.

The law firms Susman Godfrey; Togut, Segal & Segal; and Venable represent Enron in the MegaClaims litigation.
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Analyst Sees 'Relief' Rally in Cdn Banks

  
The Globe and Mail, Angela Barnes, 9 May 2006

In case you hadn't noticed it, Canadian financial stocks have been under pressure recently. As a result, the S&P/TSX financial index is the most oversold it has been in more than a year, says Dennis Mark, technical research analyst at Merrill Lynch Canada. He thinks the group could stage a short-term relief rally that could take the stocks back up to resistance levels.

Mr. Mark also noted in a report yesterday that when the S&P/TSX energy index is compared with the TSX financials, the resulting ratio is near the top of a one-year trading range, which suggests that money could flow out of the energy stocks and into the financials.

And if a short-term rebound develops in the bond market, as he thinks could happen, that would also be supportive of a recovery in the financials, he said.

Mr. Mark said that Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce has the best chart among the Canadian banks. Recent weakness in that stock took it down near $81, where buying interest supported the shares. Resistance doesn't click in until $85 or $86. The next target for CIBC is $90, he said.

Meanwhile, Bank of Nova Scotia has one of the weaker charts in the group, Mr. Mark said. The stock bounced off support at $45 on below-average volume and there is fairly significant resistance at $47, he said. CIBC and Bank of Nova Scotia closed yesterday on the Toronto Stock Exchange at $83.63 and $45.42, respectively.
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BMO's Retail Unit Head Quits Suddenly

  
Pearce joins a changing of the guard at an important component of the Big Five

The Globe and Mail, Sinclair Stewart, 9 May 2006

Bank of Montreal yesterday announced the surprise resignation of Robert Pearce as head of its personal and commercial unit, completing a top-level changing of the guard for the Big Five's retail operations: Not a single one of them can now boast a boss with more than 20 months on the job.

Retail banking is by far the most stable, important component of the industry's financial health, yet in the past two years it has come to resemble an executive turnstile. The departure of Mr. Pearce, which takes effect at the end of this month, means that the leaders of the country's major retail banks will now have fewer than five years of experience in their current positions -- combined.

"It could very well speak to just how good the Canadian banks are in Canada," one analyst said. "You'd have to really go out of your way to screw one up."

Mr. Pearce, 51, who discussed his departure with BMO executives last week, did not return phone calls seeking comment, but in an e-mail to colleagues he explained that it was a "difficult decision" to leave the bank after 26 years. He said he planned to spend some time with his family before embarking on a new career path.

The move comes just a few months after the retail bank reported a weak first-quarter performance relative to its peers, with profit increasing a scant 1 per cent. The results raised questions about the unit's crimped profit margins, and also its higher loan losses.

Bill Downe, a long-time corporate banker who was promoted to chief operating officer at BMO earlier this year, will take over stewardship of the retail bank on a temporary basis. Before Mr. Downe was promoted to COO, and all but anointed as successor to chief executive officer Tony Comper, some industry observers believed Mr. Pearce also had an outside chance at the top job.

Despite BMO's lacklustre retail showing in the first three months of the fiscal year, Mr. Comper and Mr. Downe affirmed in an e-mail to staff yesterday that they are committed to the strategic direction of the retail bank, and have "ambitious plans" for accelerating growth in both the personal and the commercial bank.

Mr. Pearce was only made head of the retail bank in 2002, but that is enough to make him a relative graybeard among his peers in the sector. Jim Westlake, who replaced Jim Rager at the helm of Royal Bank of Canada's domestic retail unit in September, 2004, is now the grizzled veteran of the group.

The duo of Tim Hockey and Bernie Dorval were named co-heads of Toronto-Dominion Bank's TD Canada Trust division at the end of 2004, while Sonia Baxendale was handed responsibility for Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce's retail operations barely a year ago.

Chris Hodgson took the reins of Bank of Nova Scotia's retail unit just last month, following the retirement of Robert Chisholm. Scotiabank yesterday promoted Barb Mason to take charge of its wealth management group, to fill Mr. Hodgson's former position.

Well-entrenched distribution systems and solid brands have helped the banks absorb such high-level changes without causing much disruption. Bench strength, particularly in middle management, is clearly a key ingredient in the continued success of retail banking, which typically accounts for more than half of the industry's profit.

Yet all of these shuffles have also occurred during a particularly beneficent time for retail banking, despite occasional grousing about competition and shrinking profit margins. The credit climate is arguably as good as it's ever been, the economy is strong, and lending volumes continue to be propped up by low interest rates.

Another analyst, speaking on condition of anonymity, marvelled at how the retail banks are churning out record results despite having so much change. On the other hand, he pointed out, "none of the people have really been tested."
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08 May 2006

Credit Suisse on HSBC

  
The Standard, May 08, 2006

Shares of banking giant are expected to keep climbing thanks to a weakening dollar and QDII, writes Lee Yuk-kei

HSBC Holdings, whose shares have recently emerged from a year-long stagnation, has regained its shine on the back of the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor - or QDII - regime, the weakness of the US dollar with a relatively lower valuation than its peers and a share price that has lagged the broader market.

The shares of HSBC Holdings led the Hong Kong stock market rally last week despite the fact that what is being seen as a big positive in the bank's future, investment in Hong Kong by the mainland's National Social Security Fund, has not yet occurred.

The fund, the first mainland institutional investor given the green light from Beijing to invest overseas, is not yet ready to do so.

Shares of HSBC Holdings surged to HK$137.20 from HK$132.20 on the last trading day in April, coupled with massive buying orders of more than HK$10 billion last week.

The surge in HSBC shares came after the National Social Security Fund announced that it will be allowed to invest up to 20 percent of its assets in overseas stock, bond and money markets.

Given that the fund's total assets were worth 201 billion yuan (HK$194.5 billion) at the end of 2005, the estimated amount available for overseas investment should be 40.2 billion yuan.

KGI Securities reckons the amount the National Social Security Fund could invest in Hong Kong ranges between some four billion yuan and 6.4 billion yuan.

But since the fund can invest in other products such as global equities, US equities, global bonds and foreign exchange instruments, the total 6.4 billion yuan may not solely be invested in Hong Kong.

And as the benchmark for the fund's return on investment in Hong Kong equities will be the FTSE, the total amount invested in the local stock market will not only be in H shares.

As a result, the benefit to H shares from fund investments will be smaller than expected.

"We believe the fund will buy those Chinese shares that are not available in the domestic equity market, such as banks, insurance and telecommunication," KGI Securities said.

"Besides, some blue chips of good quality and with overseas business such as HSBC Holdings ... will also be Social Security Fund targets."

In addition to the boost from QDII, analysts said the resurgence of the euro and the pound sterling will help lift HSBC shares as the global bank derives about a third of its profit from Europe.

Core Pacific-Yamaichi banking analyst Kent Yau said the weakening of the US dollar against a strengthening pound and euro will boost HSBC profits from the European and United Kingdom markets and will also book translation gains from foreign exchange.

In the face of expectations that US interest rates will peak in the first half of this year and speculation that central banks sitting on mountains of foreign reserves will dump US dollars and replace them with other currencies and precious metals like gold, the US dollar has been weakening against the euro as well as the pound since early this year.

The pound has risen more than 7 percent to about US$1.85 from about US$1.72 since early this year. The euro has also soared more than 7 percent to about US$1.27 from US$1.18.

DBS Bank treasury and markets vice president Mark Wan Chuck-pui said he expects the dollar to hit US$1.29 per euro by year's end.

If the expected 25-basis point interest-rate hike [in the US] Wednesday is the peak, he said the US dollar will fall.

"On the other hand, in the face of mounting inflation pressure, low unemployment rate and strong economy, the European Union central bank is facing mounting pressure to raise interest rates," Wan said.

"So far the EU central bank has merely lifted its rate to 3.5 percent from 2.5 percent, compared with the US Federal Reserve which has raised its funds target rate to 4.75 percent from 1 percent since June 2004.

"Therefore, there's more room for Europe to raise interest rates at a very fast pace."

A Credit Suisse research report on April 25 said Europe is a difficult market for HSBC, particularly the UK, with competitive pressures on margins, rising consumer credit costs, a high share of investment expenses in capital and investment banking market business and investment in reducing a cost structure that is relatively high.

Credit Suisse forecasts HSBC's pre- tax profit will grow at an average 15 percent over the next three years on benefits from cost cuts, a more stable credit outlook and less investment spending in CIBM and in rebranding in France.

Credit Suisse set HSBC's target price at HK$168, representing an almost 22 percent upside potential from HK$137.2 at close last Thursday.

"We have shown that HSBC is trading on low multiples relative to history and relative to its international peers at present," said Credit Suisse analysts in the report.

"We believe that the stagnation in the share price [of HSBC] may be nearing an end, and when it does, the potential upside is considerable.

HSBC trades at just 10.9 times over its 2007 estimated earnings - a 10 percent discount to its UK peers.

HSBC ranks as one of the lowest- multiple major bank franchises in the region: multiples below those for South Korea's Kookmin Bank, all Singapore banks, Thailand's Kasikornbank, Indonesia-based Bank Central Asia, most Taiwan banks and all China-listed banks."

HSBC Holdings recorded a net profit of US$15 billion (HK$117 billion) in 2005, up about 15 percent from US$12.9 billion a year previously, driven largely by a strong performance in emerging markets, resilient trading revenues, low credit costs and cost controls in lower growth markets.

Moreover, the share price of HSBC Holdings has risen by 10 percent since January 2005.

In stark contrast, the Hang Seng Index has risen about 25 percent to above 17,000, while the MSCI World Finance Index has surged more than 20 percent.

Kent Yau of Core Pacific-Yamaichi said HSBC is a "defensive play" with a balanced global portfolio but its share price lags far behind peers such as Standard Chartered.

He estimates HSBC shares will hit HK$153 within a year.
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Whole Life vs. Term Life

  
Motley Fool Staff, 8 May 2006

The two main forms of life insurance you should understand are whole life and term life insurance. (It's also good to learn about universal and variable, which are variations of whole life insurance.)

But what's the difference between the two? With term insurance, you're covered only during the life of the policy, while you're paying the premiums. If you carry a term life insurance policy for 50 years, regularly pay the premiums, and then quit paying and die a year later, you're out of luck. (Well, you'd be out of luck regardless -- but in this case, your beneficiaries are out of luck, too.)

There are several forms of term insurance:

Level term -- you pay a fixed premium for up to 20 years. This can be a good deal, since it protects you against the effects of inflation and unexpected changes in your health that would warrant higher premiums.

Annual renewable term -- gives you the option of renewing your policy regularly, but at increasing premium rates.

Decreasing term -- features a steadily decreasing death benefit. This might seem undesirable, but it can be sensible for many people. You may need a bigger benefit when you're a young breadwinner with a family to support than when you're a retiree with grown children and a nice nest egg.

Whole life insurance, meanwhile, is designed to cover you for your entire life. These policies charge you a fixed premium each year, one that's typically higher than term insurance. The advantage touted by insurance companies for whole life insurance is that, while part of the premium covers what term insurance would cost, the surplus resides in an account that pays interest and accumulates a cash value. As this "accumulation account" grows, your premiums can decrease over time. Eventually, in some cases, the interest earned can pay the premiums for you. So you won't be paying any more premiums, but you'll still be covered for the rest of your life.

The problem with whole life insurance is that insurance companies tend to offer low interest rates to policyholders, while the companies typically earn much greater returns because they invest the money in stocks and bonds. Policyholders are indeed earning a bit of money through the policy, but as an "investment," it leaves a lot to be desired.

Enter "universal" life insurance, a form of whole life insurance. With universal life, in years when the insurance company earns more on policyholders' accumulation accounts than they promised, they pass along the extra gain. This sounds good, but in some situations, because of overly optimistic assumptions insurers make about customers' returns, customers can end up paying more than they expected to. "Variable" life insurance policies, which invest in sub-accounts that look like (but legally are not and cannot be) mutual funds, carry the same danger.

With universal and variable insurance, the higher the initial assumed rate of return, the lower the annual payments will be. This is how some unscrupulous agents can sign you up -- through very attractive policies based on unreasonable assumptions. Since most insurers invest to a great degree in bonds, be skeptical of any promised universal rates much higher than the 30-year Treasury rate. With variable insurance, since most mutual funds have trouble beating the S&P 500's average historical return of 10%-12% per year, we'd be skeptical of any projected rates in that neighborhood.

Learn more about the less-exciting-but-still-critical topic of insurance in our Insurance Center or our 60-Second Guide to Insurance. You may not have thought about some kinds of insurance, such as disability or long-term care insurance, but they're vital for many people. And, of course, properly insuring your property is crucial, too. Take a little time to learn more, and you may be very happy you did, especially if some calamity occurs in the future.

And if you're in the market for insurance, another way to inform yourself about options is to spend some time at the websites of insurance companies. According to SNL Financial, the 10 largest US insurance companies (as of 9/30/05) are:

American International Group
Berkshire Hathaway
UnitedHealth Group
WellPoint
MetLife
Allstate
Prudential Financial
St. Paul Travelers
Aetna
Hartford Financial Services
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Price Targets for Life Insurance Companies

  
Great West LifeCo Inc.
• BMO Nesbitt Burns maintains "market perform," target price is $32.00
• Desjardins Securities maintains "hold," 12-month target price raised to $33.00
• National Bank Financial maintains "sector perform," target price is $31.50
• RBC Capital Markets maintains "sector perform," 12-month target price is $32.00
• Scotia Capital Markets maintains "sector outperform," 12-month target price is $33.00
• TD Newcrest maintains "hold," 12-month target price raised to $31.00

Industrial Alliance Insurance & Financial Services
• BMO Nesbitt Burns maintains "outperform," 12-month target price raised to $37.00
• Desjardins Securities maintains "buy," 12-month target price raised to $38.50
• National Bank Financial maintains "outperform," target price is $38.00
• RBC Capital Markets maintains "outperform," 12-month target price is $36.00
• Scotia Capital Markets downgrades to "sector underperform," 12-month target price raised to $34.00
• TD Newcrest maintains "hold," 12-month target price raised to $35.00
• UBS maintains "neutral," 12-month target price raised to $36.00

Manulife Financial Corp
• BMO Nesbitt Burns maintains "outperform," target price is $80.00
• Desjardins Securities maintains "top pick," target price is $84.00
• National Bank Financial maintains "sector perform," target price is $78.00
• RBC Capital Markets maintains "top pick," 12-month target price is $86.00
• Scotia Capital Markets maintains "sector outperform," 12-month target price is $77.00
• TD Newcrest maintains "Action List Buy," 12-month target price is $83.00

Sun Life Financial Inc.
• BMO Nesbitt Burns maintains "outperform," 12-month target price is $54.00
• Credit Suisse maintains "neutral," 12-month target price is $51.00
• Desjardins Securities maintains "top pick," 12-month target price raised to $55.00
• GMP Securities maintains "buy," 12-month target price is $56.00
• National Bank Financial maintains "outperform," 12-month target price cut to $54.00
• RBC Capital Markets maintains "sector perform," 12-month target price cut to $52.00
• Scotia Capital Markets maintains "sector perform," 12-month target price is $52.00
• TD Newcrest maintains "buy," 12-month target price cut to $54.00;

US Banks at 25% Discount to Rest of the Market

  
Financial Post, Duncan Mavin, 8 May 2006

The U.S. banking sector is delivering record-busting profits and stellar growth of late. But bank stock valuations haven't caught up and are "too good and too cheap to ignore," says UBS Investment Research analyst David Bianco.

In the first quarter of 2006, Wachovia Corp., the fourth-largest bank in the U.S, posted a 7% increase in net income compared with the previous year, while SunTrust Banks Inc., the seventh-largest bank in the U.S., recorded net income up 8%. Yet valuations for those banks and others remain too cheap, said Mr. Bianco.

"Banks now trade at 11 to 12 times earnings, a 25% discount to the rest of the market," noted Mr. Bianco. "While discounts are typical for banks historically, this large discount exceeds history."

Canadian banks, by comparison, were trading at more like 13 to 16 times earnings in 2005. Though they are expected to trade a little lower in 2006, they will still likely be in the 13 to 14 times earnings range for this year, according to estimates from Royal Bank of Canada analyst Jamie Keating.

Of course, Canada is not the U.S. and the banking environments in the two countries are different. Still, Canadian investors can also factor into their investment decisions the beneficial exchange rate when considering U.S. stocks.

Mr. Bianco said his bullish view on U.S. bank stocks is because the banks occupy a "sweet spot" in the American economy.

In March and April, for instance, he notes the S&P 500 Financials reported an increase in earnings of US$3.2-billion, compared with a decline of US$1.5-billion for information technology companies, and a drop of US$320-million for energy companies.

He said the U.S. banks are benefiting from a range of factors. For instance, in comparison with other industries, banking is not under pressure from Asian competitors, and has relatively low exposure to soaring energy costs, noted Mr. Bianco.

Furthermore, banks, which rely heavily on electronic processing, stand to gain more than most from advancements in technology; they also have the expertise to exploit capital markets to reduce risk; and they have a high claim on the disposable income of Americans.

Mr. Bianco also downplayed the potential impact on the sector of the flattening yield curve.

The yield curve inverted in December, and stayed that way through most of January, when the yield on the U.S. two-year bond was higher than the yield on the 10-year bond.

In the past, this has been taken as a sign of a looming recession in the United States and so the recent inversion caused much hand-wringing among economists and investors alike.

But the yield curve "gets too much attention," said Mr. Bianco, and bank earnings are more robust than many investors think.
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07 May 2006

Top US Commercial Banking M&A Deals Since 1995

  












ANNOUNCED ACQUIRER TARGET DEAL VALUE*
April 6, 1998 Travelers Group Citicorp
$72.6 billion
April 13, 1998 NationsBank BankAmerica
$61.6 billion
Jan. 14, 2004 J.P Morgan Chase Bank One $58.8 billion
Oct. 27, 2003 Bank of America FleetBoston Financial $43 billion
June 8, 1998 Norwest Wells Fargo
$34.4 billion
Sept. 13, 2000 Chase Manhattan J.P Morgan $33.6 billion
April 13, 1998 Banc One First Chicago NBD $29.6 billion
Oct. 4, 2000 Firstar US Bancorp $21.1 billion
Nov. 18, 1997 First Union CoreStates Financial$17.1 billion
March 14, 1999 Fleet Financial BankBoston $15.9 billion
Aug. 29, 1997 Nations Bank Barnett Banks$14.8 billion

* Excludes net debt of target
Source: Thomson Financial

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06 May 2006

HSBC's Expansion in Canada

  
The Globe and Mail, Omar El Akkad, 6 May 2006

The challenge: To expand into Canada's lucrative suburban market by building branches in wealthy, rapidly growing communities

The call: Understand that it's a real estate, not a banking game you're playing, and find the well-connected insiders who can get you in on the ground floor (literally) of new developments

HSBC Bank Canada's ambitious drive to cash in on Canada's suburban construction boom was hitting a brick wall. Every time the bank's strategists identified a growing community with the potential to sustain a lucrative branch, they found one of two other companies had already beaten them to the punch. Either Toronto-Dominion -- widely recognized as the Canadian bank industry's leader in snatching prime real estate -- had already secured the best spot, or Tim Hortons had.

That's one of the frustrations the bank has had to deal with as it pursues its expansion strategy in Canada's fastest-growing suburbs. HSBC's plans include a dramatic expansion in Toronto, Calgary and Edmonton. The bank has 43 branches in Ontario, of which 32 are in Toronto. Over the next 18 to 24 months, it wants to add another 20 in and around places such as Burlington, Mississauga and Aurora, at an average capital cost of a quarter-million dollars a branch. The goal, according to HSBC Canada CEO Lindsay Gordon, is to reach a "minimal critical mass" of locations that'll convince customers at the Big Five banks to switch.

The expansion marks a strategy shift for a company that started up in Canada 25 years ago primarily to serve Western Canada's Chinese community. Today, Mr. Gordon says Canada's growth, driven by India and China's demand for natural resources, is part of a long-term trend, one that HSBC hope to cash in on.

The problem is, so does everyone else.

"It's an expensive proposition," Mr. Gordon says of the bank's suburban expansion strategy. "There's no question there's competition from TD, Tim Hortons, you name it."

HSBC's corporate makeup gives the company several key advantages over other banks. The Canadian arm's parent company, HSBC Holdings PLC, is a global giant with operations in almost 80 countries. That gives HSBC Canada the kind of international access that draws high-net-worth clients and customers with overseas banking needs. But one strength HSBC doesn't have is a major Canadian presence on the ground. Its 130-odd branches are no match in number for big players such as Royal Bank of Canada and Bank of Nova Scotia.

HSBC is also hindered in achieving its expansion ambitions by a lack of real estate know-how. The company has its own in-house real estate team, but relies heavily on well-connected outside consultants who can mean the difference between a prime location and the odd lot out in a new shopping development. And because HSBC doesn't want to get into the real estate game, it leases, rather than buys its locations.

But suburbia is where many of HSBC's target customers live, so that's where the company must go. The bank has always been a favourite of customers who do a lot of travelling, but Mr. Gordon says it's now targeting "soccer moms and dads" -- families who have their own homes and are looking for more than a simple chequing account. Even as on-line banking grows at a much faster rate, Mr. Gordon says branches are vital to attracting those people.

"I'm a very big believer in the 'bricks and clicks' strategy," he says. With more customers doing their banking on-line, he adds, branches are becoming a destination for financial services and advice, rather than basic transactions. "Very few [banks] have succeeded on a purely virtual basis," he says.

Branches are also an important part of HSBC's marketing strategy. Last year, the bank began an aggressive marketing campaign, partly in an effort to convince those soccer moms and dads to switch from the Big Five banks. Even though most branches typically don't make any money for the first couple of years, they enhance brand recognition immediately (worldwide, HSBC is the 29th best-known brand, between Sony and Nike. In Canada, it barely registers compared with the Big Five). That's also part of the reason HSBC branches become heavily involved in corporate donations and sponsorships in their communities.

"Clearly in Canada, outside mainland B.C., we have to build our brand," Mr. Gordon says. However, he believes success lies in targeting where they set up shop, rather than just littering the country with new locations. "If you build [branches] on the basis of 'if you build it, they will come,' it probably won't work."

Lindsay Gordon, CEO, HSBC Bank Canada

Age: 54

Education: Bachelor of Arts degree in economics (1973) and MBA (1976) from the University of British Columbia.

Family: Married, with four children.

First bank account: He didn't get his first account until 1970, when he came to Canada from England as a student. He got his first loan from a company that was eventually merged into HSBC's finance arm.

Best banking experience: Opening a high-interest savings account with HSBC a couple of weeks ago.

Worst banking experience: He won't say which bank it was, but one of his first employers refused to give him a loan to buy furniture for his new home. "Apparently my credit rating wasn't good enough. I hope that wouldn't happen today.'

Travel mileage: He's in the air almost every week, usually visiting one of the company's Canadian operations. However, last week he was co-host, along with the head of HSBC's U.S. operations, of a vacation retreat in Bermuda for last year's top-performing 100 North American employees.

What he does when he's not working: He maintains that the real reason he came to Canada wasn't to study, it was for the skiing. "I like to say I have three priorities: family, work and skiing. But my wife says they're not necessarily in that order." Now that his youngest son is finishing high school, he's also taking up sailing in his spare time.

Charitable side: His youngest son was diagnosed with Crohn's disease at age five. That led him to co-found CH.I.L.D. Foundation, a group that raises funds for medical research into intestinal and liver diseases. He's also vice-chairman of the United Way's 2006 campaign cabinet in B.C.'s Lower Mainland.
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05 May 2006

Scotia Capital on Manulife's Q1 2006 Earnings

  
Scotia Capital, 5 May 2006

• 16% EPS growth (22% ex f/x), owing to strong sales growth, favourable investment results and the emergence of expense synergies. Results of $1.19 per share were $0.02 per share ahead of our estimate and $0.01 per share ahead of consensus. Excluding the impact of currency, which negatively impacted the company's YOY EPS by $0.07 per share, EPS growth was an impressive 22%. Over 62% of the company's earnings are from USD denominated jurisdictions, and 8% are from Yen denominated or Japan. With average quarterly levels of the USD down 6% YOY versus the CAD, and average quarterly levels of the Yen down 16% YOY versus the CAD, changes in currency changes took a substantial bite out of EPS growth. We expect this trend to continue as the CAD continues to appreciate versus the USD.

• Some noise as is usual for a company of this size - we put net impact at a positive $0.02. A company of this size and with all these segments will naturally have a lot of moving parts, and we don't believe investors should get too caught up in micro-analyzing quarterly movements that may appear to be one-timers in each segment. Nevertheless, we categorize "unusuals", all after tax, as a $19 million loss in the Corporate segment due to unfavourable claims in the discontinued John Hancock Accident and Health block, a $24 million gain in the reinsurance segment due to a downward adjustment on a previously conservative estimate for hurricane claims taken in Q4/05, a $32 million gain in the corporate segment due to refinements in asset cash flow segmentation in the company's U.S. fixed annuity business, an $18 million gain in the Japan segment resulting from lengthening the portfolio, $22 million in significantly lower than usual investment gains in the corporate segment, and $15 million (or just 1/4 of the QOQ decline in pre-hurricane experience gains) due to unfavourable claims experience in the quarter. All this nets to positive $18 million or about $0.02 per share. Even net of this, EPS growth was 14%, and 20% ex f/x.

• Moderate EPS reductions to reflect f/x - we still expect 15% (20% ex f/x) growth for the remainder of 2006 and 14% (15%-16% ex f/x) in 2007. We reduced our 2006 EPS estimates by $0.03 per share in 2006 ($0.05 if we include the $0.02 outperformance in Q1/06) and $0.03 per share in 2007 to reflect the negative impact of the strengthening CAD. We forecast an average rate of CAD/USD rate of 1.116 for the remaining three quarters of 2006 (or average levels of the USD down 7% versus the CAD), and 1.09 in 2007 (for a 3% decline in average levels versus 2006). Even with currency negatively impacting 70% of the company's bottom line to the tune of 7% in Q1/06, the company was still able to achieve a very respectable 16% YOY growth in CAD (22% ex f/x). For the remaining three quarters of 2006 we estimate the negative impact of currency will be 7% (relative to Q1/06, a weaker US$ offsetting stronger Yen), with an estimated 15% in EPS in CAD (20% ex f/x). In 2007 we estimate the negative impact of currency will be 3% YOY, and we look for 14% EPS growth in CAD (15%-16% ex f/x). We believe our 2007E estimate is conservative, and believe that should the company continue to grow in the 17%+ range ex f/x (in Q1/06 EPS growth ex f/x was 22%), and exceed our 15%-16% assumption ex f/x, there is a good chance the company can exceed our 14% EPS growth estimate (including f/x) in 2007.

• ROE at 16.3% up 220 bp YOY - with ROE back at company target and John Hancock acquisition complete, is it time for another acquisition? We expect company to remain patient, and buyback more stock. It clearly has not taken long since the closing of the John Hancock acquisition (closed in April, 2004) for the company to get its ROE back up to its initially targeted 16% level. We expect the ROE to modestly surpass the 16% target in 2007. We expect the company to increase its buyback activity, and gradually increase its payout ratio from its current 29% of 2006E to a level toward the top-end of its targeted 25%-35% range.

• Exceptional sales growth in U.S. division - Manulife continues to increase market share; Manulife's sales growth is particularly impressive versus its U.S. peers. U.S. variable annuity (VA) sales increased 61% YOY, gaining market share in this product category as the company refreshed its flagship optional withdrawal benefit, the Principal Plus for Life rider, available on its core VA product. Manulife's variable annuity sales growth was exceptionally strong, with heavy players such as Hartford, Prudential, and Met Life exhibiting growth rates of 0%, 49%, and 57%, respectively. The company now ranks second in the non-proprietary channel in U.S. variable annuity sales, up from fifth at the end of 2004. Manulife's U.S. individual insurance sales increased 78% YOY, with the company now ranking #1 in universal life sales, up from 3rd rank in 2004. Finally, 401(k) deposits increased 36% for Manulife, on the back of 15% growth in 2005. Clearly the company is gaining share, and with diversified distribution channels and an excellent reputation as a strong product innovator, we expect the trend to continue.

• Earnings for U.S. division up 31% (ex f/x). Excellent sales growth and solid margin improvement in all segments contributed to the exceptional results for the company's largest division (44% of the bottom line in Q1/06). Maintaining this pace is obviously a challenge, and we expect sales growth to return to a more "normalized" 15% range with earnings up 15%-20% (ex f/x) through 2007.

• Earnings for Canadian division up 29%. Steady sales growth in Canada, management cites an irrational individual insurance market. Improving margins, the impact of rising equity markets, and favourable claims experience all contributed to an exceptional quarter. Citing an irrational universal life market in Canada, Manulife has made a conscious decision to not chase business. As a result, sales were down 4% in quarter. Variable products in individual wealth management continue to exhibit positive net sales, fuelling record gross sales of segregated funds. However, fixed products continue to incur net outflows in what was still considered a relatively low interest rate environment, in part due to the tremendous run in equity markets.

• Asia earnings up 13% ex f/x. Hong Kong led the Asian operations (ex-Japan), with 18% YOY increase in earnings in Q1/06 on a USD basis (operations are pegged to the USD), lead largely by excellent growth in wealth management sales and improved experience gains in the Hong Kong life business. Wealth management sales in this division more than doubled (up 107% YOY in USD) as the company launched new mutual funds and benefited from strong equity markets. In China, Manulife received approval for 2 new licenses and now has 14 licenses in China at the end of the quarter, which should contribute to strong sales growth in their Asian division.

• Japan earnings up 22% ex f/x and excluding "unusual items". Excluding the impact of a C$18 million gain in Q1/06 from lengthening the portfolio duration and a C$21 million net release of tax provisions in Q1/05, earnings for the company's Japan division were up 22% YOY ex f/x. Variable annuity sales in Japan hit the $1.1 billion USD mark setting a new record and were up 39% YOY ex f/x. as the company added three new banks and one security firm to their VA distribution network, bringing the total to 16 banks and 5 security dealers. As the company continues to expand its variable annuity distribution platform in Japan, and takes advantage of increased distribution points as its bank partner BOTM now has merged with UFJ (effective Q4/05) we expect the company to continue to build scale in this attractive market, and look for meaningful earnings impact in 2007 and beyond.

• Share repurchases continue at a robust rate with 3.5 million shares repurchased in Q1/06. Manulife repurchased 3.5 million shares in Q1/06 and a further 2.0 million shares in April. This 5.5 million share repurchase represents 0.7% of outstanding shares as of 2005 YE and 11% of their current 50 million share normal course issuer bid, which expires on 11/08/2006.

• Stock split - could be attractive to the stock's large retail. Manulife will pay a stock 100% dividend (effectively a 2-for-1 stock split) to shareholders on record as of May 25, 2006, payable on June 2.
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04 May 2006

Manulife & Great West Q1 2006 Earnings

  
Bloomberg, 4 May 2006

Manulife Financial Corp. and Great- West Lifeco Inc., Canada's largest and third-largest insurers, said first-quarter profit rose after a stock rally increased mutual fund sales.

Manulife's net income climbed for an 18th straight quarter to a record C$956 million ($863.5 million), or C$1.19 a share, from C$801 million, or 98 cents a share, a year earlier, the Toronto-based insurer said today. Great-West's profit rose 6.4 percent to C$446 million, missing analysts' estimates.

Manulife, which owns Boston-based John Hancock Financial Services, said earnings from U.S. asset management climbed 25 percent to C$255 million, contributing more to profit than any other business unit. A 5 percent gain in the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index this year also lifted segregated fund sales for Winnipeg, Manitoba-based Great-West.

``The U.S. equity markets are doing very well right now,'' said Ian Nakamoto, director of research at MacDougall, MacDougall & Mactier Inc. in Toronto, which manages about $3.25 billion in assets, including Manulife shares. ``I would expect the mutual fund side of the business to do well for the balance of the year.''

Manulife shares fell C$1.87, or 2.6 percent, to C$70.35 in 4:10 p.m. trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange, the biggest decline in 18 months. Manulife is the second-biggest Canadian company by market value, trailing Royal Bank of Canada. Great- West shares fell 57 cents, or 2 percent, to C$28.58, as most financial shares fell on concern the central bank will raise interest rates further to stem inflation.

U.S. Expansion

Manulife Chief Executive Officer Dominic D'Alessandro, 59, led Manulife's $13.9 billion takeover of John Hancock in 2004 to expand earnings outside of Canada. About 70 percent of Manulife's revenue came from outside its home country last year.

Profit from U.S. insurance climbed 17 percent to C$158 million, while earnings at Manulife's Canadian businesses rose 29 percent to C$238 million. Profit from Asia and Japan climbed 1.9 percent to C$162 million.

Merrill Lynch & Co. analyst Andre-Philippe Hardy expected Manulife to earn C$1.18 a share, matching the average estimate of eight analysts polled by Thomson Financial, which declined to say how it compiled its estimates.

Manulife said overall premiums and deposits rose 20 percent to C$17.94 billion. Return on equity was 16.3 percent, from 14.1 percent a year ago.

Rising Dollar

D'Alessandro said on a conference call with investors today that a rising Canadian dollar, as well as Manulife's share price, gives the company ``the wherewithal to consummate important transactions.'' He didn't elaborate.

The company has more than C$3 billion in cash that could be used for acquisitions, Manulife said on the call today.

Great-West said net income climbed to 50 cents a share, from C$419 million, or 47 cents, a year earlier. Steve Cawley, an analyst at TD Newcrest, was expecting per-share profit of 52 cents for Great-West.

An increase in fund sales helped counter a decline in life insurance premiums and a surging Canadian dollar, which reduced profit by about C$23 million.

Profit from the Canadian unit rose 10 percent to C$204 million, from C$186 million. U.S. earnings fell 7 percent to C$134 million, and profit in Europe was 10 percent higher at C$111 million. Total premiums and deposits were unchanged at C$9.19 billion.

Dividend Growth

Great-West's dividend growth ``will probably slow, but not dramatically'' this year, Chief Executive Officer Raymond McFeetors said on a conference call today. He didn't elaborate.

D'Alessandro told Manulife shareholders at the annual meeting today he opposes proposals made last year by Canadian banks such as Royal Bank and Toronto-Dominion Bank to allow them to use customer information to sell insurance. Banks face restrictions on insurance sales, and can't sell policies in branches.

``The situation is fraught with hazard,'' D'Alessandro told reporters in Toronto following the meeting. ``I have yet to see any great advantage,'' to changing the rules.

He said he supports the idea of bank and insurance mergers, which are barred by the federal government. D'Alessandro also called for a single securities regulator in Canada.

Manulife will split its stock two-for-one as of June 2, for shareholders of record on May 25.
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Reuters, Frank Pingue, 4 May 2006

Manulife Financial Corp. wants to keep growing in regions where it has already established a presence, but would also like to plant its feet in India and Korea, the chief executive of the world's No. 5 life insurer said on Thursday.

Two years after acquiring John Hancock in a blockbuster deal that ranks as one of the industry's biggest, Chief Executive Dominic D'Alessandro said the company remains well positioned to take advantage of acquisition opportunities that may surface.

"We like all of the regions where we are, and we think that we have an ideal platform for growth in all the exciting markets in the world," D'Alessandro, told reporters after the company's annual meeting in Toronto.

"We'd like to continue to grow in the U.S. and to grow in Asia where we already have a presence in 10 countries there now. But we would also like to be in India some day and we'd like to go to Korea."

D'Alessandro also said Manulife, which has more than C$3 billion ($2.7 billion) in excess capital, would likely stay out of Europe, given the the many large financial institutions already there, and Latin America. Rival Sun Life Financial is already active in India.

Manulife, which operates in Canada and Asia through Manulife Financial and in the United States primarily through John Hancock, also said the quicker-than-expected integration of John Hancock has built its confidence for whatever move it makes next.

"Every time you do anything in life where it works out well it emboldens you to do others, so we feel confident in our ability to do business combinations as I think we're familiar with the issues," said D'Alessandro.

Manulife's chief executive also repeated that mergers between Canadian financial institutions should be allowed, something the government has not permitted since it blocked two merger proposals in 1998.

"I would recommend that mergers within the industry whether bank with bank, bank with insurer, or insurer with insurer, be allowed," D'Alessandro told the annual meeting.

"As it now stands it is highly unlikely that the aspirations of the ten or so large institutions that make up the bulk of our financial services industry can be satisfied by domestic demand alone."

Manulife reported an 18.6 percent jump in first-quarter profit, due to growth in its wealth management business, and declared a stock dividend, which will have the same effect as a two-for-one stock split of its common shares.

Its net income for the quarter to March 31 was C$949 million ($855 million), or C$1.19 a share, up from C$800 million, or 98 Canadian cents a share, in the same period last year.

The profit just topped analysts' expectations for a profit of C$1.18 per share, according to Reuters Estimates.

Revenue rose 8.6 percent to C$8.2 billion from C$7.5 billion.

Total premiums and deposits rose 20 percent to C$17.9 billion from C$14.9 billion last year, while funds under management rose to C$385.6 billion from C$349.9 billion last year.

Return on equity rose to 16.3 percent on an annualized basis from 14.1 percent in the year-ago quarter.

Manulife shares fell 97 Canadian cents, or 1.3 percent to C$71.25 on the Toronto Stock Exchange, its lowest close since early February.
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02 May 2006

Cdn Banks Push to Market Insurance Rather Than Merge

  
The Bank Act comes up for review later this year, and the players know they’re better off pursuing goals that are more attainable

Investment Executive, Rudy Mezzetta, 2 May 2006

The review of the federal Bank Act will take place in October, and Canada’s chartered banks are redoubling their efforts to win the right to market insurance through their extensive network of branches. They admit that the question of mergers is now off the radar screen.

“We now appear to be getting some clarity,” Ed Clark, president and CEO of TD Bank Financial Group, told that bank’s annual general meeting on March 30. “The federal government has indicated its five priorities, and Big Bank mergers is not one of them.”

Although noting that TD “would definitely be at the table” if mergers were given the go-ahead, Clark said the banking sector should focus its efforts on persuading Ottawa to give it the right to provide insurance information and referrals in-branch and to send customers insurance information in a targeted manner.

As it stands, banks are not allowed to sell insurance in their branches, except for travel or credit-linked insurance, nor are they allowed to market insurance in branches nor refer customers to an insurance broker. And although banks are allowed to market insurance through the mail or online, they are restricted from targeting any particular subset of clients. They can also sell insurance via an insurance subsidiary or through a dual-licensed broker at a securities subsidiary.

In anticipation of the mandatory Bank Act review, the Canadian Bankers Association has been pressing the government to remove the restrictions on marketing insurance at the branch level, but has stopped short of asking for the right to sell directly from branches. The CBA adds that, although it hopes mergers eventually will be allowed, the issue is not at the top of its agenda at the moment. “It’s the insurance side we’re focusing on,” says CBA spokesperson Maura Drew-Lytle.

The insurance sector, meanwhile, has vigorously argued against any erosion of the current restrictions on the banks concerning insurance. Allowing banks to market and sell insurance directly in their branches could lead to so-called “tied selling” or coercive selling, the insurance industry says, and would raise privacy issues as the banks become both insurer and lender to clients. The banking sector, in turn, argues that regulations are already in place to prevent tied selling and to protect privacy.

In February, the CBA and Advocis, which represents Canadian financial advisors, released separate surveys about Canadians’ attitudes on banking and insurance. The studies seem to contradict each other. The CBA survey said more than 90% of Canadians surveyed wanted banks to be able to offer insurance information in branches, while Advocis’s survey showed that 78% of consumers are in favour of keeping current restrictions on banks and insurance.

Of the six large banks, Royal Bank of Canada has been the most aggressive in advocating the removal of restrictions against banks. In recent speeches, senior RBC executives have argued that banks should not only have the right to market insurance at the branch level, they should also have the right to sell it.

“That’s RBC’s position,“ says Drew-Lytle. “It’s similar to that of the CBA, but it goes a step further. RBC essentially agrees with our position.”

RBC says its size plays a role. “Given our significant presence in insurance, you might expect us to be the loudest,” says Jim Westlake, group head of Canadian personal and business clients, for RBC. “We think [removal of all restrictions] will happen eventually, although it should happen now. The CBA’s position is one everyone could agree on. This is what should happen this time around.”

Westlake says RBC doesn’t connect the merger and insurance issues. “We think public policy should allow consolidation,” he says. “But until the government is ready to deal with it, we’d just as soon leave it. We understand this is probably not the best time.”

RBC has opened several RBC Insurance branches next door to its bank branches, raising the question of whether it is trying to prod the government into making a decision — something Westlake denies.

“We don’t try to poke a stick at government,” he says, adding the branches were opened where RBC felt it made good business sense. “If we knew the rules would never change, we would still go ahead [and open the insurance branches].”

Westlake says RBC has looked for opportunities to open RBC Insurance branches where existing bank branches were being refurbished or a new branch was opening. He does acknowledge, however, that RBC is being careful about opening insurance outlets. “Until the Bank Act review is complete, we don’t want to open a ton of them,” he says.

RBC Insurance is the dominant player among the bank-owned insurers, boasting about five million customers in North America. It offers insurance for life, health (including disability, critical illness and long-term care), travel, home, auto, reinsurance and creditor insurance. Taking into account its parent’s business in Canada, the U.S. and in global reinsurance, insurance represents about $3 billion of its revenue.

TD is also a strong player in the insurance sector. It has two main insurance arms: TD Insurance, through which it sells life and health insurance, including critical illness and direct life, to 1.8 million retail customers; and TD Meloche Monnex, through which it primarily offers home and auto insurance.

The other Big Six banks have not been as vocal as RBC and TD in advocating the loosening of insurance regulations in the Bank Act, but all support the CBA’s position.

National Bank of Canada divides its insurance arm into three main businesses: a life insurance subsidiary, which is among the biggest in Quebec; a general insurance subsidiary, through which it offers home and auto insurance; and an insurance and investment brokerage that offers in-house and third-party products.

CIBC offers travel insurance, as well as mortgage, life and credit-related insurance. Bank of Montreal offers term life, mortgage life, accident and critical illness, and credit-related and travel insurance, while Bank of Nova Scotia offers travel, accident and credit-related insurance.
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National Bank Gears Up for Growth

  
The super-regional bank sees country-wide expansion if bank mergers are allowed. But for now, it’s not resting on its laurels

Investment Executive, Catherine Harris, 2 May 2006

Réal Raymond is excited about the future. The president and CEO of Montreal-based National Bank of Canada sees great days ahead for Canada’s sixth-largest bank, both in terms of organic growth and the opportunities that could come when bank mergers are allowed.

But Raymond doesn’t see National Bank as simply Canada’s sixth-largest bank. He sees it as a super-regional bank and an important player nationally in financial market activities and wealth management.

Nor is he waiting for bank mergers to arrive. He recognizes that, at this point in time, mergers are a tough sell politically. Instead, the 150-year-old bank is moving forward on its strategy of leveraging its brand in Quebec and pursuing national niches in which it can create value.

Already, National Bank dominates the Quebec marketplace to a degree not achieved by any of the Big Five banks in any region. Mergers would provide National Bank — and other smaller banks — a rare opportunity to expand their personal and commercial banking activities into other regions.

Following a merger of two of the Big Five banks, competition issues would certainly require the sale of some branches. Increased competition would occur only if the branches were sold in blocks, says Raymond. If branches are sold piecemeal, the new competitors would have great difficulty establishing a permanent presence.

As the biggest of the smaller players, the well-capitalized National Bank would have an advantage in bidding for these branches.

But even without mergers, National Bank’s strategy appears to be working well already. Net income excluding unusual or non-recurring items was $804 million in the fiscal year ended Oct. 31, 2005, up 14.5% from $702 million in fiscal 2004. In the first quarter of fiscal 2006, it reported net income of $217 million, up 1.4% from $214 million in the same period a year earlier. Revenue was $979 million for the quarter, up 3.5% from the $946 million it amassed during the same period in 2005. Assets as of Jan. 31 were $105.3 billion, vs $91.7 billion a year earlier.

The bank’s 164.3 million common shares were trading around $63 a share in mid-April, up from $50 a share at the beginning of 2005. In an early March report, Catalyst Equity Research Inc. in Toronto increased its 12-month target to $67 from $65. The change is based mainly on expectations of a repurchase of eight million shares and an increase in the annual dividend to $2.20 from $1.92. Earnings estimates consolidator Thomson/First Call Research has a mean share price target of $68.18 a share and a median of $68, with a high of $72 and low of $62.

Here is a closer look at what the National Bank has done, is currently doing and what it plans to do in its niches.

• Personal and commercial banking. This is the bank’s bread and butter, especially in Quebec, where it has a 38% share of the commercial banking market and a 34% share of the personal banking market among the chartered banks. “We have a lot of staying power and the ability to leverage on the brand,” says Raymond.

National Bank’s main competition is Groupe Desjardins — which, through its caisses populaires, has a bigger share of the personal and small commercial loans (less than $1 million each) market, but only a quarter as much as National Bank’s share of the $5-million-plus commercial-loan sector.

National Bank is also putting a lot of effort into developing the “sales culture” at its branches. Raymond admits this isn’t easy; training and financial incentives don’t necessarily turn employees into salespeople.

On the personal banking side, the bank’s solution has been to use those employees who don’t take to sales as personal bankers, and hire new employees to boost the numbers of those expected to sell.

Even though customer retention has increased with the introduction of personal bankers, Raymond admits that getting the system to work well can be challenging. He explains that it isn’t always enough for personal bankers to call the customers and request a meeting for the next time the customer visits the branch. Sometimes, home visits may be required and personal bankers may not want to make these trips because they don’t have the incentive of those whose mission it is to sell products.

On the commercial side, National Bank’s history in the province gives it a huge advantage over the Big Five. It knows everything about its clients — directors, management, company histories, succession plans and family stories. As well, it has had a lot of success with two recent initiatives in this area. One was contacting the 20% of commercial customers who don’t have loans at the bank. A team of 20 to 25 employees was put in place to call on these clients, and the result was a big increase in deposits as customers consolidated their deposits at National Bank. “No one had ever called on them,” says Raymond.

• Investment banking and related financial market activities. National Bank’s full-service brokerage subsidiary, National Bank Financial Ltd. , has seen great success in the financial markets, ranking up with the brokerage subsidiaries of the Big Five in areas such as research ratings. It also has significant market share in equity and fixed-income issues and in mergers and acquisitions. Its share of total Canadian equity issues increased to 8.7% in 2002 from 4.2% in 2000 and has stayed in the 7%-7.9% range since then. Of the bank-owned brokerages, its share of equity issues has been in the 11%-13% range.

National Bank Financial was created in September 1999, when National Bank acquired institutional boutique First Marathon Inc. and then merged it with the bank’s wholly owned investment dealer, Lévesque Beaubien Geoffrion Inc. The timing was just right for the merger, says Raymond: “The market wanted an alternative, so there was room for us.”

National Bank Financial focuses on the mid-cap market, which, Raymond notes, is very big in Canada. It has also been very active in oil and gas income trusts. “It’s a very nice niche for us,” he says. “We’ve been in oil and gas a long time, since our takeover of Mercantile Bank in 1985. We’re well known in the sector.”

• Wealth management. National Bank’s share of personal finance wallets in Quebec was 42% last October, vs 29% three years earlier. During that time, it has increased the average number of products sold to high net-worth clients to 6.4 from 5.8; and for all customers, to 4.3 from 3.7.

“This is a great area for us. There still [will be] a lot of organic growth in the next five years as the population ages,” says Raymond.

National Bank Financial doesn’t have the same brand recognition nationally at the retail level as it has in Quebec. “For serious growth, we need an acquisition — for scale and leverage,” says Raymond. The bank is looking for a good fit, in terms of culture.

In the meantime, National Bank does have national brand recognition in the mutual fund marketplace with Altamira Investment Services Inc. , which it acquired in 2002.

Although turning Altamira around took more time and more senior-management changes than expected, the process has been completed, says Raymond. Altamira’s investment philosophy has been changed to one that focuses on core products and providing consistent returns, which required changes in mandates and portfolio managers.

The bank also introduced a sales culture at Altamira, says Raymond. Besides direct-to-consumer call-centre sales — which was its main source of sales before it was acquired — Altamira products are now sold in National Bank branches and through independent financial advisors.

It may, however, take longer than Raymond suggests for Altamira to return to robust health. Even with excellent performance in 2005, Altamira still reported net redemptions in long-term funds of $105 million this 2005-06 RRSP season and $29 million in April. Advisors and investors alike want to see good three-year returns before they buy.

Nevertheless, Raymond says, Altamira is set for strong growth. Investment performance has turned around and, assuming that continues, Altamira’s brand recognition should result in strong sales. Although it’s only the 15th-largest mutual fund family, with $3.9 billion in assets under management as of Feb. 28, National Bank research shows Altamira is among the top four best-known brands, says Raymond.

In addition to Altamira, the bank’s wholly owned mutual fund subsidiary, National Bank Securities Inc. , offers mutual funds. Although performance of those funds has been poor for the past three years, they did tally $277 million in net sales, excluding money market funds, during the recent RRSP season, bringing AUM to $7.3 billion — almost double that of Altamira’s.

Martin Lavigne, senior vice president of sales and products at National Bank Securities, believes one reason for the continued sales is that performance of the funds improves significantly when they are combined in portfolio products, a major focus for National Bank Securities.

In addition to developing these brands, National Bank has also adopted some other strategies to increase its wealth-management component. One is selling investment products to commercial customers — which extends a presumably good relationship that already exists. Financial planners were put into the branches, and both they and the commercial lenders were given financial incentives based on net assets acquired. The incentives are key to the success of this. “[The trick is] to figure out what you want, and pay accordingly,” says Raymond.

Another strategy that is going well is National Bank’s partnership program, under which the bank sells branded or white-label banking products, including investment loans. National Bank has about 15 such partners, including Power Financial Corp. ’s life insurance subsidiaries and Investors Group Inc. (see page 22). This is a strategy that’s ideal for a regional bank rather than a national one, because there is no risk of cannibalizing existing business. This means that with few National Bank retail customers outside of Quebec, everyone who buys one of its banking services through the partnerships is a new customer. “We can grow without spending much, except on technology,” says Raymond.

Laurentian Bank of Canada is also in this niche through its B2B Trust subsidiary; but CIBC is the only one of the Big Five selling white-label products, with its Amicus subsidiary providing banking products for Loblaw Companies Ltd. CIBC isn’t targeting the financial services sector.

• Insurance. National Bank has both life and property and casualty insurance subsidiaries, with the latter being the larger.

With 80,000 customers, it is the third-largest P&C direct insurer in the province. This business was built from scratch in a 50/50 partnership with AXA Group of France. The two started with auto insurance, but recently added home insurance.

National Bank has also been focusing on the life insurance market recently. Through its life subsidiary, it has introduced new products for individuals, such as the $10,000 55+ life insurance policy with no medical requirement and premiums based on age. It is also gearing up to become a major player in the group insurance segment and has set up a specialized team to offer group life, disability, health and dental insurance solutions.

Like the other banks, National Bank is lobbying the federal government to allow the sale of insurance products in its branches. As a first step, it wants permission to provide information about insurance at all its locations.
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Cdn Banks & Tree Huggers

  
Investment Executive, James Langton, 2 May 2006

Tree huggers and the “greed is good” crowd are hardly natural allies, but with environmental worries on the rise, financial services firms are increasingly finding themselves at the centre of efforts to limit the human-inflicted damage being done to the planet.

The uneasy dance between the two groups involves many steps. Banks are facing pressure from both advocacy groups and institutional investors about the banks’ impact on the environment, both through their own activities and those of their large clients. Banks are also increasingly sensitive about damage to their reputations.

And they aren’t the only ones eager to be green. Some prominent investment managers are making environmental considerations an increasingly important part of their decision-making process, a move that may ultimately force the rest of the industry to share their concerns.

Banks, particularly in Canada, make good targets for organizations seeking to motivate social change. They are so large and diverse that they can’t help being touched by a vast array of issues, both directly and as financiers. As banks are generally eager to be seen as good corporate citizens, they often lead the way for the rest of corporate Canada on a multitude of issues.

BankTrack monitors financial institutions around the world in an effort to hold them accountable for their financing activities. Earlier this year, BankTrack and the World Wildlife Fund published a joint report indicating that there is a growing commitment to sustainable banking within the international banking sector, but more needs to be done. In particular, it highlighted the need for the sector to adopt more transparent financing policies.

TD Bank Financial Group got a more direct taste of environmental activism at its annual meeting in Vancouver, when the groups ForestEthics and Rainforest Action Network released a report accusing TD of having a poor record on social and environmental issues. The report was distributed to TD shareholders attending the meeting, and a representative questioned TD CEO Ed Clark about his bank’s environmental efforts during the question period.

Clark stridently defended the bank’s record, insisting that TD “believes passionately in the environment.” He said the bank’s efforts to improve its environmental practices are not a marketing ploy, but reflect a genuine belief that in the long run TD must pay attention to environmental issues. To that end, the bank has focused on funding grassroots environmental projects, a cause it has spent more than $40 million on since 1990.

In terms of its own impact of the environment, such as consumption of paper and power and other resources, Clark agreed that the bank could improve. “I wouldn’t give us an A-plus; we have a way to go,” he said.

A more contentious issue for Canada’s banks is their role in financing projects that generate environmental concerns. All the resources industries face such issues. The mining, forestry, energy and power sectors often generate controversy with both local populations that are affected by their efforts and advocacy groups. At the TD meeting, Clark argued that banks have different obligations when such projects are carried out in developed, democratic countries vs those destined for the developing world, in which environmental standards may be much lower and the local population may have much less of a voice.

Financial firms have recognized the dichotomy, in part through development of the “equator principles,” which are project-financing guidelines for the developing world that aim to promote responsible environmental stewardship and socially responsible development.

TD is the only one of the Big Five banks that hasn’t signed on to the principles. Many of the world’s biggest banks, including HSBC Group, Citigroup Inc., JP Morgan Chase and Mizuho Corporate Bank are signatories, as is Manulife Financial Corp.

Clark says TD hasn’t signed on simply because it doesn’t finance the sort of projects the guidelines are meant to cover. That said, the principles are being updated and Clark says TD will look at signing the revised version, due for release in the summer, as a matter of principle — even if it still doesn’t apply to TD’s business.

When it comes to clients operating in developed and democratic countries such as Canada, Clark argues that it is not appropriate for a lender to impose its values. As long as its clients are complying with local environmental standards, he suggests, a bank would be abusing its power as a lender to substitute its values for those of the local elected government by putting conditions on projects beyond those imposed by the government.

Even so, Clark notes that the bank is prepared to work with environmental groups to ensure that it is doing enough to make its clients understand any environmental concerns. In fact, TD made a similar pledge earlier this year in response to a shareholder proposal filed by Ethical Funds Co. of Vancouver. TD’s latest proxy notes that it received two proposals from Ethical Funds: one dealing with climate-change risk disclosure and the other with biodiversity protection policies in corporate finance. Both proposals, however, were withdrawn before being put to shareholders.

In the proxy, TD acknowledges the risks associated with climate change for energy-intensive industries it finances and, ultimately, the bank itself. It promises to develop risk-management policies in that area and, if they are deemed material, to disclose them in its financial statements. It also agrees to disclose its responses to the carbon disclosure project, an initiative of institutional investors to assess the business implications of climate change by requesting disclosure from the world’s large companies.

On the biodiversity issue, TD has pledged to meet with interested parties to consider appropriate policy actions, and to report its progress in its 2006 corporate responsibility report.

While TD was the one in the spotlight, all of the banks must be more sensitive to the environmental impacts of their activities — not because of ethics or public relations but for financial reasons. They can’t ignore the fact that environmental issues carry risks.

Demonstrating indifference to the issues can pose a risk to banks’ reputations and, under new capital adequacy guidelines, operational risks must be accounted and provisioned for accordingly. Moreover, environmental issues can become credit risk considerations, particularly as governments ramp up efforts to ensure companies bear a greater cost for the polluting they do.

The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions does not have any guidelines that specifically address banks’ environmental policies. It does, however, give financial institutions general guidance concerning reputational risk, noting that “improving the effectiveness of reputation risk-management practices should be a priority for all financial institutions.”

Banks aren’t the only financial firms that are seeing their fortunes intersect with the interests of environmentalists. It’s also becoming a key issue for some asset managers. At the end of March, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board announced it has signed the enhanced analytics initiative, an effort originated by European fund managers that aims to encourage a broader approach to investment research. The CPPIB, which manages about $92.5 billion, is the first Canadian firm to join the EAI.

Firms that sign on pledge to allocate at least 5% of their annual brokerage commissions to research organizations that analyse the so-called “extra-financial factors” that may affect the long-term value of a company. Factors include regulatory, political, governance and environmental risks. To win the business, analysts will have to provide insight into possible fallout from areas such as pollution, global warming and other risks in a company’s supply chain.

So far, no Canadian brokerage firms qualify for EAI commissions. In January, eight of 31 firms evaluated were deemed eligible to earn the commissions in the first half of 2006: Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, UBS Investment Research, West LB, DrKW, Bernstein Research, CLSA and CM-CIC Securities.

For the money managers, the purpose of the initiative is improving returns. “Our membership in the EAI provides us increased access to data on the material impact of environmental, social and governance factors that will ultimately help us maximize investment returns and minimize investment risk over the long term,” says Don Raymond, CPPIB vice president of public market investments.

So far, equity analysts have proved fairly resistant to such change. A study by the United Nations environment program finance initiative found that the analysts it interviewed “are typically uninformed on many environmental, social and governance issues, and cynical about their materiality. Many are unconvinced that their clients would value environmental, social and governance-focused research, and doubtful that their companies would reward them sufficiently for doing it.”

The fact that asset managers are allocating brokerage commissions for such analysis should go a long way to reducing some of that cynicism. If institutional investors truly believe green issues impact long-term returns, they can only reasonably expect to prove it to brokerage houses by talking with their wallets.

Moreover, the fact that large pension funds are explicitly calling for research that spells out environmental and other non-financial risks is pushing against a legal tradition of excluding such considerations from investment decision-making. In that tradition, pension managers that are mindful of their fiduciary duties can only consider financial factors in making their investment decisions. Trying to “do the right thing” at the expense of returns could earn a lawsuit from plan members.

Yet the line between financial and non-financial factors is becoming increasingly blurred as governments seek to ensure that companies pay more of the cost of their pollution. The imposition of carbon-emission limits and the establishment of markets to trade such permits is putting a price on what were once intangibles. In late April, EU carbon permits were setting new price records as governments in the region mused over the possibility of cutting the number of permits issued after 2007. No longer is pollution just a bad PR risk for companies; it can also impact the bottom line.

Governments are pushing companies that generate pollution to bear the costs, and mainstream institutional investors are demanding more insight into environmental impact. As a result, the banks are growing increasingly sensitive to their own ecological footprints, and the financial services industry’s heartless capitalists may find themselves sharing common ground with the pro-green movement.
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Cdn Banks Can Weather Auto Woes

  
The Globe and Mail, Allan Robinson, 2 May 2006

Canadian banks can withstand the troubles facing the North American auto industry despite the deteriorating credit quality of car manufacturers, said Brenda Lum, managing director of Canadian financial institutions for Dominion Bond Rating Service Ltd.

The domestic bank with the greatest exposure to auto manufacturers is Bank of Nova Scotia, according to a DBRS report. The bank's direct loans outstanding of $4.5-billion to the industry represent 25.1 per cent of its common equity and reserves, it said.

However, unlike some of the other banks, Scotiabank does not disclose separately the loans it makes to car dealers under plans to finance their inventories on the floor, Ms. Lum said. The data also do not include debt from car leases or retail loans.

Bank of Montreal has $551-million in direct loans to car manufacturers or 3.7 per cent of its common equity and reserves; Royal Bank of Canada has $2.6-billion in loans or 12.7 per cent of its capital; and Toronto-Dominion Bank has $1.3-billion in loans or 7.5 per cent of its capital.

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce does not disclose details on its loans to the auto manufacturing sector.

“As an industry, the banks are in good shape and Bank of Nova Scotia has strong earnings and can absorb loan losses should they be higher,” Ms. Lum said. During the past three years, banks have reduced their loans to the industry, she said.

Canadian banks were much more heavily exposed to the telecommunications and cable industry when the tech bubble burst in 2000, according to the report.

The collateralized debt obligation (CDO) markets have also escaped damages arising from recent defaults by auto parts makers such as Collins & Aikman Corp., Delphi Corp. and Dana Corp., according to DBRS.

Typically no single company accounts for more than 1 per cent of the pool of debt obligations within a CDO security and creditors have recovered some of the money owed by the defaulting companies. About 42 per cent of the debt was recovered from Collins & Aikman, while about 60 per cent and 70 per cent, respectively, have been recovered from Delphi and Dana, it said.

In Canada, CDOs outstanding at the end of 2005 totalled $16.9-billion, DBRS said. Exposure to auto makers and auto parts sectors within the CDO market is about 4 per cent, it said.

New York-based Fitch Inc., a credit ratings agency, said recently that auto debt put only a minor dent in CDOs even though Delphi and Dana “experienced a precipitous decline from investment grade to default in a short period.”

Delphi was in 88 per cent of the 173 CDO transactions, while Dana was in 34 per cent of the deals outstanding, according to Fitch.
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01 May 2006

Do All Banks Have Moats?

  
Morningstar, Jim Callahan, 1 May 2006

You might be surprised to hear that nearly all banks have a sustainable competitive advantage--an economic moat. Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger were surprised, too. Buffett once remarked, "Charlie and I have been surprised at how much profitability banks have, given that it seems like a commodity business."

At Morningstar, we've long recognized the moats of banks, and it's nearly impossible to understate their importance. Without a robust analysis of a company's competitive advantage and the sustainability of that advantage over time, investors run the risk of buying one-hit wonders that burn out fast…along with shareholders' money.

At Morningstar, we begin each new analysis with the idea that a company has no economic moat until one is proven. But our financial services team believes that the banking industry offers an exception to the rule. We would argue that every bank has, at a minimum, a narrow economic moat.

To review some fundamentals, an economic moat represents a company's ability to earn returns above its cost of capital and defend its ability to do so over time. After confirming that a company's historical returns on invested capital exceed its cost of capital--the easier task--one must assess the likelihood of those surplus returns persisting in the future, and here's where mistakes can be made.

Below is a table of the most common sources of wide economic moats, a brief description of each, and their application to the banking industry. We will then get into some of the more important moat sources for banks.

The Beauty of the Deposit-Gathering Business

We believe that the true value in the banking industry is in the deposit business. The cost of banks' deposits can vary widely, ranging from market-rate-bearing deposits to non-interest-bearing deposits. This is because deposits, unlike any other form of debt, can generate revenue. (Imagine being paid to take out a mortgage!) When factoring in the income generated from deposit service fees (think ATM charges or overdraft fees), some banks are actually getting paid to hold depositors' funds.

Consider this: Banks can borrow money more cheaply than the U.S. government. The U.S. government is known as a risk-free borrower and, therefore, should command the lowest interest rates on its borrowings in the market. Of the largest banks by asset size, we found a five-year average effective deposit cost (interest costs net of deposit service fees) of 1.14% compared to a 2.13% average short-term Treasury bill over the same time period. In fact, a full 87 of the 113 banks (77%) we analyzed boasted average effective deposit costs below that of Uncle Sam's borrowing rate since 2000, while six banks actually generated deposit fees in excess of their deposit interest costs. Some of the more attractively funded banks we cover, as measured by their average cost of deposits over the last five years, include TCF Financial, Provident Bankshares, and Cullen/Frost Bankers.

The Advantage of Regulation

We believe that the heavy regulation of the past provided many banks a head start toward their dominant market shares. After the Great Depression, the banking industry became highly regulated. Banks were essentially granted government licenses to operate their depository and lending operations within a specified state or even county.

Further, banks were required to pay depository insurance, allowing the government to guarantee bank customers security from bank runs. The result was that, for any given operating area, one bank dominated the market, had barriers protecting it from new entrants, and was given below-market funding due to the risk-free nature of the deposit business. As long as the bank's borrowers didn't default, it was almost guaranteed a profit based upon the spread earned between the cheap funding and the interest rate on its loans. (Further, since the industry became highly fragmented, numerous banks--each operating within their own small market--often had loan officers and customers that developed deep relationships that lasted for years.)

Over the decades, of course, things have changed. Banks can apply for a charter to operate in any state and can engage in many nonbanking businesses, such as investment banking, asset management, and insurance brokerage. But the foundation upon which the industry was formed is still present. The banks that dominated certain cities 75 years ago remain (in various forms) today. Think of Wells Fargo in San Francisco, Fifth Third in Cincinnati, and Washington Mutual in Seattle. We believe that this stems from banks' integral roles within their respective communities: In assessing risk, they must know a borrower well, and in making loans, a bank is essentially financing the growth of a community over time.

Switching Costs

On a related note, we'd highlight the surprisingly high switching costs in the industry. Now, at first glance, it would appear easy enough to switch accounts from one bank to another. However, on average, deposits have proven to be fairly "sticky."

The development of alternative distribution channels--first ATMs, then in-store branches, then Internet banking---have made banks more accessible to customers. This availability lowers the chance of a customer leaving simply because a competing bank's branch is more convenient to, say, the workplace or school. Online bill payment and automatic direct deposits further increase a deposit account's "stickiness." It can be tedious setting up payees and dollar amounts upon initiating an online bill payments, making the thought of switching to another bank and having to go through the process again somewhat of a mini-barrier to exit. (We say mini-barrier because, as we speak, various technology firms are developing software to help transfer such information from one bank to another with the simple click of a button.) The bottom line is that the average life of a deposit account is surprisingly long, offering banks more opportunities to earn the spread between its borrowing and lending activities.

A Caveat: International Banks

The U.S. market is somewhat of a special case. Our comments thus far have focused on the U.S. banking industry, and the biggest difference when looking beyond the domestic banking market is that, unlike in the U.S., many countries' banking industries are largely consolidated. In fact, the U.S. ranks as one of the most fragmented banking industries in the world. Although the moat characteristics we've described broadly apply to the international banks we follow, there are exceptions to the rule, and we'd advise thorough research prior to investing internationally. (See our two-part article from January on how we approach investing in international banks.)

Conclusion

Banks are good businesses because of their fundamental design. Although many believe that banking is a commodity business, we believe that the basic business of banking and the industry's average profitability tell investors something different. Simply put, the proof of the industry's narrow economic moat is in the numbers: The average bank over the last 15 years has generated a 13%-14% tangible return on equity, above our 10%-11% estimated cost of capital. Those are the kind of numbers that turned the heads of Buffett and Munger.

A quick review of Morningstar's bank coverage reveals 59 domestic banks and 29 international banks. Of the domestic banks, 49 have narrow moats and 10 have wide moats. Currently, we believe the best investment opportunities are in large-cap, wide-moat banks, and we encourage investors to take a closer look.
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Sources of Economic Moats:

1. Factor: Intangible assets (brands, patents, government licenses, etc.)

Description: Unique non-physical assets that limit competition or allow a firm to charge higher prices.

Application to Banks: Regulation played a more important role historically, and we believe that the industry will continue its long-term trend of deregulation.

2. Factor: Cost advantage

Description: Important for commoditylike industries in which pricing power is nil. This advantage is often created through economies of scale.

Application to Banks: How a bank funds its loans plays a big role in its profitability-- banks have access to lower-cost funding than most other businesses.

3. Factor: High customer switching costs

Description: When customers are willing to pay higher prices for their convenience or because they can't easily get serviced elsewhere.

Application to Banks: Banks have surprisingly high switching costs.

4. Factor: Network effect

Description: A rare factor most often seen in technology industries, this is the widespread adoption of a first-mover's product or service until it becomes the standard.

Application to Banks: Not applicable to nearly all banks.
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28 April 2006

Sun Life Q1 2006 Earnings

  
Scotia Capital, 28 April 2006

Q1/06 - Slight miss due to unfavourable claims experience

• Sun Life reported Q1/06 operating EPS (f.d.) of $0.84 vs $0.77 for 9% YOY growth, $0.02 below our estimate, and $0.02 below consensus. Given the favourable economic "tail winds" (buoyant markets, excellent credit environment, rising long term rates) we believe the "miss," largely due to modestly unfavourable claims experience in both the U.S. and Canadian group insurance segments, was somewhat disappointing.

• Mixed results. What was likely needed to boost the stock just wasn't there this quarter. We believe Sun Life needs to have, amongst other things, exceptionally better-than-industry sales growth in U.S. variable annuity, positive net flows in U.S. variable annuity, increasingly positive net flows at MFS and significant margin improvement at MFS before we can ascribe an increasing multiple (relative to the group) to the stock. Unfortunately this wasn't the case in Q1/06.

• But relatively favourable macro-environment and hint of increasing buy-back activity should continue to provide support. The combined impact of rising interest rates, which help to mitigate spread compression concerns, buoyant markets, good credit, lots of buyback support, and a payout ratio still at the low end of the targeted 30%-40% range, should continue to provide support. Management indicated the company would likely increase the pace of share buybacks going forward (from the 2 million shares in Q1/06, most of which were in March), suggesting the company definitely will meet if not exceed its targeted $500 million spend on annual share buybacks.

• Still a "show me story" - and not showing positive net sales in either U.S. variable annuity or U.S. mutual funds, and showing no significant improvement in U.S. variable annuity market share. Although we find the 24% increase in U.S. variable annuity (VA) sales encouraging (after increasing 10% at Q4/05), we expect only very modest market share improvement at best, especially given that exceptional results from other U.S. lifecos so far this quarter (Ameriprise's U.S. VA sales were up 70%, Genworth's were up 50%, MetLife's were up 57% and Harford's were flat, after declining sharply for several quarters). With total sales growth from these five players, including Sun Life, up 25% (we would expect this figure to increase when we include traditional players such as Prudential, Lincoln and Manulife) we expect the company will gain little in the way of market share in the U.S. VA market, despite the $10 million spent in expanding its distribution. More importantly, net sales continue to be negative, and, with a large block of single manager variable annuity business with a current duration of 5-7 years, we expect this trend to continue, despite the improvement in gross sales. Finally, weaker-than-expected net sales in both retail mutual funds and institutional business, largely due to a "poor" January per management, contributed to a disappointing negative US$300 million in net sales at MFS. Management indicated flows at MFS were positive in February and March of 2006.

• Margin improvement at MFS due in part to the transfer of money losing retirement services operation from MFS to U.S. annuities. The company noted that pre-tax margins at MFS (10% of SLF's bottom line) improved 300 bps, with about 150 bps due to the transfer of a retirement services operation from MFS to SLF's U.S. annuity segment, and another 150 bps due to operational improvements. The retirement services operation, which lost US$4 million in Q1/06, includes roughly US$6 million in revenue and US$10 million in expenses in the quarter, and about US$15 billion in assets. While the transfer of this retirement services business makes MFS look better (we look for 18% CAGR earnings growth, ex f/x through 2007), the only way for a meaningful impact on SLF's bottom line is for the company's U.S. annuity segment to turn this business around. With little experience in the retirement services business, we remain somewhat sceptical.

• Canadian segment (50% of bottom line) reported a disappointing 4% YOY decline in earnings over a strong Q1/05 due to unfavourable group claims experience. Group long term disability claims experience, an often volatile business, contributed, in part, to the decline, as did a slight decline in the earnings contribution from SLF's 34% interest in CI funds. The 12% CAGR the Canadian operations had from 2003 through 2005 certainly benefited from CI's 38% CAGR over the same period. Excluding CI, earnings for Sun Life's Canadian division grew 9% (CAGR) over the same period, and just 6% in 2005. We expect 7% growth in 2006 and 10% growth in 2007, respectively, for the segment, assuming a return to a more "normal" claims experience in the group insurance segment.

• For the U.S. division we look for steady 11% growth (CAGR, ex fx) through 2007. Despite the somewhat mixed outlook for average asset growth in the U.S. annuity segment (for a business in which average assets increased ex f/x just 1% CAGR from 2002 through 2005, we forecast just 2% CAGR through 2007 largely due to continued negative net flows) we expect rising interest rates and continued buoyant markets to allow for margin improvement. Whether it be a yield pick-up program for the company's U.S. fixed annuity business (by investing at longer durations than the liability portfolio) or an innovative "surplus" type funding of U.S. individual AXXX reserves (whereby the company uses internal funds rather than bank letters of credit (LOC) to fund these reserve requirements thus generating additional yield and saving the LOC costs), Sun Life has done a very good job of engineering stable earnings growth in its U.S. division, despite the drag of currency. The yield pick-up in the U.S. fixed annuity business was the prominent contributor to the 64% YOY earnings growth in the U.S. division in Q1/06 (ex f/x), over a very poor Q1/05 that had a significant amount of reserve strengthening. Our 11% growth assumption assumes group insurance claims experience will return to more normalized levels. Poor group insurance claims experience was the primary contributor to the 22% QOQ decline in earnings for the division.

• CMG Asia acquisition progressing well and provides the necessary catalyst ($0.05 accretion in 2006, $0.07 accretion in 2007) for the company to exceed 10% EPS growth target in 2006 despite currency headwinds. We look for 11% EPS growth in 2006 and 10% in 2007, which combined with aggressive buyback levels should add 100 bps to ROE over the next two years, just shy of the company's target of 75 bps per year.

• We expect 100 bps improvement in ROE over next two years - 50 bps shy of target - which might suggest the company needs to do something other than buy back stock. With an estimated $1.5 billion in excess capital, we believe the company continues to look for deals. Our impression is prices are too high and the company remains patient. With the CFO set to leave within the next 10 months, and an expected detailed search for a replacement underway, we remain somewhat sceptical as to whether a large and/or complicated deal gets done before the end of the year. Clearly smaller and simple deals, largely accretive, like the CMG Asia acquisition ($560 million spend with $0.05-$0.07 per share accretion) are ideal.

• Asset quality remains strong. Net impaireds at 18 bps remain exceptionally low. With only 3% of bonds below investment grade, we believe Sun Life’s balance sheet is well protected should the credit environment become unfavourable.
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